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This thesis examines the role played by the concept of aggression in international 
relations, in order to reveal fresh insight into the nature of international society. 
In the first chapter, the concept of aggression is located within its theoretical 
context, with particular reference to the writings of certain realists, liberals, and 
international society theorists. The following chapters then assess the significance 
of the concept of aggression in the practice of international relations from the 
early twentieth century period onwards. Thus, chapter two looks at the concept of 
aggression in the post-World War One Treaty of Versailles peace agreement, 
including its importance in the US Senate’s decision not to ratify that agreement. 
Subsequently, chapter three examines aggression in the context of the policy­
making and procedures of the League of Nations prior to World War Two. In the 
aftermath of this conflict, chapter four considers how the crime of aggression 
came to be the key charge laid against Nazi leaders at the International Military 
Tribunal held at Nuremberg from 1945-1946, and chapter five goes on to look at 
the crime of aggression’s role at the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East in Tokyo from 1946-1948. The re-emergence of the concept of aggression in 
the Charter of the United Nations, and this organisation’s long struggle to ‘define’ 
aggression for the purposes of international peace and security are the focus of 
chapter six. The work of various UN organs towards achieving these purposes, 
and the part played by the concept of aggression in this work, feature in chapter 
seven. In chapters eight and nine, attention is turned to efforts since Nuremberg 
and Tokyo to entrench aggression as an offence against international criminal law, 
most recently at the 1998 Rome Conference on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court. The final part of the thesis makes some concluding 
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Chapter One: The Concept of Aggression in International Relations
It will be argued in this thesis that prevailing international political conditions 
strongly influence how moral and legal impulses compelling the further evolution 
of the concept of aggression play out in practice. However, the significance of the 
concept of aggression in international relations cannot simply be explained by 
reference to power politics: it has made a positive contribution to the
understanding of international relations. Before developing this argument further, 
it is first necessary to examine more closely what we mean by the concept of 
aggression.
(1) The Problem of Aggression
While ‘aggression’ remains a highly contested concept, with very little agreement 
on its definition or scope, it is possible to identify two elements of the notion 
which are more or less accepted as fundamental:
(a) A use of international armed force; and
(b) The judgment of that use as wrong.
Broadly, these features of the concept of aggression correspond with the general 
division of international conduct into processes of coercion and processes of 
decision as developed by McDougal and Feliciano1. We shall now look at each of 
these aspects in turn.
(a) A Use of International Armed Force
The level of anarchy present in the international sphere makes it unsurprising that 
states use varying degrees of coercion, or force, in their relations with one 
another. With no mechanisms for the promulgation of international legislation, no 
centralised international law enforcement agency or compulsory jurisdiction for
1 Myres S McDougal and Florentino P Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). The view of law as a social process developed by 
McDougal was later discussed and partially endorsed in Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society 
London: Macmillan, 1977), ppl27-128.
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the adjudication of international disputes, self-help remains one of the most 
effective means available to states for the defence or assertion of their rights and 
interests. In practice, most states have at their disposal a range of tools for 
exerting force over others, which fall into one of four categories: diplomatic, 
ideological, economic and military2. However, stronger states, with greater 
material resources, are likely to succeed more frequently in asserting their rights 
and interests by recourse to these tools than weaker states, with fewer material 
resources.
What types of force are relevant where aggression is concerned? As we shall see, 
much time and effort has been devoted to answering this question, with little 
resulting consensus. As regards military, or armed, force -  the most serious form 
of coercion -  a majority would accept instances of invasion, annexation or 
occupation of a state by another state, as circumstances which, at first instance, 
would strongly support a determination of aggression. However, beyond this 
extreme, it is not possible to generalize. Less grave uses of armed force, such as 
border skirmishes, may or may not be considered as aggression. Moreover, many 
states have sought to promote the ideas of ‘economic aggression’ and, especially 
during the Cold War, ‘ideological aggression’, but these have not attracted the 
same level of diplomatic support as a notion of aggression which targets military 
actions. Thus, a minimum precondition of aggression is a use of armed force 
across state boundaries.
(bl The Judgment of A Use of International Armed Force as Wrong
However, the concept of aggression denotes more than just the existence of a 
particular use of international armed force; it simultaneously labels such use as 
wrong. Hence, this aspect of the concept of aggression is about assigning 
responsibility for deeds done, meting out punishment, and/or creating an effective 
deterrent, all of which raise moral and legal issues.
2 McDougal et al, Law and Minimum World Public Order, p28.
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It is this moral and legal element in the concept of aggression which is the most 
problematic, as it rests on a number of assumptions about international life which 
are by no means settled. Firstly, the concept of aggression makes an assumption 
about international standards: by denouncing particular, international acts, it 
implies that standards of international conduct exist which are universally, or 
near-universally, recognized by states as authoritative. This assumption leads to a 
second: that some international authorities exist which can act as final arbiter of 
such standards, putting an end to incessant debate about them through binding 
interpretation, enforcement, amendment and reconciliation. A third assumption 
made by the concept of aggression concerns the moral value o f  peace. By 
condemning, at minimum, the most grave military actions a state can carry out in 
the international arena, the concept of aggression necessarily asserts that peace is 
a morally good thing. Although not a faulty assertion in itself, in practice it leads 
to the inescapable conclusion that the status quo immediately prior to the 
allegedly aggressive act holds positive moral value, a much more contentious 
proposition. By contrast, the mere existence of a use of international armed force 
-  the first precondition of aggression - says little about the moral value or 
otherwise of the pre-existing status quo. Fourthly, the concept of aggression 
makes an assumption about the existence of international rules o f procedure: it 
assumes that in certain circumstances, some states are entitled to judge, while 
other states are entitled to be judged.
Before examining what theories of world politics have to say about aggression, 
certain observations about its two fundamental elements are worth noting. Firstly, 
important level of analysis issues are raised by the two elements, both individually 
and in combination. In relation to the first element, reference to a use of 
international armed force presupposes a state-centric approach to aggression, but 
what about the situation where a non-state actor located in state X occupies part of 
the territory of state Y, for example? Could this equally qualify as aggression? 
On occasion, the armed activities of non-state actors have been denounced at the 
international level as aggression3; however, this has been a rare occurrence. More
3 See, for example, SC Res 496 of 15 December 1981 and SC Res 507 of 28 May 1982, both 
condemning “mercenary aggression” committed against the Seychelles.
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frequently, aggression relates to state conduct as and between themselves, and this 
remains the predominant focus of this thesis.
In relation to the second element, the level of analysis problem concerns whether 
it is to the state or to the individual that moral and/or legal responsibility for 
aggression can and should be attributed. This question represents another theme 
running through international discussions about aggression, and forms part of the 
wider, continuing debate about agency in international relations4. Though 
occasional suggestions to develop the concept of aggression as a state offence 
contrary to international criminal law have been identified5, the most significant 
developments in this context have been achieved in relation to individual criminal 
responsibility for aggression. Thus, in the chapters dealing with the prosecution 
of aggression as an international crime at Nuremberg and Tokyo, it has been 
necessary to examine both state and individual conduct in assessing the 
significance of the concept of aggression in world affairs.
Reconciling this tension between, on the one hand, aggression as a particular 
military act by a state against international order, and, on the other, aggression as 
an act committed by an individual in breach of international criminal law, remains 
one of the basic challenges posed to the further evolution of the concept. Current 
efforts towards this goal are examined in more detail in the postscript to this 
thesis. For the moment, it is sufficient simply to be aware of this tension at the 
heart of the concept of aggression.
(2) The Concept of Aggression in International Theory
Already, our discussion of the problem of aggression has raised a number of 
issues around which theories of world politics have developed. From the 
discussions above, it is also evident that insights from international law will also
4 On this debate, see, for example, Toni Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral 
Agents: The Case of States and Quasi-States’, Ethics and International Affairs 15 (2001), pp67- 
85; Chris Brown, ‘Moral Agency and International Society’, Ethics and International Affairs 15 
(2001), pp87-98; and Barry Buzan, ‘The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations 
Reconsidered’, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory Today 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1995).
5 In particular, see chapter eight of this thesis.
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have an important part to play in assessing the significance of the concept of 
aggression in international relations. We will now turn to the political and legal 
literature in order to gain a better understanding of the role of aggression in 
international theory.
(a) Liberalism
Although liberal thought in the context of international relations has developed in 
a range of different directions, and contains within itself many variations of view, 
it is possible to identify certain major themes which unify this perspective. In 
particular, liberals assume that progress is inevitable and consider realism, 
discussed below, a dangerous and inaccurate interpretation of world affairs. 
Realism’s state-centric approach to international relations is an especially 
prominent focus of criticism for liberals, who often argue that an analogy can be 
drawn between the relationship between individuals within a state on the one 
hand, and relations between states on the other6. A central concern of liberal 
thought is the eradication of anarchy in the international sphere in favour of the 
rule of law; to this end, the following main themes have evolved:
(i) that the best way to secure world peace is through the global 
proliferation of democratic institutions;
n
(ii) that cooperation, based on the harmony of interests between 
states, in international relations is a more significant factor than 
competition;
(iii)that dispute resolution among states can be achieved through 
recognized judicial procedures; and
(iv)that international security can only be assured through collective 
measures that overcome the balance of power and the need to 
resort to self-help.
6 Frequently referred to as the ‘domestic analogy’. For further discussion of the domestic analogy 
in international relations theory, see Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order 
Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
7 The “natural harmony of interests” among states is a phrase used in Norman Angell’s work, The 
Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1910).
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This fourth theme is especially relevant, as it is within the context of efforts 
during World War One to develop for the future an international collective 
security scheme that the concept of aggression first emerged in modem times. 
The aim of collective security was a general agreement among participating states 
to take united action against any state which threatened the independence or 
integrity of any of the participants. The rationale behind collective security was 
that ‘aggression’ by one or more states was both the precursor and cause o f war; 
thus, if states could agree to cooperate in confronting all instances of aggression - 
and this agreement was supported by disarmament, the growth of international 
political institutions and the achievement of other liberal goals - then war would 
be eliminated from international relations. As a consequence, aggression formed 
both the practical target, and the triggering mechanism of communal response 
under collective security arrangements. From the liberal perspective, therefore, 
once states had agreed to the establishment of a collective security regime, the 
maintenance of international security was simply a matter of participants 
recognizing aggression as it arose in practice and responding accordingly. Any 
difficulty experienced in recognizing aggression could be easily overcome 
through the development of international mles and procedures, such as an 
international definition of aggression.
Liberal thinking generally was particularly popular in the interwar period, 
capturing the imagination of academics, politicians, philosophers, and ordinary
Q
people alike . One commentator who devoted much time to the pursuit of 
effective collective security through the development of international procedures 
for recognizing aggression was Quincy Wright. In 1935 he advocated a test of 
aggression based on a state’s lack of compliance with international dispute 
settlement procedures, irrespective of the merits of the conflict. As long as his 
test was applied quickly after the outbreak of hostilities, Wright argued that the 
test was not “contrary to justice or impracticable”, but in fact “necessary”9.
8 For instance, see RH Tawney, Equality (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931); JS Bury, The Idea o f  
Progress (New York: Dover Publications Inc, 1955; first published 1920); Leonard Hobhouse,
The Elements o f  Social Justice (London: Allen and Unwin, 1922) and Social Development 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1924); and John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: 
Putnam, 1935).
9 Wright’s response to criticism from Hersch Lauterpacht in The Function o f  Law in the 
International Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p82, quoted in Quincy Wright, ‘The
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Rather, it was through rapid application of the test that “substantial justice”10 
between the parties could be achieved.
More than twenty years later, Wright’s view had changed somewhat. Certainly, 
he maintained his view that a “definition of aggression is clearly vital to this 
objective of eliminating war, both legally and materially” 11. In addition, he 
continued to oppose self-help and the balance of power as means of achieving 
international security, contending that many states are unable to obtain even 
average levels of security by these methods, “at least without costs which will
1 9seriously impair their economic and social progress” . However, now apparently
more sensitive to criticisms of his test of aggression on justice grounds, Wright
1 1
argued that aggression was a rule of order, not a principle of justice . He pointed 
out that from League discussions about aggression onwards, it had generally been 
acknowledged that the prohibition of the use of military force must be categorized 
as a rule of order, separate from the merits of an international dispute, and so:
“The effort to identify aggression with ‘unjust war’...is quite 
contrary to the conception of aggression used in League of Nations 
and United Nations discussions. It would mark the abandonment of 
the efforts to prevent hostilities by law.. ,”14
From this perspective, then, the overriding purpose of the concept of aggression 
was to help abolish war from the international stage, thereby contributing to the
Concept of Aggression in International Law’ American Journal o f  International Law 29 (1935), 
pp373-395.
10 Wright, ‘The Concept of Aggression in International Law’, p393.
11 Quincy Wright, The Role o f  International Law in the Elimination o f  War (Manchester: 
Manchester Uni Press, 1961), p59.
12 Quincy Wright, ‘The Prevention of Aggression’ American Journal o f  International Law 50 
(1956), pp514-532, at p519.
13 Wright, The Role o f  International Law in the Elimination o f  War, p64.
14 Wright, The Role o f  International Law in the Elimination o f  War, p65. Subsequently, Y oram 
Dinstein too has argued that there is no room for the resurrection o f ‘just war’ considerations in 
relation to the UN Charter or its notion of aggression, a view which he points out has been 
endorsed by Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua (Merits) case: Yoram 
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
pp89-90. However, Dinstein also refers to article 43 of the UN Charter -  the essential collective 
security provision, which creates an obligation on members to negotiate special agreements to 
make their armed forces available to the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and 
security. He concedes that while this provision continues to lay dormant, states must rely on their 
own resources to counteract unlawful uses of force, and therefore self-help remains today the 
primary form of international redress: p255.
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achievement of international peace. This, and not the pursuit of justice per se, 
was the most important priority in the international sphere.
(b) Realism
While, like liberalism, realism is by no means a homogeneous world view, its 
characteristic features were set out at length by Morgenthau in his classic work on 
international relations15. He argued, inter alia, that the rules governing politics 
originate from human nature, that a state’s national interest is best defined in 
terms of power, and that this interest fluctuates in meaning. According to realists 
then, all international politics is about a struggle for power among states.
Of particular relevance to the concept of aggression, Morgenthau contended that 
while realism “is aware of the moral significance of political action”16, it rejects 
the idea that universal moral principles in the abstract can themselves be applied 
to state conduct. Instead, he claimed that “they must be filtered through the 
concrete circumstances of time and place”17. Although individuals are morally 
entitled to make their own sacrifices in defence of their moral principles, states do 
not have the same right to allow their moral disapproval of particular conduct to 
“get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle
• ,  t oof national survival” . Prudence -  defined as “consideration of the political 
consequences of seemingly moral action”19 -  is the ultimate value in international 
politics.
In addition, Morgenthau claimed, realism views international politics as an 
autonomous, clearly defined field, entirely distinct from other research fields. He 
identified two consequences of this approach: (1) realists do not equate the moral
15 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1956; first published 1948).
16 171819 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p9. The point Morgenthau seems to be making
here is that states are not entitled to prioritise their opposition to an issue -  based on their own
indigenous moral values - at the expense of political conduct in pursuit of national survival -
perhaps the only objective common to all states in international politics. Implicitly, this
acknowledges that states have the capacity for moral approval or disapproval of the actions of
other states. However, later, Morgenthau dismisses this possibility: “ ...a moral rule of conduct
requires an individual conscience from which it emanates, and there is no individual conscience
from which what we call the international morality of Great Britain or of any other nation could
emanate”: p225.
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aims of a specific state with the moral principles ruling the universe; and (2) 
realists subordinate non-political “standards of thought”20 to the political in their 
analysis, at the same time as rejecting outright the imposition by other fields of 
their non-political standards on the political realm. In this latter regard, the 
“legalistic-moralistic”21 approach to international politics is a notable offender: 
“to know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to 
know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite 
another”22.
Though adamant about keeping international political thought free from incursion 
by other, non-political disciplines, Morgenthau did acknowledge the historical 
existence of an international society of states, within which international morality 
had operated23. Within this society, international morality had provided an 
“effective system of restraints”24. However, he argues that the shift from 
aristocratic government to “the democratic selection and responsibility of 
government officials”25 transformed “international morality as a system of moral
9 f trestraints from a reality to a mere figure of speech” . Further, Morgenthau 
contended that nationalism ushered in “morally self-sufficient national 
communities”27, thus ending international society. These events have 
fundamentally altered the relationship between universal moral principles and 
national moral values in two ways. Firstly, they have “weakened, to the point of 
ineffectiveness, the universal, supranational moral rules of conduct, which before
the age of nationalism had imposed a system -  however precarious and wide-
28meshed -  of limitations upon the foreign policies of individual nations” . 
Secondly, they have “greatly strengthened the tendency of individual nations to
• 9 9endow their particular national systems of ethics with universal validity” .
This latter observation was central to Carr’s critique of interwar liberalism, or 
‘utopianism’, and its supposedly universal standards . Similarly to Morgenthau, 
Carr argued that these standards were not universal at all but merely the
20 2 i 22 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p i0-11.
23 24 25 26 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp224-226.
27 28 29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p228.
30 See EH Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan and Co., 1939).
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“unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of 
national interest at a particular time”31. Carr contended “slogans like ‘collective 
security’ and ‘resistance to aggression’ serve the same purpose of proclaiming an 
identity of interest between the dominant group and the world as a whole in the 
maintenance of peace”32. It was impossible for Utopians to escape this “identity 
of interest”33, and hence no objective, universal standard of international conduct 
could be achieved; the application of so-called ‘universal’ principles in practice 
would simply reveal themselves as “transparent disguises of selfish vested 
interests”34. Consequently, Carr’s stark and scathing analysis on this front refuted 
a priori the possibility of the existence of an international society35 -  a concession 
that even Morgenthau had made. To Carr then, the concept of aggression was 
little more than a ruse by those powers most favoured by the status quo -  relying 
on the international promotion of peace as a moral value -  to delegitimise conduct 
most threatening to that status quo, thereby protecting their vital interests.
The characterization put forward by Morgenthau of world politics as an eternal 
battle for power among states clearly forms the foundation of Stone’s works on 
international aggression. In accordance with realist theory, and writing just after 
the General Assembly passed its own resolution defining aggression36, Stone 
claimed that the concept of aggression acts simply as a tool of political warfare
XIamong states . He flatly denied the ‘need’ for a definition of aggression for the 
purpose of maintaining international order effectively, and countered that, in fact, 
a definition of aggression is unviable, unacceptable to states and in any case 
undesirable, for a great number of reasons. Stone’s argument directly attacks 
many of the assumptions about world politics underlying the concept of 
aggression identified above.
31 33 34 EH Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001; with a new introduction by
Michael Cox), p80.
32 EH Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (2001 edition), p76.
35 See Michael Cox, 'Introduction', in EH Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (2001 edition), p xiv.
36 see GA Res 3314 of 14 December 1974. Hereafter the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression.
37 Julius Stone, Conflict Through Consensus (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1977), ppl 23-152.
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In relation to the assumption about universal standards, Stone claimed that while 
each state continues to pursue its own vested interests, it will seek to protect these 
by branding as ‘aggression’ conduct which threatens them. The heterogeneity of 
states ensures that differences in both the substance and priority of their vested 
interests emerge. Thus, disagreement ensues as to what conduct constitutes 
aggression, as each state seeks to assert, and attract support for, a universally- 
recognised concept which reflects its own preferences, in order to gain and 
maintain advantage over other states. As a result, the international debates about 
aggression directly reflect the rivalry between the most and least powerful states 
in international politics; they are not genuine attempts to reach by consensus an 
internationally authoritative concept of aggression to act as the triggering 
mechanism in a fully-functional collective security system. Consequently, in 
Stone’s view, the real standards used by states to evaluate the various draft 
definitions of aggression are:
(i) “whether the proposed definition would stigmatise as 
aggression, action which that state may in some yet unforeseen 
but not unforeseeable future circumstances feel justified and 
even compelled to take; and
(ii) whether the indirect effect of the definition is such as to grant 
an excessive licence for illegal and predatory activities by other 
states, by condemning as ‘aggression’ the only kind of 
vindication of violated rights which may in fact be available.”38
The relatively high level of uncertainty in the international arena over the longer 
term means that states have a strong incentive to safeguard their freedom of action 
by ensuring maximum flexibility for themselves in any universally-endorsed 
definition of aggression. As a result, draft ‘definitions’ of aggression merely 
preserve within their own terms differences of views among states. This allows 
sufficient ambiguity of language that political arguments about aggression can 
continue to be fought under the cloak of legal conflicts of interpretation. Thus, 
states remain free to unilaterally accuse each other of aggression, which they
38 Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1958), ppl06-107.
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usually do in an attempt to harness the emotive value of this term39 and gain 
political support for their cause both domestically and abroad. Just as 
Morgenthau had dismissed modem references to international morality as a 
“figure of speech”, Stone described the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression as a “verbal tour de force”, rather than “ a miraculous conversion of 
strategic political and economic conflicts into a harmonious consensus”40.
Lastly, Stone raised challenges to another two of the concept of aggression’s 
founding assumptions -  namely, the existence of international authorities to 
uphold supposedly universal standards of state conduct, and the moral value of 
peace. He emphasized that:
“the international community lacks any collective means of 
vindication of violated legal rights, as well as any collective means 
of legislative adjustment of new conflicting claims, or even of 
existing legal rights.”41
On this basis, Stone pointed out that an internationally-endorsed definition of 
aggression would protect indefinitely existing injustices from redress. Such a 
definition could not be expected to perform tasks normally undertaken at the 
domestic level by comprehensive and sophisticated bodies of constitutional and 
criminal law, simply because these have not sufficiently developed in the 
international sphere42.
In a similar vein, Babic argued that the crime of aggression really amounts to a 
crime against defeat, and thus its nature is political, not legal or moral43. To him, 
the cost of incorporating the concept of aggression into international law is the 
loss of the concept of war, which is unwarranted in the absence of a world state44. 
In Babic’s view, the concept of aggression reduces war to a type of police
39 Stone did not deny the emotional, symbolic appeal o f the concept of aggression, but doubted 
that this appeal on its own could compel the operation of an effective collective security system 
with ‘aggression’ as the trigger.
40 Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, p i9.
41 Stone, Aggression and World Order, p53.
42 Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, ppl57-158.
43 J Babic, 'War Crimes: Moral, Legal, or Simply Political?’ in A Jokic (ed), War Crimes and 
Collective Wrongdoing (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001), pp57-71 atp63.
44 Babic, W ar Crimes: Moral, Legal, or Simply Political?', p64.
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measure, with the moral correctness or incorrectness of each side already decided 
before military action takes place; Babic refers to this as the “right of victory”45. 
By contrast, the traditional rules of warfare dictate that adversaries entering war 
must accept the outcome as just. The only basis in support of a ‘right of victory’ 
is naked power, and thus the subjective and prior determination of which side is 
entitled to the right of victory -  necessarily assumed by the introduction of the 
concept of aggression into international law - ensures that crimes against peace 
remain a political tool used by the powerful, without moral or legal resonance46.
From the realist perspective, therefore, the concept of aggression holds no 
intrinsic value of its own, but simply represents yet another topic in relation to 
which states compete to assert their vital interests, defined in terms of power.
(c) International Society
While Morgenthau argued that international society was destroyed by the advent 
of nationalism, a third approach to world politics asserts that international society 
still exists today, and is worthy of academic attention in and of itself. It is 
contended that international society did not disappear at the end of the nineteenth 
century, but merely changed from a European international society into a 
worldwide international society with its European origins intact47. Hence, the 
social context in which the state operates forms the primary research focus of this 
approach.
According to Wight, international society represents the “most comprehensive 
form of society on earth”48, and possesses four idiosyncracies:
45 Babic, W ar Crimes: Moral, Legal, or Simply Political?', p63.
46 However, it appears that Babic acknowledges the law plays some role in the regulation of wan 
“starting a war is, from the perspective o f the status quo ante, a violation of the established state 
and therefore a violation of international contract”: p63.
47 See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion o f  International Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1984) and Adam Watson, The Evolution o f  International Society (London: Routledge, 
1992).
48 Martin Wight, Power Politics (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1999; first published 1946; 
revised and expanded edition published 1978 and edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad), 
p i 06.
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(1) It is a unique entity, with its “prime and immediate” membership being 
comprised of states, which themselves are societies, though of a more 
developed kind;
(2) As a result of (1), membership of international society is always small, 
compared with the populations of most states;
(3) As a result of (2), there is great diversity among member states on virtually 
all of their features, such as geography, population, and resource. “There 
is no average state.
(4) Generally, members of international society are immortal. Occasionally, 
states implode, explode or quietly cease to exist, but more often than not 
they survive longer than individuals do.
A consequence of (4), Wight continued, is that international society will be looser 
than a national society. Thus, international society -  as a society of immortals -  
“cannot easily coerce a recalcitrant member if consensus breaks down, and it 
cannot ask of its members the self-sacrifice which states in certain circumstances 
ask of individuals”50. Similarly, international society will not be able to “attribute 
moral responsibility to its members in the same way as it can to individuals”51. 
Wight contended that there are “moral difficulties” with assigning responsibility 
to states, because such assignment produces suffering on the part of the “passive 
majority”53 of individuals for the conduct of the “criminal minority”54. From 
these comments, we can infer just how ‘loose’ Wight believed international 
society to be. He was skeptical of international society’s capacity for combatting 
recalcitrance, such as aggression, where political consensus was absent. Further, 
while implicitly acknowledging the theoretical possibility of international society 
holding a state responsible for aggression, Wight did not believe this could be 
done easily, or that the way individuals were held morally responsible offered 
much guidance on this matter.
Against this ‘looseness’ of international society, what is perhaps most interesting 
is Wight’s recognition of that society’s ability to assign moral responsibility to
49 Wight, Power Politics, pi 07.
50 si 5253 54 wight, Power Politics, pl07. From the context, it seems clear that "criminal minority"
denoted those individuals in serious breach of moral, rather than legal, standards of conduct.
21
individuals at all. This statement is hard to reconcile with Wight’s view of 
international law, though it does reveal the importance he placed on the moral 
element within international society. To Wight, although international law 
provided the best proof of the existence of international society, he claimed that 
states, not individuals, are the subject of international law, and that the aim of 
international law is “to define the rights and duties of one state, acting on behalf 
of its nationals, towards other states”55. Despite the significance of international 
law as an indicator of international society, Wight openly admitted the former’s 
limitations: without international legislation, most international law is comprised 
of treaties; only states can enforce international law in the absence of an 
international executive; and the lack of international judiciary with compulsory 
jurisdiction56. These constraints add support to Wight’s argument about the 
relative ‘looseness’ of international society, though at the same time they suggest 
Wight was only too aware of the pitfalls of relying too heavily on international 
law as evidence of his own argument.
Legal considerations aside, it is clear that Wight viewed moral values as an 
important feature of any properly functioning international society. He blamed a 
lack of “moral solidarity”57 for the failure of the League of Nations. In addition, 
he rejected the argument that the moral significance of the Nuremberg verdict was 
entirely destroyed by the fact that it was imposed by the victorious powers on the 
vanquished, stating that “such a judgement ignores the part played by political
CO
power in the development of law and freedom” . Aggression was the key charge 
against the top Nazis at the Nuremberg trial. It is apparent then, that Wight fully 
appreciated the significance of political factors in light of international society’s 
unique characteristics and the resultant limitations of international law, but 
nevertheless upheld the importance of international morality within these 
parameters. This suggests that the mere fact of political influence in the 
development of the concept of aggression should not, by definition, invalidate any
55 56 Wight, Power Politics, ppl08-109.
57 Wight, Power Politics, p i 10.
58 Wight, Power Politics, p i l l .  In support of this statement, Wight cited the Magna Carta, which 
“was imposed by a rebellious baronage to codify their own interests”, and the liberation of slaves 
in the slave-owning states of the US as an act of war by the anti-slavery states.
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contribution made by this concept to international law and/or morality59. Rather, 
any assessment of such contribution will depend on the degree and substance of 
political influence.
Bull further developed Wight’s thoughts on international society. According to 
Bull, international society
“exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions.”60
This definition is derived from Bull’s observation that there are three specific aims 
which are recognised by all societies and are reflected in their practices: (1) the 
safeguarding of life to some degree against physically injurious, or fatal, violence;
(2) the maxim pacta sunt servanda -  that promises or agreements made will be 
honoured; and (3) the possession of material goods will remain secure in some 
measure, without constant and unlimited challenge. All of these goals Bull 
described as “elementary”, namely, without them, no form of society whatsoever 
can be said to exist; “primary” in that all other goals of society are contingent, to a 
certain extent, on the achievement of these; and “universal”, that is all “actual” 
societies seem to take these goals into consideration. In addition to these goals, 
Bull recognised a further three objectives pertaining specifically to the 
international society of states: (4) the maintenance of the international system61 
and the society of states; (5) the preservation of the independence or external 
sovereignty of individual states; and (6) peace . Five “institutions” of 
international society -  the causes of international order - are identified by Bull: 
the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, the great powers and war63.
59 In a similar vein, Chris Brown has argued as regards the pursuit o f national foreign policy there 
is no “sound ethical reason why states should be required to neglect their own interests in the 
interests of the common good”: see ‘On Morality, Self-Interest and Foreign Policy’, Government 
and Opposition 37 (2002), ppl73-189.
60 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pl3.
61 Bull indicates an ‘international system’ is created “when two or more states have sufficient 
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to 
behave -  at least in some measure -  as parts of a whole.”: p9-10.
62 Bull, The Anarchical Society, ppl6-18.
63 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pxiv.
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His comments about the first two of these are of particular relevance in relation to 
the concept of aggression.
While acknowledging the useful functions both the balance of power64 and 
international law65 contribute to international order, Bull outlined a number of 
limitations which constrain the contribution made by international law. Apart 
from pointing out that international law is neither a necessary or sufficient 
condition of international order, Bull argued that on occasion, international law 
can impede measures to preserve a balance of power which are considered 
necessary for the maintenance of international order. The issue of whether, or 
how, to respond to aggression is one of the examples Bull used to illustrate this 
clash of institutions. On die one hand, international law may clearly prohibit the 
waging of aggressive war; on the other, there may be reasons to do with the 
distribution of power on the world stage which encourage members of 
international society not to enforce such a law. The 1935 Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia and the 1939 Soviet invasion of Finland are both occasions on which the 
balance of power and international law came into direct conflict with one another, 
and in each instance, balance of power considerations ultimately triumphed in the 
calculations of the strongest member states. Although efforts have been made to 
overcome this clash of priorities -  for instance, by incorporating balance of power 
considerations into international law, or conversely by keeping balance of power 
issues distinct from the operation of international law -  this conflict remains a 
major limitation of international law66.
Thus, according to Bull, the problem of aggression cannot be fully addressed 
within the parameters of international law, because in the event that aggression 
occurs, and international law and the balance of power collide, it is inevitable the 
tenets of international law will be made subordinate to the response dictated by 
the balance of power. There is such an “intimate connection between the 
effectiveness of international law in international society and the functioning of
64 See discussion in Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp!06-l 12.
65 see discussion in Bull, The Anarchical Society, ppl40-142
66 Subsequently, Dunne has argued that outlawing aggression is an example of international
society’s “constraining” element: see ‘International Society -  Theoretical Promises Fulfilled?’,
Cooperation and Conflict 30 (1995), ppl25-154.
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the balance of power” that it is only if the latter allows states to defend at least 
some of their rights when they are breached that regard for international law can
fnbe preserved at all .
The conclusion that resolution of the problem of aggression falls largely outside 
what can be achieved by international law also suggests Bull was less optimistic 
than Wight about the moral relevance of developing a concept of aggression in 
international law68. However, Bull does not entirely overlook moral factors in his 
analysis: to promote the legitimacy of the special position the great powers enjoy 
in international society, he argues that the great powers must attempt “to avoid 
being responsible for conspicuously disorderly acts themselves”, and “to satisfy 
some of the demands for just change being expressed in the world”69. Hence, 
Bull was sensitive to the challenges presented by the conflict between some of the 
aims of international society, such as the maintenance of each state’s external 
sovereignty on the one hand and the objective of peace on the other. He also 
understood the difficulty of achieving more extensively these aims in a world 
where self-help remained a key means of recourse available to states, and the 
value of ‘peace’ in practice was indistinguishable from a moral endorsement of 
the status quo. Thus, from the perspective of international society, shared moral 
values among states remain important, within the constraints of international 
political conditions. However, both Bull and Carr seem to suggest that the 
concept of aggression falls somewhere near the boundary between the two. While
67 Bull, The Anarchical Society, ppl 31-132.
68 Atlhough Bull’s definition of international society contains reference to ‘common values’, very 
little of his 1977 work discusses this idea. Greater focus is placed on the ‘common interests’ 
among states - for instance, see pp66-67 - with no indication of how he intends the two terms to 
differ.
69 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp228-229. In a departure from his demolition of ‘universal’ 
standards and therefore the entire basis upon which Wight and Bull developed their theories of 
international society, Carr acknowledges the existence of international morality, and his 
conclusions and prescriptions on this issue are very similar to those of Wight and Bull: “Any 
international moral order must rely on some hegemony of power. But this hegemony, like the 
supremacy of a ruling class within the state, is itself a challenge to those who do not share it; and it 
must, if it is to survive, contain an element of give and take, of self-sacrifice on the part of those 
who have, which will render it tolerable to the other members of the world community. It is 
through this process of give and take, of willingness not to insist on all the prerogatives of power, 
that morality finds its surest foothold in international -  and perhaps also in national -  politics.”: 
Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (2001 edition), ppl51-152. On the interplay of both realist and 
utopian elements in Carr’s writing, see Michael Cox's ‘Introduction’, in that volume, and Ken 
Booth, ‘Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice’ International Affairs 67 
(1991), pp527-545.
25
Bull’s analysis suggests the further moral and legal development of the concept of 
aggression is likely to be compromised through a ‘clash’ with balance of power 
priorities, Wight upholds the role of politics generally in driving this development.
World politics as an international society of states informed Ferencz’s approach to 
the concept of aggression, which upheld the international roles of morality and 
law, and the importance of universal moral standards of state conduct. While it is 
conceded that a lack of widespread agreement as to the content and operation of 
these standards leaves states open to the accusation that they are merely paying 
cheap lip service to altruistic aims at the expense of real action, Ferencz would 
argue that even lip service is demonstrative of, and contributes to, the ongoing 
relevance of moral considerations in the international sphere. Thus, the concept of 
aggression is important for its moral, emotional and hortatory value, and 
especially as a vehicle for promoting global social objectives.
However, this view is subject to a caveat: according to Ferencz, the significance 
of international morality is vindicated only if the political progress achieved by 
the concept of aggression in terms of promoting state restraint was followed by a 
broader movement towards the goals of social justice, peace and security. If the 
concept of aggression was used exclusively by the great powers to entrench the
7Dstatus quo, it would be, at most, “a very fragile shield” . Ferencz cautioned that 
“unless change by non-violent means is made possible, change by violent means 
will be made inevitable”71.
Although Ferencz is quick to recognise the weaknesses inherent in the General 
Assembly’s Definition of Aggression, its value emanates less from its actual 
content and more as a symbol of broad-based, international consensus not to 
passively accept ongoing war-mongering. For Ferencz, the fact that this definition 
emerged from the General Assembly, with its universal state representation and 
equality of voting, imbued it with a high level of legitimacy, thus further 
highlighting the strength of this consensus. Consequently, to Ferencz, the General 
Assembly’s Definition of Aggression represented:
70 71 Benjamin B Ferencz, Defining International Aggression (New York: Oceana Publications
Inc, 1975), vol 2, p52.
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“a visible reaffirmation of the indominable hope and determination 
that there must be legal limits to the use of armed force, and that the
72existing international anarchy must be brought to an end.”
Since this time, however, Ferencz has noted a breakdown of consensus in the 
context of aggression as a crime against peace, it no longer being possible to 
assume the approach to aggression adopted in the Nuremberg Charter attracts 
widespread international support .
Some sense of international society is also evident in Broms’ 1968 work on 
defining aggression74. Deftly, Broms avoided discussing the basic, political issue 
-  namely, the purpose of, or rationale for, a definition of aggression - instead 
concentrating on outlining his own definition prescriptions. However, these 
prescriptions are not simply flights of fancy on Broms’ part; he does acknowledge 
to some extent the constraints of international political conditions. Thus, for 
example, he noted that the main prerequisite of any definition of aggression was 
acceptance of it by the P5 powers. This justified a definition which strongly 
reflected the wishes of these states75. As a consequence, Broms advocated the 
limitation of the definition of aggression to armed activities in light of substantial 
Anglo-American resistance to anything broader in scope at the time of writing. 
Broms’ prescriptions attempt to forge the middle ground between balance of 
power priorities and international law, which Bull was so sceptical about in the 
context of aggression. Despite the difficulties posed by this task, Broms remained 
committed to its completion:
72 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p53.
73 Benjamin B Ferencz, 'Can Aggression Be Deterred By Law?' Pace International Law Review 11 
(1999), pp341-360 at pp349-350. More recently, Dinstein too acknowledged some ongoing 
disagreement about the crime of aggression, although he still maintained its solid status in 
international law, on the basis of a series of General Assembly resolutions and associated efforts 
by the International Law Commission: “the criminality of aggressive war has entrenched itself in 
an impregnable position in contemporary international law. It is true that the full consequences of 
this criminality are not always agreed upon.. .But it cannot be denied that responsibility for 
international crimes, as distinct from responsibility for ordinary breaches of international law, 
entails the punishment of individuals.”: Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, pi 13.
74 Bengt Broms, The Definition o f  Aggression in the United Nations (Turku: Turun Yliopisto, 
1968).
75 Broms, The Definition o f  Aggression in the United Nations, pi 57.
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“So much work has already been done by the various organs and 
suborgans of the United Nations, not to mention the organs and 
suborgans of the League of Nations, that to abandon this question 
now, when there is apparently a slightly better understanding 
among the members of the United Nations and especially among 
the permanent members of the Security Council, would be a great 
pity.”76
A less optimistic view is taken by Antonopoulos, though some sense of 
international society is implicit to his discussion of aggression as a crime against 
peace. According to him, ‘aggression’ is only useful as a basic classification 
device, not as a notion in and of itself:
“What really matters if  the unlawfulness of the use of force and its 
magnitude, not by reference to an abstract concept of aggression, 
but to fact and legal evaluation on the basis of the current state of 
the law regarding the use of force by states. This is possible only if 
aggression is viewed as a generic term connoting unlawful use of 
force, and not as an abstract concept having a life of its own, which 
presupposes by definition the unlawfulness of a use of force as if 
every controversy surrounding the use of force by states has been 
resolved.”77
Antonopoulos noted that states continue to search for a universally acceptable 
definition of aggression, as confirmed by the wording of article 5(2) of the Rome
78Statute . He argued that this preoccupation with defining aggression delays 
further the possibility of future prosecutions of crimes against peace, and serves 
the purpose of obscuring from superficial view the very real hesitancy of states to
76 Broms, The Definition o f  Aggression in the United Nations, p i 56. It is perhaps because of this 
steadfast commitment in the face of great political obstacles that Broms was later appointed as 
chair of UN efforts to define aggression in 1973-1974, immediately prior to the adoption of the 
General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression.
77 Constantine Antonopoulos, 'Whatever Happened to Crimes Against Peace?' Journal o f  Conflict 
and Security Law 6 (2001), p47. Pompe has argued that it is wrong to claim the non-existence of 
the concept of aggression “For the concept of aggression was transferred from the field of 
particular conventions to that of general international law at the moment an international organ 
was given the power to designate a State as aggressor, with legal consequences for the whole 
society of States”: CA Pompe, Aggressive War an International Crime (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff,1953), p71.
78 Article 5(2) reads: “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a 
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”: 
The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available online
<www .un .org/1 aw/icc/ statute/romefra.htm>
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subject their resorts to interstate force to judicial inquiry79. For the purposes of 
prosecuting aggression as a crime against peace, therefore, the crucial requirement 
is a decision as to whether or not the use of force in question is lawful, not a 
definition of aggression beyond that which appears in the Nuremberg Charter. 
Unfortunately, however, there are some serious difficulties with this line of 
argument80.
(3) Conclusion
In this chapter, the concept of aggression in international relations has been 
examined in its theoretical context. Two essential features of aggression were 
identified and discussed: (1) the use of international armed force; and (2) the 
judgment of that use as wrong. The implications of these features were then 
explored through the lens of three approaches to international theory: (1)
liberalism; (2) realism; and (3) international society. It was found that in modem 
international relations, the concept of aggression originated from developments in 
liberal thought, which prioritised the abolition of war through a collective security 
system designed to combat ‘aggression’. By contrast, realism denied the concept 
of aggression any special status; like all other issue-areas in international 
relations, it was simply another subject in relation to which each state could 
compete with others in an effort to ensure its vital, national interests were 
maximally asserted. Meanwhile, international society theorists developed a 
middle path between liberalism and realism, acknowledging the limitations 
imposed by political factors in the international sphere, yet at the same time 
upholding the relevance of international law and morality within those limitations. 
It was demonstrated that although the analyses presented by Wight and Bull
79 Antonopoulos, 'Whatever Happened to Crimes Against Peace?1, p62.
80 The main difficulty with Antonopoulos’ argument is that it does not actually advance very far 
the literature on aggression. Even if we accept his contention that aggression is best considered as 
a category term for unlawful uses of force, the vital decision about the legality or otherwise of a 
particular use o f armed force raises all the same controversial assumptions as when aggression is 
approached as a concept -  for instance, the existence of universal legal standards of state conduct, 
international authorities with binding power to develop and enforce these standards, and the moral 
value of peace. When Antonopoulos refers to “fact and legal evaluation”, he overlooks the extent 
to which, at the international level, these are themselves influenced by political considerations. 
Antonopoulos’ perspective is important, however, in terms of the overall argument of the thesis: it 
demonstrates how transforming an unresolved international political debate into a question of 
international law contributes little, if anything, to the resolution of that debate.
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suggest that both recognised the high degree to which the concept of aggression 
was held hostage to international political conditions, some disagreement existed 
between them as to consequences of this. By examining the concept of aggression 
in practice and assessing its significance, this thesis will reveal further insight into 
the relative persuasiveness of these three approaches as explanations of 
international relations.
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Chapter Two: Aggression in the post-World War One Settlement
The concept of aggression arose in the post-World War One settlement as part of 
Woodrow Wilson’s dream of establishing a global collective security system, which 
would displace traditional power politics and alliance-building in favour of a 
universal peace enforcement body founded upon shared moral values. However, 
despite Wilson’s charismatic leadership and popularity with peoples in many nations, 
his vision was not shared by: (1) some within his own administration; (2) foreign 
governments, that were still smarting from their own experience of World War One; 
or (3) the US Senate. The influence of this opposition in the drafting and ratification 
of the League Covenant, in article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles concerning 
reparations, and in articles 227-230 proposing a trial of Kaiser Wilhelm and other 
German nationals overwhelmed Wilson’s original aim of an entity incorporating a 
positive, mutual guarantee among signatories to defend each other against aggression. 
The result was the creation and operation of a post-World War One international 
security system which reflected the immediate political priorities of the major 
European powers to a far greater extent than Wilson’s expansive, international moral 
aspirations. In particular, the concept of aggression’s role both at the centre of the 
new international security system and at the heart of the punitive peace terms 
imposed upon Germany demonstrated the degree to which the traditional, diplomatic 
tools of alliances and balance of power co-existed with Wilson’s new approach to 
international security.
(1) Aggression and the League of Nations: Article 10 of the Covenant
(a) Pre-Paris Drafts: 1914-1918
The concept of aggression originated at the US Presidential level in relation to efforts 
to organize international politics in the post-World War One period according to a 
collective security model. In December 1914, Colonel House, confidant of President 
Wilson, approached him with a proposal for an agreement between the US and the
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states of South America, the substance of which was summarized by the President as 
follows:
“1st. Mutual guarantees of political independence under republican 
form of government and mutual guarantees of territorial integrity.
2nd. Mutual agreements that the Government of each of the contracting 
parties acquire complete control within its jurisdiction of the 
manufacture and sale of munitions of war.”1
House argued that, if successful, this type of accord could also act as a model for the 
nations of Europe once the war ended. However, Wilson quickly saw its potential for 
securing not just a European peace but a global one, so that during his re-election 
campaign of 1916, he announced that “the world has a right to be free from every 
disturbance of its peace that has its origins in aggression and disregard of the rights of 
peoples and nations”2. In January 1918, Wilson publicized his plan for postwar 
settlement: the Fourteen Points. It was the last of these points which captured 
Wilson’s vision of postwar international security:
“14. The formation of a general association of nations under specific 
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political 
independence and territorial integrity for large and small states alike.”3
Thus, with states committing themselves to act jointly in defence of one another’s 
political independence and territorial integrity, war could be averted and the old 
realpolitik system would be overcome. This approach rested on the assumption that 
all participants accepted peace -  and the particular distribution of power upon which 
it was made manifest -  as a moral value. This shared moral outlook meant that 
challenges to peace would be identifiable by all participants, who would collectively 
mount a full, final and punitive response. Of course, for a security system in which 
peace was ascribed moral value to work, some method of peaceful change would
1 Charles Seymour, Intimate Papers o f Colonel House (London: Emest Benn Ltd, 1926), vol 1, p216.
2 Address to American League to Enforce Peace of May 27, 1916, quoted in Bruce Williams, State 
Security and the League o f Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), p70.
3 Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2000), p97.
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have to be permitted, and it was this aspect of collective security which Wilson 
focussed upon in the lead-up to the Paris Peace Conference.
However, Wilson’s desire for a collective security system was not universally 
embraced amongst his American advisers. From his Fourteen Points speech up until 
his arrival in Paris almost a year later, Wilson’s own, verbose version of what was to 
become article 10 of the League Covenant - the crux of the new collective security 
system - had not changed:
“The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political 
independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them 
that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become 
necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and 
aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the 
principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments 
as may in the judgment of three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded 
by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be 
effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may 
in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers 
accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is 
superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or 
boundary.”4
The many difficulties raised by such a detailed and unconventional provision were 
not lost on some of those within Wilson’s government. Robert Lansing, the Secretary 
of State, urged Wilson on January 7, 1919, to adopt a negative form of guarantee, 
arguing that most states favoured an agreement of “self-denying character”5 than 
binding themselves to a vague duty to act in the future. He also noted that anti- 
League interests would exploit a positive guarantee, especially in the US, by 
questioning its consistency with the US Constitution’s allocation of war-making 
powers, the Monroe Doctrine and the traditional American foreign policy of 
isolationism, thus helping to undermine American support for the League. David 
Hunter Miller, Legal Adviser to the American Peace Commission, initially backed
4 David Hunter Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant (New York: GP Putnam's Sons, 1928), vol 2, 
p70.
5 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 1, p30.
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Lansing’s view, but became more apathetic as time passed, probably in response to 
Wilson’s insistence on positive guarantees6.
It was against this background of discussions that by January 20, 1919, Wilson had 
incorporated the words “as against external aggression” into the second line of his 
draft article, after the words “territorial integrity”, on the suggestion of General 
Tasker Bliss. From Bliss’ military perspective, it was important to clarify the nature 
of the guarantees being entered into, and more specifically to stipulate that member 
obligations among members extended to aggression from non-domestic sources only. 
Wilson himself also recognized the necessity of preserving the rights of each people 
within a state to revolt against their own government7, and hence he included the 
Bliss amendment.
It is important to note that Wilson’s focus was to create a living institution with the 
scope to address all international threats to the peace; he placed little value on the 
consideration of legal technicalities, and therefore concerns about the vagueness of 
the meaning of ‘aggression’ or the very wide scope of the obligations being created 
were of little consequence to him8. From Wilson’s perspective, an international 
system that recognized the moral value of peace would have no difficulty recognizing
6 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 1, pp30-33. In his account, Miller claims to have had an 
equivocal attitude to article 10 at the time of the events. Miller's apparent equivocation can be 
contrasted with the position taken by Lansing, who was increasingly left out as his opposition to 
Wilson’s objectives and methods became more frequent and rabid: see Lansing’s account for a 
scathing attack on Wilson and the record of the deterioration of their relationship: Robert Lansing, The 
Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921). However, certain of 
Lansing’s claims have been subject to challenge on the basis that many of the memoranda supposedly 
comprising his diary may in fact have been written later in time: see Arthur S Link (ed), The Papers o f  
Woodrow Wilson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), vol 54, p4.
7 Link, The Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, vol 55, p319. This interpretation -  namely, that League 
assistance could not be sought by a member to “suppress a national movement within its boundaries” -  
is supported by Frederick Whelen, The Covenant Explained, For Speakers and Study Circles (London: 
League of Nations Union, 1935), p62.
8 Lansing claimed that Wilson announced during a meeting of the American delegation to the Peace 
Conference: “I don’t want lawyers drafting this treaty” (Link, The Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, vol 54, 
p4); however this claim is dubious for the reasons detailed in footnote six of this chapter.
Nevertheless, Lamont's observation of Wilson’s intolerance of technicalities in the context of 
reparations lends support to this view: see TW Lamont, ‘Reparations’, in Edward Mandell House and 
Charles S Seymour (eds), What Really Happened at Paris (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), 
pp259-290.
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aggression in practice, and unlike narrower terms such as ‘armed attack’, or ‘armed 
hostilities’, ‘aggression’ was sufficiently flexible to move with the times, capturing 
innovative ways of destroying a state’s political independence or territorial integrity. 
As a Covenant term, ‘aggression’ had the added advantage of currency in everyday 
language, important to Wilson for a number of reasons. Firstly, it reflected his high 
level of popularity amongst peoples worldwide, and Wilson’s eagerness to achieve a 
“people’s peace”9. Secondly, its incorporation at the heart of the Covenant helped to 
communicate reassurance to the public that its hopes for a new international security 
system to prevent another World War One had been accomplished. Thirdly, 
identifying ‘aggression’ as the main target of League action acted as an invitation to 
the public to participate in world affairs: it brought the burgeoning, political
watchdog power exercised by public opinion to bear upon one of the most prized and 
jealously guarded decision-making powers traditionally reserved to a tiny minority 
within the realm of high politics10.
Since the Fourteen Points speech, Britain too had been drafting plans for 
implementing Wilson’s goal. The Phillimore Plan of March 1918n , the Smuts Plan 
of December 191812 and the Cecil Plan of January 14, 191913 all reflected the British 
preference for a negatively-framed guarantee: namely, a promise by League
9 Remarks to Working Women in Paris of January 15, 1919, quoted in Link, The Papers o f Woodrow 
Wilson, vol 54, p273. Indeed, Herbert Hoover observed that “when Mr Wilson arrived in Europe, he 
was almost believed in as the Second Messiah by the common people of every nation”: Herbert 
Hoover, America’s First Crusade (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942), p9. Wilson’s 
tremendous popularity with ordinary folk can be compared with his lack of rapport with their leaders, 
which has been described thus: “his presumption of superior knowledge and divine guidance often 
outraged those who had to do business with him”: George Scott, The Rise and Fall o f the League o f  
Nations (London: Hutchinson, 1973), p39. This view is supported by the writing of Harold Nicolson - 
at the time, a junior member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference - who wrote, in 
relation to Wilson’s negotiations with Italy concerning the peace settlement, “It was his early 
shambling over the Italian question that convinced us that Woodrow Wilson was not a great or potent 
man...” : Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable, 1934), pi 84.
10 Wilson explicitly acknowledged in the lead-up to the Covenant “we are depending primarily and 
chiefly upon one great force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world...” Miller, 
The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 2, p562.
11 Reproduced in Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 2, pp3-6. The Right Hon. Sir Walter GF 
Phillimore served as a Lord Justice of Appeal from 1913 to 1916.
12 Reproduced in Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 2, pp23-60. General Jan Christiaan Smuts 
served on the British War Cabinet from 1917 to 1919.
13 Reproduced in Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 2, pp61-64. Lord Robert Cecil served as 
the chief British negotiator for a League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference.
35
members not to start a war: (1) without first submitting the dispute to the prescribed 
settlement procedure, and (2) against any member that complied with the result of 
this procedure. Only in the event that a member breached this undertaking did the 
other states accept the active obligation to take all measures appropriate for 
restraining that member. The situation where the procedure produced no result was 
left open, and thus presumably the path to war also. This approach was a significant 
departure from the Wilsonian preference of a system of positive guarantees, and 
remained a source of tension between the British and American delegations from the 
commencement of negotiations in Paris onwards.
In the face of Wilson’s insistence on the establishment of positive guarantees to 
tackle aggression as the foundation of the League system, it is not surprising that 
Britain eventually changed strategy and released a new proposal, replacing Wilson’s 
guarantees with the undertaking:
“to respect the territorial integrity of all States members of the League, 
and to protect them from foreign aggression, and they agree to prevent 
any attempts by other States forcibly to alter the territorial settlement
existing at the date of, or established by, the present treaties of
peace.”14
A few days later, Miller was sent to meet with Cecil in order to agree to a joint 
Anglo-American draft, which produced in its first sentence virtually the first part of 
what became article 10:
“The High Contracting Powers undertake to respect and preserve as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all States members of the League.. .”15
The rest of the provision from this draft, which attempted to reconcile with this duty 
the issues of self-determination and peaceful change, was later abandoned16. This
14 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 2, pi 06.
15 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 1, p71.
16 The rest of the provision of the Cecil-Miller draft had read: “If at any time it should appear that any 
feature of the settlement made by this covenant and by the present treaties of peace no longer conforms
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sentence from the Cecil-Miller draft was later incorporated into the Hurst17-Miller 
draft of February 1, 1919, which was subsequently chosen as the basis upon which 
discussions of the League of Nations Commission would occur18. Hence, prior to 
Paris, Wilson’s vision of positive obligations to combat aggression remained largely 
in tact.
(b) The Paris Peace Negotiations. 18 January 1919-21 January 1920
British unease with the radical Wilsonian vision of combatting every aggression 
affecting the territorial integrity or political independence of League members did not 
wane at Paris. Although Cecil’s own draft of January 20 referred to ‘aggression’, it is 
evident that its meaning continued to worry him deeply throughout the Commission’s 
discussions. Miller reported that Cecil believed the article 10 obligation extended to 
war “if it means anything”, and “that things are being put in [to article 10] which 
cannot be carried out literally and in all respects”19. In fact, according to Miller, 
Cecil still opposed creating positive obligations in principle, and wished article 10 as 
drafted to be struck out entirely20. Britain was supported in this view by Canada and 
Australia, both of which feared greatly being dragged into another European war21.
to the requirements of the situation, the League shall take the matter under consideration and may 
recommend to the parties any modification which it may think necessary. If such recommendation is 
not accepted by the parties affected, the States, members of the League, shall cease to be under any 
obligation in respect of the subject matter of such recommendation. [In considering any such 
modification the League shall take into account changes in the present conditions and aspirations of 
peoples or present social and political relations, pursuant to the principle, which the High Contracting 
Powers accept without reservation, that Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.”: Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 2, pi 34.
17 Cecil Hurst was a British legal adviser at the Paris Peace Conference.
18 See the minutes of the first meeting of the Commission in Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 
2, pp231-255. The League of Nations Commission was established January 25, 1919 by plenary 
session of the Paris Peace Conference. The Commission was composed of two representatives from 
each of the five great powers -  that is, the US, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan - and five 
representatives chosen by the lesser Allies -  namely, Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal and Serbia: 
George W Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation o f the League o f Nations (London: Scholar Press, 
1979), pi 11.
19 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant,vol 1, ppl 68-169.
20 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 1, pi 69.
21 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 1, p281; text of the Borden memorandum and Hughes 
critique, pp354-368. This was the beginning of Canada’s campaign to demolish article 10 entirely: 
see below. The high number of casualties lost by Canada and Australia in World War One explained 
to a great extent their reluctance to commit to an international guarantee against aggression: according
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However, knowing that complete abolition of the article was a political impossibility, 
Cecil settled for proposing, on behalf of Britain, the omission of “and preserve as 
against external aggression” from the text, in an attempt to limit the scope of the 
obligation being undertaken. To abide by the minimal, vague requirement to respect 
the political independence and territorial integrity of members was one thing; to agree 
to preserve these against external aggression -  an explicit, active, open-ended duty -  
was quite another. In light of Britain’s status as a great power, it was aware that the 
cost of any collective anti-aggression response would fall disproportionately on its 
shoulders, and hence it was loath to commit itself to a broad-ranging obligation to act 
in uncertain and potentially unforeseeable future conditions. When it became evident 
that Britain would not achieve its proposed amendment, Cecil later sought to further 
qualify article 10 by suggesting the addition of a clause permitting the intermittent 
revision of treaties -  a provision enabling peaceful change in international 
relationships to occur. However, Cecil later conceded that this would not only 
undermine the duty to preserve, but also the basic ‘respect’ obligation, hence the 
peaceful change provision was incorporated elsewhere in the Covenant22.
By contrast, France proposed to omit article 10’s reference to territorial integrity and 
existing political independence, thus widening the obligation of state parties to act in 
relation to all external aggression. The development of article 10 thus far was viewed 
by France as much too weak, and it fought hard for a more powerful League. 
According to the French view, this League would include an international general 
staff to consider military and naval questions, with a rapid reaction force at its
to one source, each country lost just under 50% and 65% respectively of the total number of soldiers 
they mobilised: Lt the Honourable Staniforth Smith, Australian Campaigns in the Great War 
(Melbourne: Macmillan, 1919). For further details of Canadian and Australian objections, see 
Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation o f the League o f Nations, pi 45-147. The UK remained 
staunchly opposed in principle to the notion of general guarantees throughout the League negotiations: 
Frederick S Northedge, The League o f Nations Its Life and Times 1920-1946 (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1986), p20.
22 Article 19 provided that “The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by 
Members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of 
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.” Text available 
online <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm#artl 9>
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disposal comprised from the armed forces of members. In light of France’s 
experience of World War One, it sought from the Covenant the very strongest and 
most extensive guarantees possible, especially if, as Wilson intended, the League was 
to supersede alliances as the traditional means of regulating the balance of power. 
Failing the achievement of ironclad security guarantees in the League Covenant, 
France would have preferred to abandon the League altogether and return to 
conventional security measures employed at the conclusion of wars: namely, the 
imposition of a punitive peace on the vanquished, and a new round of alliance 
building23.
The American position was predictable. Wilson strongly supported collective 
security, maintaining the importance of article 10 on the basis that “there must be a 
provision that we mean business and not only discussion. This idea, not necessarily 
these words, is the key to the whole Covenant."24 He wanted to ensure that the 
League, from its commencement, was “more than an influential debating society”25. 
To overcome the divergence between the expansive French approach to the League 
and the conservative British approach, Wilson suggested the addition of the second 
part of article 10: “In case of any such aggression the Executive Council shall advise 
the plan and the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” This reassured the 
British that the Council -  on which Britain would hold a permanent seat -  would in 
practice control League responses to any alleged aggression, thus qualifying to a 
significant extent the broad, abstract and positive undertaking Wilson required. This 
addition also carried implications of the institutionalization of international military 
decision-making and cooperation which the French favoured, and for these reasons 
the suggestion was acceptable to both Britain and France, and thus was adopted26.
23 In fact, the traditional approach to security based on alliance building remained privately the 
preference of some French negotiators, such as Clemenceau, the French Premier, who announced on 
December 29, 1918, that “there is an old system which appears to be discredited today, but to 
which...1 am still faithful. Here in this system of alliance...is the thought which will guide me at the 
conference”: Thomas J Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World 
Order. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pi 98.
24 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 1, pi 68.
25 Williams, State Security and the League o f Nations, p76.
26 On the French desire for a strong provision: see Alfred E Zimmem, The League o f  Nations and the 
Rule o f Law 1918-1935 (London: Macmillan, 1939), p247.
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The remaining drafting changes were largely cosmetic. Thus, by February 14, 1919 
the day Wilson left Europe to consult members of the legislative bodies in the US 
about the Covenant, article 10 read:
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all States members of the League. In case of any such 
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the 
Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation 
shall be fulfilled.”27
Although discussions about article 10 continued on Wilson’s return to Europe on 
March 14, it is largely this text which was finally adopted into the Treaty of 
Versailles and agreed by the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany on 28 June 
1919. Throughout the Paris negotiations and in the League provisions of the Treaty 
of Versailles, then, the drafting of the ‘guarantee’ against aggression in article 10 of 
the League Covenant revealed the tension between the pursuit of political self-interest 
by the major European states in the aftermath of devastating conflict, and the aim of 
avoiding another world war through the establishment of a new, morally-driven 
security system.
(c) Wilson. Article 10 and The Fight for Ratification
The significance and operation of article 10 were central in the battle to secure US 
ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Confusion reigned over the article; however, 
once the status of the Monroe Doctrine with respect to the Covenant had been 
clarified28, two issues remained: (1) the interrelationship between the Covenant and 
the war-making power of Congress; and (2) the degree to which article 10 froze the
27 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 2, p330.
28 In article 21 of the Covenant, the effect o f ‘regional understandings’ such as the Monroe Doctrine 
was expressly preserved. Text available online 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avaIon/leagcov.htm#art21 >.
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1919 political and territorial status quo, endorsing it with uniform legitimacy 
worldwide.
In response to the first concern, Wilson emphasised the “new role and...new 
responsibility” 29 of the US created out of World War One, and the moral character of 
article 10. “All the ideals of American history”30 militated against the US continuing 
in its isolationist foreign policy. To the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
August 19, 1919, Wilson reaffirmed that in the event of an external aggression, the 
US retained veto power over any decision by the Council to advise members as to 
their obligations. Thus, the significance of article 10 was ethical: it formed “a very 
grave and solemn moral obligation”, but not a legal one, and hence was “binding in 
conscience only, not in law”31. On questioning, Wilson reiterated that the article 
represented “an attitude of comradeship and protection among the members of the 
League, which in its very nature is moral and not legal”32. According to Wilson, if an 
obvious breach of article 10 occurred, such as an uncontested invasion, the only legal 
duty which would arise on the part of a member would be to apply the “automatic 
punishments of the Covenant”33. There would be no immediate legal obligation to 
wage war, though Wilson conceded, depending on the circumstances, there might be 
“a very strong moral obligation”34. Wilson’s efforts to focus on the moral value of 
article 10 and play down its legal effect did not impress the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, which stipulated in its report to the Senate:
“Under no circumstances must there be any legal or moral obligation
upon the United States to enter into war or to send its army and navy
29 Knock, To End All Wars, p251.
30 Knock, To End All Wars, p261. In Wilson’s view, the US was a participant “whether we would or 
not, in the life of the world. The interests of all the nations are our own also. We are partners with the 
rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair.. James Walker, State Morality and A League o f 
Nations (London: TF Unwin Ltd, 1919), p42.
31 Williams, State Security and the League o f Nations, p76.
32 Williams, State Security and the League o f Nations, p77.
33 Williams, State Security and the League o f Nations, p77.
34 Williams, State Security and the League o f Nations, p77. Contrary to Wilson, Williams argues that 
article 10 did create a legal obligation, despite a lack of specified sanction in the Covenant; if the 
presence or absence of a sanction determined the issue, this would “set up a criterion of legality which 
would deny the quality of law to practically the whole body of customary and conventional rules 
which govern the relations of states”: pp85-6.
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abroad or without the unfettered action of Congress to impose 
economic boycotts on other countries.. .nor can any opportunity of 
charging the United States with bad faith be permitted.. .”35
In relation to the reverse situation -  the power of the League to curb unilateral US 
action -  Wilson was more realistic: the League would, to a certain extent, infringe 
the sovereignty of the US, but the requirement that League decisions be unanimous 
meant the US could prevent any action being taken against itself. In any case, the 
Council only had the power to advise; it was up to individual states to decide whether 
or how to implement Council decisions. Thus, US actions would in all likelihood 
remain free from interference. However, the mere possibility of interference from 
non-American sources in US foreign affairs was seized upon by staunch opponents of 
the League, such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and exploited to great effect36.
The second concern also generated much public debate. Some viewed article 10 as 
cementing for all time the mistakes contained in the peace treaty, thereby requiring 
the US to guarantee indefinitely an unjust and unstable settlement37. Others viewed 
article 10 as a form of validation of those empires already in existence. Certain 
commentators also pointed out the inconsistency between the new rules accepted as 
the modus operandi of the League, and the way in which the post-World War One 
peace settlement itself had been achieved via recourse to old-style diplomacy38. In 
defence of the article, Wilson noted the protection it offered to small states, and the 
restraints it placed on the more powerful. Without article 10,
“we have guaranteed that any imperialistic enterprise may revive, we 
have guaranteed that there is no barrier to the ambition of nations 
[including the United States] that have the power to dominate, we have
35 Williams, State Security and the League o f Nations, pp78-79.
36 Lodge described article 10 as a “very perilous promise”: Link, The Papers o f  Woodrow Wilson, vol 
55, p312.
37 Knock, To End All Wars, pp253-254. Thus, a journalist for Dial, the left-wing liberal fortnightly 
publication, wrote that article 10 was dangerous because it appeared “in effect to validate existing 
empires”: p253.
38 see the comments of Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of Nation, in Knock, To End All Wars, p253- 
254.
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abdicated the whole position of right and substituted the principle of 
might.”39
Despite Wilson’s responses to the concerns raised in relation to article 10, it remained 
the main target of League opponents, and played a leading role in the Senate's 
rejection of the Covenant, and consequently also the Treaty of Versailles, on 
November 19, 191940. Thus, Wilson’s efforts to establish a values-based collective 
security regime targetting aggression to replace conventional means of promoting 
international security were ultimately undermined from within. Though the values 
underpinning Wilson’s vision were broadly American in origin, these were made 
subordinate to American domestic concerns about the political impact of Wilson’s 
system on US foreign policy decision-making, therefore preventing the US from 
joining the League. Hence, the League was robbed of its most powerful potential ally 
in the development of its new approach to international security.
(2) Aggression and the End of World War One: Article 231 of the Treaty of 
Versailles
The conflict between old-style diplomatic practices and the new, morally-driven 
approach to security was also evident in the reparations provisions of the Treaty of 
Versailles. That Germany had to pay something to fix the damage resulting from four 
years of industrialized warfare was beyond question, even to the Germans 
themselves. However, the differences in Allied views on what this liability entailed 
in practical terms were so profound that they threatened to destroy altogether Allied 
cooperation in the peacemaking process. Despite Wilson’s warning to delegates at 
the Peace Conference “that it was impossible with one foot in the Old Order and the 
other in the New to arrive anywhere”, this tension remained41. It was in these 
circumstances that a compromise was brokered, with the concept of aggression being
39 Knock, To End All Wars, pp261-262.
40The Covenant was defeated in the Senate by 38 votes to 53: see Henry C Lodge, The Senate and the 
League o f Nations (New York: C Scribner’s Sons, 1925).
41Georg Schwarzenberger, The League o f Nations and World Order (London: Constable and Co, 
1936), p46.
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used to justify the wholesale assignment of moral responsibility for World War One 
to Germany, and consequently, an accompanying degree of economic responsibility.
Possibly the most profound argument among the Allies concerned whether Germany 
should be compelled to pay reparations for civilian damage, or an indemnity, which 
would include reparations and a portion of the Allies’ war costs. Informed by both 
legal advice and League aspirations, the American view favoured reparations only: 
the US interpretation of the pre-armistice agreement of November 5 1918 signed 
between the Allies and Germany precluded compensation for anything other than 
civilian damage. Indeed, Wilson argued in response to the inclusion of war costs that 
it “is clearly inconsistent with what we deliberately led the enemy to expect and 
cannot now honorably alter simply because we have the power”42.
However, Britain, France and their associated allies had other ideas, which reflected 
their own bitter experiences of World War One and their desire to ‘make Germany 
pay’. This was evident from the pre-Armistice agreement onwards, when Britain 
suggested that reference to German ‘invasion’ should be replaced by ‘aggression’, so 
that Britain, as an uninvaded ally, might secure its own compensation claim, as well 
as that of its Dominions43. Despite the terms of this earlier agreement limiting 
German liability to civilian damage, Britain, and every other non-American 
delegation to the Peace Conference promptly submitted a claim for the 
reimbursement of all their war costs44. Britain was under particular pressure to do so: 
the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, had just been re-elected on a platform 
which had exploited very successfully the desire of the British public and some
42House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p270. For a view of the general approach of 
the American Delegation to the issue of reparations, see Philip M Burnett, Reparation at the Paris 
Peace Conference From the Standpoint o f the American Delegation (New Y ork: Columbia University 
Press, 1940, 2 vols).
43 Howard Elcock, Portrait o f a Decision: the Council o f  Four and the Treaty o f Versailles (London: 
Eyre Methuen, 1972), p34.
44 These claims were partly made out of necessity: the US insisted that its Allies repay the loans they 
obtained from the US to finance their war efforts, and without some substantial contribution from 
Germany on top of its repayments for material damage, these debts would have crippled the economies 
of Britain and France, while leaving the German economy relatively unburdened: see Manfred F 
Boemeke (ed), The Treaty o f Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p224.
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newspaper owners to enforce a punitive settlement on Germany45. In addition, the 
inflammatory remarks of Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes, who insisted upon 
an indemnity, added to the pressure on Lloyd George to push for the recompense of 
war costs in full. Once Lloyd George adopted this view at the Conference, public 
expectations in Britain were raised even higher, placing the Prime Minister in a very 
difficult position when it became clear that Britain would receive nowhere near her 
entire war costs in repayment, which exceeded those of France46.
Only France was more adamant than Britain that Germany must repay on the basis of 
an indemnity policy. Having experienced the most direct damage during the war47, 
and still feeling vulnerable, the French had an obvious interest in ensuring that the 
payment of reparations was sufficiently onerous to keep Germany economically weak 
for some time. It was also convenient for France to support the maximum 
reimbursement, even in the knowledge that Germany would not be able to pay it, in 
the hope of forcing the other Allies to shoulder some of the burden. France favoured 
the continuation of economic cooperation among the Allies in peacetime and saw this 
strategy as a way of getting its wish48.
By the time of Wilson’s departure from Europe on February 14, 1919, it was evident 
that no consensus as to the final figure Germany should pay would be reached among 
the great powers. Whereas the US suggested the total sum should be £4.4 billion, 
Britain argued for £24 billion and France preferred £44 billion49. Of course, further 
exacerbating the difficulty of determining an amount was the fact that at the time of 
these negotiations, there was simply no way of knowing accurately (1) the extent and
45 In one of his election speeches, Lloyd George had declared “we shall go through these Germans ’ 
pockets... Karl F Nowak (translated by Norman Thomas and EW Dickes), Versailles (London: 
Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1928), pl45.
46 Margaret O Macmillan, Peacemakers (London: John Murray, 2003), p202.
47 Macmillan, Peacemakers, pi 92.
48 Macmillan, Peacemakers, pi 94. Later, in an effort to reduce the UK’s share of German payments, 
and in response to the need for US support to ensure French security priorities were achieved, France 
argued that costs resulting from direct damage only should be paid: pp202-203. For the role of 
various French newspapers in pushing for maximum reparations from Germany, see George B Noble, 
Policies and Options at Paris, 19J9 (New York: Macmillan, 1935), pi 88-192.
49 Macmillan, Peacemakers, pi 95.
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value of the damage caused by Germany; and (2) the capacity of Germany to pay for 
it50. The fear of potential consequences if the figure set for repayment by Germany 
was either too low or too high also played on the minds of the Allies, and influenced 
their numbers accordingly.
The solution to this impasse was crafted by John Foster Dulles of the American 
delegation. His idea was to draft a provision stating Germany’s responsibility in 
theory for the whole cost of the war, but reducing its actual liability to an amount that 
it was able to pay. Thus, similarly to the way in which Wilson would later seek to 
distinguish between moral and legal obligations created by the League in his 
submissions to the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, Germany’s obligations 
were also neatly separated into moral and legal categories. Dulles’ proposal was 
readily supported by Lloyd George, and article 231 was drawn up and subsequently 
approved on 7 April as follows:
“Article 231. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and 
Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for 
causing all the damage to which the Allied and Associated 
Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence 
of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her 
allies.”51
Thus, it was the labelling of Germany’s conduct in World War One as aggression -  
the same term used to describe the target conduct and triggering mechanism of the 
new League collective security system -  that justified the punitive measures imposed 
on Germany by the Allies as part of the peace agreement. While this move assuaged 
the immediate diplomatic tensions among the Allies, the topic of reparations 
remained difficult over the longer term52.
50 Indeed, Temperley claims that the question of Germany’s capacity to pay reparations attracted 
possibly the widest range o f views of any subject discussed at the Conference: Harold WV Temperley, 
A History o f  the Peace Conference o f Paris (London: Henry Fraude, 1920), vol 2, p49.
5lAllied and Associated Powers (1914-1920), The Treaties o f Peace 1919-1923 (New York: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1924), vol 1, pi 23.
52 In the end, it was agreed that Germany would pay £1 billion to the inter-AUied Reparation 
Commission by May 1921, and that this Commission would then determine how much, when, and at 
what interest levels Germany would pay, up to a maximum of thirty years.
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German reaction to the Treaty of Versailles’ reparations provisions was very hostile. 
Having accepted in principle its financial obligations to compensate for some damage 
-  namely that inflicted upon France and Belgium53 - Germany now found itself 
lumped with the entire moral blame for the war. Worse, no final payment figure had 
been included in the Treaty, and the Germans consequently complained of being 
forced to sign a “blank cheque”54. Nevertheless, Germany had little choice but to 
accept the Treaty terms as proposed, not least because the complex series of 
interwoven Allied compromises embodied in the draft left limited scope for German 
input, without destroying altogether the Conference’s hard-won achievements55. The 
fact that Germany was kept out of the League system until 1926 also ensured it could 
not, in the interim, appeal directly to this body to seek variation of the Treaty's terms.
When 1921 came, the Commission set the total amount at £6.6 billion, but in practice, 
clever drafting and finance arrangements ensured that Germany was bound to pay 
under half this sum56. Though Germany received credit for payments already made, 
and its payment schedule was revised in its favour a number of times, it continued to 
oppose bitterly the reparations scheme, and frequently defaulted on payments. That 
German ‘aggression’ was not merely a political mistake but also somehow morally 
aberrant behaviour in a way that the previous war-mongering of other powers had not 
been, was a proposition rejected outright by German opinion. This opposition was 
masterfully exploited by Hitler and contributed greatly to Nazism’s initial rise to 
power57. Other developments also raised doubts about Germany’s identification in 
the Treaty of Versailles as sole aggressor responsible for World War One, such as the 
publication of Keynes’ work58 and of previously classified documents which pointed 
to the responsibility of the prior governments of Russia and Austria-Hungary, arms
53 Boemeke, Treaty o f  Versailles, p226.
54 Macmillan, Peacemakers, pi 92.
55 Boemeke, Treaty o f Versailles, p242.
56 Macmillan, Peacemakers, p490.
57 Arnold J Toynbee, “The Main Features in the Landscape”, in Lord Riddell (ed), The Treaty o f  
Versailles and After (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1935), p55.
58 John M Keynes, The Economic Consequences o f the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1919).
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manufacturers or capitalism59. Thus although by 1932, Germany may have paid only 
about £1.1 billion reparations in total, events impacting on international political 
conditions meant that none of the Allies was willing any longer to exercise its 
enforcement powers under the Treaty in order to compel Germany to pay more. 
Changing perceptions of the reparations clauses, and the emergence of more pressing 
political priorities, such as the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany and bolshevism in 
Russia, overtook the ongoing implementation of the reparations provisions, which 
were concerned with assigning moral and legal responsibility for political events now 
long since past60.
(3) Aggression and Articles 227-230 of the Treaty of Versailles
Further evidence of the extent to which the promotion of international moral values is 
constrained by prevailing international political circumstances is apparent in articles 
227-230 of the Treaty of Versailles. As part of the Allies’ punitive peace terms, in 
article 227, they stated their intention to try Kaiser Wilhelm, the German head of state 
during World War One, for “a supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties”61. The tribunal established for this purpose would be “guided by 
the highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn 
obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality”62. 
Further provisions in the Treaty of Versailles compelled Germany: (1) to accept the 
right of the Allies to prosecute in military tribunals German nationals alleged to have 
violated the laws and customs of war or to have committed crimes against Allied
59 Macmillan, Peacemakers, p489.
60 On the impact of the Bolshevik revolution in Wilson’s thinking at the time of the peace settlement, 
see N Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
ppl29-153.
61 Allied and Associated Powers (1914-1920), The Treaties o f Peace, 1919-1923, vol 1, pl21.
62 Allied and Associated Powers (1914-1920), The Treaties o f  Peace, 1919-1923, vol 1, pi 21.
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nationals63; (2) to surrender German nationals requested by the Allies64; and (3) to 
provide all necessary documentation in these matters65.
Article 227 was included in the Treaty of Versailles as a result of the findings of the 
Commission on Responsibilities, a fifteen-member panel established in January 1919 
by the Paris Peace Conference to inquire into the origins of World War One. The 
Commission concluded that the German government assisted Austria-Hungary to 
initiate war against Serbia, and that Kaiser Wilhelm acted either as the leader of the 
German government at the relevant time, or as the government itself. It further 
concluded that by Germany’s breach of Belgian neutrality, Germany had provoked 
Britain to enter into World War One66. Once again, it was Britain and France that 
were most in favour of punishing Germany by trying Kaiser Wilhelm; Wilson, the US 
members of the Commission and Japan all opposed the idea. Nevertheless, Wilson 
attempted a draft of article 227 which included an explicit statement that the offence 
Kaiser Wilhelm was being charged with was not criminal. However, this was later 
excluded, probably on the suggestion of Lloyd George, Britain’s prime minister67.
The degree to which the Allies had overestimated the force of international morality 
in international relations was confirmed when they took steps to enforce article 227. 
Kaiser Wilhelm had already escaped to the Netherlands, a neutral state not party to 
the Treaty of Versailles, by the time the latter was signed; thus, in January 1920, the 
Supreme Council issued to the Netherlands a formal demand for Kaiser Wilhelm. 
The demand implored the Dutch Government to fulfill its:
63 See articles 228 and 229 in Allied and Associated Powers (1914-1920), The Treaties o f Peace, 1919- 
1923, vol 1, ppl21-122.
64 See second paragraph of article 228 in Allied and Associated Powers (1914-1920), The Treaties o f  
Peace, 1919-1923,vol l,ppl21-122.
65 Article 230 in The Treaties o f Peace, 1919-1923, vol 1, pi 22. Although not specifically referring to 
aggression, these provisions were the precursor to efforts in the aftermath of World War Two to 
prosecute Japanese and German leaders for the crime of aggression; by its terms, article 227 essentially 
acknowledged that Kaiser Wilhelm’s offence was of a moral nature, not recognized in either 
international law or criminal law.
65 JB Scott, ‘The Trial of the Kaiser’, in House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, pp235- 
236.
67 Scott, ‘The Trial of the Kaiser’, p237.
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“duty to insure the execution of Article 227 without allowing 
themselves to be stopped by arguments, because it is not a question of 
a public accusation with juridical character as regards its basis, but an 
act of high international policy imposed by the universal conscience, 
in which legal forms have been provided solely to assure to the 
accused such guarantees as were never before recognized in public 
law.”68
In response, the Dutch Government refused to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm, arguing that 
it was bound by no international duty to do so, and that Dutch tradition “has made 
this country always a ground of refuge for the vanquished in international 
conflicts”69. Further correspondence between the Dutch authorities and the twenty- 
six member Council of Ambassadors, which was charged with implementing the 
terms of the Treaty of Versailles, took place in February and March 1920 without 
resolution, and Kaiser Wilhelm enjoyed the protection afforded to him by the Dutch 
Government for the rest of his life70. Thus, the power of international morality was 
proven to be of little consequence outside that group of states which shared the values 
it promotes.
The enforcement of articles 228-230 of the Treaty of Versailles experienced a similar 
fate. At the beginning of February 1920, the Council of Ambassadors identified 900 
Germany nationals it wished to prosecute, and presented their names to the president 
of the German peace delegation in Paris71. However, Germany later advised that on 
political and economic grounds, it could not surrender these nationals in accordance 
with Allied demands, but would be willing to prosecute the 900 before a German 
court at Leipzig. The Allies accepted this proposal, on the proviso that if they felt 
that justice had not been served by the Leipzig court, they could establish their own 
tribunals for trying the German nationals. In the end, only a tiny fraction of this 900
68 Scott, ‘The Trial of the Kaiser’, p243.
69 Scott, ‘The Trial of the Kaiser’, p244.
70 Kaiser Wilhelm died in 1941.
71 Geo. Gordon Battle, ‘The Trials Before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Germans Accused of War 
Crimes’ Virginia Law Review, 8 (1921), p5.
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were tried by a German high court, and these were either acquitted or only very 
lightly punished72.
(4) Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated that from the earliest days of the Paris Peace Conference 
onwards, the post-World War One settlement contained within its terms a strong 
tension between the Wilsonian ideal of a new international collective security system 
and traditional security measures aimed at regulating the balance of power, such as 
alliance-building. As a consequence of this tension, it was revealed that the concept 
of aggression was used in two different ways: (1) to describe the conduct specifically 
targetted by the new collective security obligations; and (2) to describe the conduct of 
Germany in World War One, this latter description acting to justify the punitive terms 
of the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, the concept of aggression itself exemplified the co­
existence of the two competing approaches to international security. However, 
skepticism about the new collective security model on the part of the major European 
powers and the failure of the US to ratify the Treaty of Versailles meant that 
conventional balance of power methods remained the primary means of pursuing 
international security. Hence, the significant role envisaged for international morality 
under the collective security model did not eventuate, and instead the impact of moral 
values was limited by changing political conditions, as fluctuating reactions to 
articles 231 and 227-230 showed. Nonetheless, the way in which the concept of 
aggression was used at this time highlighted the strength of reactions to World War 
One, and the lengths some were prepared to go to in order to avoid such a conflict 
again.
72 Claud Mullins, The Leipzig Trials (London: HF and G Witherby, 1922).
51
Chapter Three: Aggression at the League, 1920-1940
Although the post-World War One settlement had demonstrated the ongoing 
significance of traditional security methods in the political calculations of the major 
powers -  at the expense of Wilson’s morally-driven collective security model -  the 
tension between these two approaches continued, as the concept of aggression in 
League policy-making and practice reveals. As long as states insisted upon 
conventional means of ensuring their own security, collective security would not 
work, and it was this growing realisation which generated initial efforts within the 
League to amend the concept of aggression featured in the Covenant. However, these 
efforts achieved little, and the main result was conflict which was either not 
prevented or resolved effectively by the League, or simply not addressed within 
League auspices at all. Yet this is not the entire story: on certain occasions, the 
concept of aggression under article 10 of the Covenant was invoked and conflict 
successfully resolved. We now turn to League policy-making and practice to 
examine further the role of the concept of aggression.
(1) Canadian Attempts to Amend Article 10
The obligation to combat aggression, at the heart of the League Covenant, was not 
even universally supported among those states that became members of the League. 
Canada was deeply concerned about the endurance of article 10 despite its protests 
during the peace negotiations, and proposed the provision be struck out altogether 
during the first and second assemblies of the League. Canadian opposition revisited 
criticisms raised during the US ratification debate. The basis premise of article 10 
came under direct attack, Canada taking issue in particular with the assumptions that: 
(a) all existing territorial boundaries were just and expedient; (b) these boundaries 
would continue permanently to be just and expedient; and (c) the Signatories to the 
Covenant held themselves responsible for these boundaries1. In light of the 
dynamism of international conditions, Canada argued it was not possible to determine
1 Miller, The Drafting o f the Covenant, vol 1, p358.
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if a given frontier would always conform with the needs of justice, and consequently 
Canada did not wish to be called upon to defend a potentially unjust state of affairs. 
Canada also claimed that, if Wilson had been correct and League members were 
legally free to ignore the advice of the Council as to how to fufil the obligations 
created by article 10, the provision was worthless in reality anyway, which was 
sufficient reason for members seeking to rely upon article 10 for protection, as well as 
for members providing that protection, to complain2.
In response to these concerns, the First Committee of the League drafted a report 
reiterating that article 10 does not cement the existing territorial status quo for all 
time, but merely delegitimises acts of external aggression as a way of changing 
territorial integrity and political independence3. Other members favouring a strong 
League insisted that article 10 was the foundation of the Covenant, and they simply 
would not entertain the possibility of its exclusion.
However, this did not satisfy Canada, which was still anxious to avoid any 
commitments which might oblige it to participate in another World War One4. By 
the fourth League Assembly of 1923, accepting that its chances of getting article 10 
severed from the Covenant were slim, Canada altered course, suggesting an 
‘interpretive resolution’ in order to clarify the scope of article 10. The two main 
points Canada wished to make explicit were: (1) that the Council, when advising the 
application of military measures under article 10, would be bound to consider the 
“geographical situation and the special conditions of each State”5; and (2) that each 
member retained the power to determine to what extent it must use its armed forces in 
conformity with this obligation. Although, as Walters argues, each of these 
conditions were implicit in the drafting of article 10 anyway, it had been politically 
expedient not to acknowledge them expressly, in order to reassure those states most
2 World Peace Foundation, Second Yearbook o f the League o f Nations: Record o f 1921 (Boston,
1922), p i95.
3 World Peace Foundation, Second Yearbook o f the League o f Nations: Record o f 1921, pi 96.
4 For details of the high proportion of Canadian World War One casualties, see footnote 21 in chapter 
two of this thesis, p37.
5 World Peace Foundation, Fourth Yearbook o f the League o f Nations: Record o f 1923 (Boston,
1924), p86.
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in need of international security guarantees6. In the final result, the interpretive 
resolution was not adopted as a consequence of the single negative vote of Persia, 
though the resolution attracted support from twenty-eight other powers excluding 
Canada7. However, the Canadian campaign had brought the attention of League 
members and public opinion to thaLeague’s operating assumptions, which continued 
in force implicitly despite the outcome of the vote.
The widespread awareness of the fact that each League member was ultimately free 
to decide how to respond to the advice of the Council in the event of an external 
aggression, which was produced by the Canadian campaign, reinforced the great 
extent to which traditional security perspectives informed and shaped state practice 
within the League system. The realisation That the obligations created in relation to 
aggression under article 10 were not as iron-clad as they first appeared led to a 
reconsideration of other Covenant provisions and how they might be strengthened. 
Through this process, another weakness of the Covenant was identified.
(2) The ‘Gap* in the Covenant
Certain League members now noted publicly that even if articles 11-16 of the 
Covenant were strictly adhered to, war was still a legal possibility8. The questions
6 Francis P Walters, History o f the League o f Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p259.
7 By the end of 1923, there were 54 League member states.
8 Article 11 of the League Covenant read as follows: “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately 
affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole 
League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the 
peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request 
of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. It is also declared to be the 
friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council 
any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international 
peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends”. Article 12 provided 
that “The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to 
lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they 
agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by 
the Council. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a 
reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of 
the dispute”: The Treaties o f  Peace, 1919-1923, both pi 4. The text of articles 13-16 is available 
online <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm>. War would still be legal in the event of no 
award or report being agreed, for instance: see Northedge, League o f Nations: Its Life and Times 
1920-1946, p28.
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were raised: how was this ‘gap’ reconcilable with the undertaking in article 10, and 
what measures could be taken to eradicate the ’gap', thereby strengthening 
international security?
In response to these questions -  and further proof of the League’s subordination to 
traditional power politics - efforts both inside and outside the League were made to 
achieve this heightened security. Within the League, the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee 
and Geneva Protocol never made it past the draft stage, and it was against this 
backdrop that League attention shifted back to the Covenant, and the issue of defining 
aggression arose9. Noting the great difficulty of gaining unanimous support for any 
definition of aggression, the League’s Committee on Arbitration and Security 
concluded in 1928 that “any attempt to lay down rigid or absolute criteria in advance 
for determining an aggressor would be unlikely in existing circumstances to lead to 
any practical result”10. Nevertheless, the report of the second session of the 
Committee identified certain acts, drawn from earlier agreements, which could be 
classified as acts of aggression in certain circumstances. Two suggestions about how 
to decide whether or not aggression had taken place were also made by the 
Committee: (1) determination by unanimous vote of the Council, not counting the
votes of the belligerent parties, as per the Locarno Treaty system11; and (2) 
determination as per the Geneval Protocol system, which presumed any state engaged 
in hostilities was an aggressor. However, the Committee also acknowledged serious 
objections to both of these approaches12. The failure of League attempts to broker
9 The 1923 Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, which pledged immediate and effective aid to any attacked 
signatory from all other signatories of the same region, was condemned by the Soviet Union, US, 
Germany, the European neutrals, and Britain and its Dominions. France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Belgium, the Baltic states and Finland all supported this Treaty. The 1924 Geneva Protocol, which 
created a rebuttable presumption that in the event of hostilities, any state is an aggressor (article 10), 
was opposed by the League's most important member, Britain.
10 League o f  Nations Official Journal 9 (1928), p671. The year before, Sir Austen Chamberlain,
British Foreign Secretary, had expressed in the House of Commons concern that any listed criteria of 
aggression would create “a trap for the innocent and a signpost to the guilty”: as quoted in Stone, 
Aggression and World Order, p36.
11 The Locarno Treaty is discussed in further detail below.
12 League o f  Nations Official Journal 9 (1928), p666. This Committee was also responsible for the 
drafting of the Treaty to Improve the Means of Preventing War (1931) and the Convention on 
Financial Assistance to a Victim of Aggression (1930), both of which were approved by the Assembly, 
but which did not enter into force.
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new international security assurances and the dead-end it reached in relation to 
defining aggression led to the abandonment in 1928 of efforts to bridge the ‘gap’ in 
the Covenant. The League’s focus on ‘defining’ aggression implicitly confirmed the 
failure of collective security in practice -  the concept of aggression was no longer an 
abstract, universal, unifying, moral notion upon which the maintenance of 
international security could be assured; it now apparently required ‘definition’ to 
achieve more effectively its purpose.
(3) The 1933 Soviet Draft Definition of the Aggressor
Efforts to define aggression were revived in 1933, with the submission by the Soviet 
Union of a Draft Definition of the Aggressor13. The Soviet definition listed five acts, 
the initial commission of which would make any state the aggressor; it expressly 
rejected any form of political, strategic and economic justifications for the five 
aggressive acts listed; and it reiterated the right of a threatened state to resort to 
“diplomatic or other means” for the solution of the conflict, including military 
measures short of crossing international boundaries. Consideration of this draft 
definition, along with a Belgian proposal concerning the fact-finding process in the 
case of aggression, was delegated to the Committee on Security Questions, which 
produced the Politis Report of May 1933. Ultimately, despite amendments to the 
Soviet draft, it did not attract sufficient support and was therefore not finalised14.
This is not surprising, as by 1933 political conditions had shifted once again. By this 
date, the unwillingness of important League members to address many serious 
conflicts was very evident from experience15, and it was equally clear that no 
definition of aggression -  even if consensus around a definition was possible -  would 
overcome this problem on its own. In fact, the Soviet Union’s Draft Definition of the
13 League Document Conf.D/C.G.38, reproduced in Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 1, 
pp202-203.
14 While on the one hand, the Soviet draft was supported by France and China, on the other, Britain, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Switzerland preferred a more flexible definition which would 
allow all the relevant circumstances in a particular incident to be considered.
15 This theme is explored in greater detail in the next section.
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Aggressor is better interpreted as a reaction to these changed political circumstances 
of the 1930s. In particular, the departure of Germany and Japan from the League in 
1933 motivated the Soviet Union to submit its Draft Definition of the Aggressor and 
join the League, so that it would have a basis upon which to call for assistance in the 
event of German or Japanese attack16.
(4) International Security Agreements Made Outside the League
The signing of security treaties outside the League merely underscored how far short 
of collective security the League fell in practice. The 1925 signing of the Locarno 
Pacts between Germany, France, Belgium, Britain, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia 
was a significant example. According to this treaty, Germany, France and Belgium 
agreed to view existing boundaries and the demilitarized Rhineland zone as 
inviolable, and to not attack, invade or resort to war against one another in any 
circumstance. Britain and Italy, as guarantors of the agreement, were to help any 
victim state at once in the event of breach. Four arbitration conventions were 
included in the pacts, and any party which refused to surrender to arbitration, or to 
abide by the arbitral award recommended in accordance with these procedures, would 
be considered the aggressor.
The Locarno Pacts undermined League procedures greatly by providing an alternative 
international forum for discussion and dispute settlement among the important 
Locarno states. These states no longer had much incentive to use the League, which 
could only operate with the agreement of a much larger group of nations. Locarno 
also provided its signatories with a good cover for meeting exclusively and privately 
to discuss matters of concern, the scope of which extended in practice to include 
issues properly within the League’s jurisdiction. Hence, as early as five years after its 
establishment, the League had in practice been downgraded to the "influential
16 Walters, History o f the League o f Nations, p579. Although the Soviet Union had already instigated 
pacts of non-aggression with all of her neighbours, none of these obliged the parties to help each other 
fight aggression from a third party. See the text of these treaties of non-aggression between the Soviet 
Union and Afghanistan, Finland, Poland, and Estonia, as well as similar security agreements with other 
states, in MM Litvinov, Against Aggression (London, 1939), pi 44-.
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debating society"17 Wilson had feared; the damaging effect of these private “Locarno
1 RTea Parties” is revealed in the next section.
(5) Aggression and League Practice
Further confirmation of the continuing significance of traditional security thinking 
based on balance of power considerations is evident from League practice. However, 
this practice also shows that, in certain circumstances, the League’s obligations to 
combat aggression did operate effectively, though not necessarily in the way League 
drafters had intended. The following examples illustrate the nature and extent of the 
contribution to the maintenance of international security made by the concept of 
aggression.
(a) Successful Applications of Article 10
(i) Greece-Bulgaria Dispute, 1925
Article 10 was first applied successfully in 1925 to a dispute occurring along the 
frontier between Greece and Bulgaria. In October of that year, following the Greek 
invasion of Bulgaria, the latter requested on the basis of articles 10 and 11 that the 
Secretary-General convene immediately a meeting of the Council. Greece denied any 
aggressive intent, claiming it was compelled to act in defence of its border 
populations, which were constantly under threat from Bulgarian gangs19. The next 
day, the Acting President of the Council issued a telegram to the Greek and Bulgarian 
governments reminding them of their obligations under article 12 of the Covenant, 
and urging them to refrain from any further military actions and to return to their 
respective frontiers pending consideration of the situation by the Council. Three days 
later, the Council met and placed a time limit of 60 hours on both of the parties to
17 See footnote 25 in chapter 2 of this thesis, p39.
18 Walters, History o f the League o f Nations, p341.
19 World Peace Foundation, Sixth Yearbook o f the League o f Nations: Record o f1925 (Boston, 1926), 
pi 708.
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bring effect to the Acting President’s suggested actions. The Council also requested 
that France, Britain and Italy send representatives to the area to observe and report 
once these actions had been completed. By October 29, the Council was informed 
that both sides had complied with the Acting President’s request, and the Council 
then appointed a Commission of Inquiry to go to site of the incident and investigate 
its causes. The Commission later concluded in December 1925 that responsibility for 
the initial incident was shared, and it recommended that Greece pay Bulgaria £45, 
000 for its losses, a figure which took into account the death of a Greek officer during 
the skirmish. Once again Greece and Bulgaria complied promptly with the 
Commission’s findings and the dispute was settled.
A more obvious, textbook example of collective security in practice is difficult to 
imagine. The crossing of a border by armed forces without the prior consent of the 
relevant state was exactly the type of action caught by 'external aggression' under 
article 10. Thus, immediate Council response was the obvious requirement, the 
complication of considering the Greek defence argument unnecessary at this stage. 
Once the situation had stabilised, then the Commission of Inquiry turned to consider 
the merits of each side's claims, which is evident in its final conclusion that both 
states were responsible.
Crucially, League action in this case was made possible because the vital interests of 
the great powers were not involved; there were no powerful political factors 
constraining the League in the carrying out of its functions. Without such barriers, 
the unhindered Council performed its duties effectively, and Greece and Bulgaria had 
little choice but to follow the Council’s recommendations.
(ii) Ethiopia vs British-Italian Agreement, 1926
One of the more unique situations in which the League was approached on the basis 
of article 10 concerned an agreement between Italy and Britain to support each other 
in their efforts to promote their economic interests in Ethiopia. Prior to the
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agreement, Britain had attempted to negotiate directly with Ethiopia for permission to 
build a dam in Lake Tsana, but these negotiations had not been concluded. In 
exchange for Italian backing of this objective, Britain agreed to assist Italy to obtain 
its own concessions from Ethiopia, which included the grant to Italy of a zone of 
exclusive economic influence in the west of Ethiopia20.
In June 1926, both Italy and Britain communicated these terms to the Regent of 
Ethiopia, who promptly forwarded the correspondence and his own letter of protest to 
the Secretary-General and requested all documents be circulated to League members 
for their consideration. The Regent interpreted the agreement as a bilateral pact to 
exert pressure upon Ethiopia in the event that it denied the economic concessions 
sought, and claimed that this comprised an indirect threat to Ethiopia’s territorial 
integrity and political independence, thus breaching article 10.
Before the Regent had an opportunity to respond to the Secretary-General’s inquiry 
as to whether Ethiopia wished to place the issue on the agenda of the next Council 
meeting, Britain and Italy sent letters to the Secretary-General disavowing any ill 
intentions on their part, maintaining that the agreement was only binding between 
themselves, and upholding the freedom of Ethiopia to make its own decisions. The 
issue was thus resolved through the good offices of the League before it reached the 
Council stage.
What is striking about the Ethiopian-British-Italian case is that the Regent of Ethiopia 
sought to classify as aggression conduct differing greatly from that originally 
intended by Covenant drafters. Here, no armed hostilities had broken out, nor did 
there seem any imminent prospect that they would. The aggression complained of 
was conceived in purely economic and political, not military, terms: the coordination 
of the strategies of two great powers in their own best interests in order to influence 
the foreign policies of a weaker power. Why did Britain and Italy back down from 
their original position, before the Ethiopian situation ever made it on to the Council
20 Walter R Sharp, Contemporary International Politics (New York: Rinehart and Co, 1940), p619.
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agenda? Ultimately, the political cost to Britain and Italy in terms of embarrassment, 
damage to reputation and the potential loss of public support for any League system 
at all in the event of obvious great power bullying outweighed the marginal benefits 
conferred by the agreement, and thus it was shelved - at least publicly. On this 
occasion, it was more prudent for Britain and Italy to support the League system in 
which they enjoyed prominent positions by distancing themselves from an agreement 
which was inconsistent with League values, than to insist on their own immediate, 
narrowly-framed self-interest, which might irreperably damage that system.
This scenario revealed how League obligations could be used by smaller powers to 
defend their own interests against major powers on moral grounds. Though the 
conduct of Britain and Italy did not constitute aggression as initially envisaged at the 
creation of the League, it was contrary to the spirit of state equality and cooperation 
in which the League was established, with the major powers playing a significant role 
in this establishment. Hence, proof that two of the major powers did not consider 
themselves bound to act in accordance with values underpinning international 
standards of their own making was a serious embarrassment, which could undermine 
confidence in the League system and thus threaten international security. With little 
to gain from upholding the agreement, Britain and Italy publicly sought to explain 
their actions in terms consistent with League principles. Ethiopia had successfully 
used article 10 and the League system to raise awareness of its plight and exert moral 
pressure on Britain and Italy to back down. However, there would be other occasions 
when such a strategy would be less successful, most notably when the political costs 
for the major powers were higher.
(b) Unsuccessful Applications of Article 10
(i) Manchuria 1931-1933
In September 1931, Japanese forces left their posts along the Southern Manchurian 
railway zone and occupied the Chinese cities of Mukden, Antung and other locations.
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China was quick to denounce Japanese actions as aggressive, and formally invoked 
article 11 of the Covenant in its appeal to the League. Japan argued that the Chinese 
army had attacked the railway zone, and that Japanese measures were merely by way 
of response to ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals. 
Although the Council adopted a resolution requesting Japan to withdraw and China to 
assume responsibility for the safety of the Japanese during this process, a 
Commission of Inquiry was not sent at this stage. Despite support for a commission 
from the UK and China, the US viewed direct negotiation between Japan and China 
as the preferred method of settling the dispute. Hence, in an effort not to isolate the 
US after the advent of its more cooperative approach to the League since 1928, the 
Council refrained from sending a commission.
By early October, Japan had bombed the city of Chinchow and there appeared to be 
few signs that Japan would comply with the Council’s September resolution. At the 
following Council meeting, the US sent a representative, but their role was limited to 
listening to the Council’s discussions as they related to the provisions of the Kellogg- 
Briand Pact21. A second resolution was instigated at the end of October requesting 
the completion of the Japanese withdrawal within three weeks, followed by the 
resumption of direct negotiations, but Japan voted against this resolution, and because 
of the unanimity rule concerning article 11, the resolution was of no legal effect22. 
Although the major powers were in a position to refute this legal interpretation, each 
was preoccupied with problems closer to home23, and the smaller powers were left 
impotent without major power leadership.
21 The signatories of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which included the US, agreed in article 1 to 
renounce war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. John Lewis 
Gaddis has described the American public of the interwar period as suffering from “a kind of moral 
anaesthesia in international affairs”: ‘Order versus Justice: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma’, in 
Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pi 58.
22 Sharp, Contemporary International Politics, p576.
23 For instance, at this time, the UK was struggling with the effects of the global economic depression 
-  September 20,2 days after Manchurian affair erupted, the UK went off the gold standard:
Northedge, League o f Nations Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p!40. Similar economic shocks were 
experienced in Germany and France: Northedge, League o f Nations Its Life and Times 1920-1946, 
pi 41.
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During November and December 1931, the situation deteriorated further, while the 
League struggled to harness the political will necessary to address the situation and 
keep apace of events: by the end of February 1932, Japan had three provinces of 
China under direct Japanese control. Out of desperation, and following the expansion 
of fighting to Shanghai, on January 29, China requested the application of article 10 
to the dispute24. Japan contended that aggression under article 10 occurred only 
when a member “intends to occupy the territory of another Power with the 
determination to remain there...when there is permanent occupation with clearly 
indicated territorial designs”25. Japan sought to argue on the basis of necessity that 
her actions did not amount to aggression: once the safety of Japanese nationals had 
been ensured and the possibility of Chinese attack of the railway zone thwarted, 
Japan would withdraw.
In an attempt to circumvent the paralysis of the Council, the dispute was referred to 
the Assembly. It was in this forum that public opinion in favour of China began to 
mobilise, which was China’s primary aim in seeking Assembly involvement. By 
September 1932, the report of a Commission of Inquiiy largely vindicated the 
Chinese version of events, and the Assembly adopted a series of recommendations 
for settling the dispute in accordance with this report. Moreover, the US endorsed the 
Assembly’s conclusions. In the face of such opposition, Japan chose to withdraw 
from the League in March 1933. By May of that year, both sides had signed a truce 
which kept the peace between them until 1937.
However, in July 1937, a new outbreak of hostilities near Beijing reignited the Sino- 
Japanese conflict. China initially approached the signatories of the nine-power 
Treaty of 1922, which laid down the principle of respect for the status quo in China, 
but a conference of the parties did not result in any action. Thus, in 1938, China 
appealed to the League for sanctions to be applied against Japan in accordance with 
article 16. Though the Council determined that members were entitled to apply the
24 In its application, China also referred to Covenant article 15.
25 World Peace Foundation, League o f Nations Official Journal 13(1932), p344.
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measures stipulated under article 16, in practice this had little effect. By this time, 
inconsistent application of the obligations under the Covenant was commonplace: 
Germany and Italy had already been successful in Spain26 and Czechoslovakia, and 
the most powerful League members were even less prepared to fulfil the duty of 
combatting Japan. Hence, the great powers' preoccupation with their own vital 
interests prevented the League from performing its article 10 obligation under the 
Covenant in relation to the Japanese invasion of China27.
(ii) Italo-Ethiopian Dispute 1935-1936
Lessons for potential aggressors from the Sino-Japanese dispute were not lost on 
Italy. An incident between Italian and Ethiopian armed forces broke out on 
December 5, 1934 at Wal-Wal, which Ethiopia requested the Secretary-General bring 
to the Council’s attention. By January 15, 1935 Ethiopia had put in a formal request 
for the dispute to be included on the Council’s agenda. However, Italy convinced the 
Council and Ethiopia to accept postponement of League discussion in relation to the 
dispute on the basis that Italy would settle it in accordance with an existing agreement 
between the two states28. Despite consistent appeals by Ethiopia to the Council to 
take up the dispute in the months that followed, it was not until September 1935, 
when Ethiopia exhorted the Council to exercise its powers under Covenant articles 10 
and 15 that the Council included the dispute on its agenda.
26 German and Italian assistance to the Spanish rebels during the Spanish War - which commenced in 
July 1936 - was the substance of an appeal by Spain to the League. Though Spain put forward the case 
that this amounted to a new kind of aggression that needed to be dealt with under the Covenant 
accordingly, the ongoing concern of Britain and France not to provoke an open conflict with the Axis 
powers compelled the former to use their positions of power to discourage League action on the 
Spanish question. When the issue was finally examined by the Assembly, the response to Spain’s wish 
to be declared a victim of foreign aggression was a proposed resolution that unless all foreign 
combatants were withdrawn from the conflict immediately and completely, League members would 
consider abandoning their policy of non-intervention. However, this resolution was defeated; no 
further League action was able to be taken and the Axis powers were free to continue their activities in 
Spain.
27 Despite this failure to act, the League did continue to provide technical assistance to China, 
particularly in relation to the prevention of epidemics among refugees fleeing from the dispute: 
Walters, The League o f Nations Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p738.
28 Namely, the 1928 Treaty of Amity, Conciliation and Arbitration between Italy and Ethiopia: see 
Alfred Zimmem, ‘The League’s Handling of the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute’, International Affairs 14 
(1935), pp751-768, at p752.
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During the intervening period, Italy had ample opportunity to maximize the delay of 
League procedures so that its preparations for war could progress. Its main strategy 
for achieving this was to appear to pursue peaceful options via diplomatic channels 
outside the League. Britain and France cooperated with Italy in this endeavour 
because they were relying on Italian support to assist them in combating the 
increasing threat posed by Nazism. In addition, as a consequence of the intimacy and 
conviviality of the Locarno power meetings, it seemed appropriate to all three powers 
to arrive at a solution among themselves, seeking League endorsement for this 
solution after the fact, rather than using the League from the outset29. Thus, at the 
Stresa Conference, Britain and France agreed not to promote the Ethiopian request 
within the League, leaving the issue of Italy’s African aims undiscussed, in exchange 
for Italian backing of Anglo-French ideas for peace in Europe and the continuing 
obligations of the Locarno treaty30. Britain and France made further attempts 
themselves to resolve Italy’s territorial designs in Africa, but to no avail.
By September, Italy had changed tactics: it now argued that Ethiopia was not entitled 
to be considered a member of the League at all on the basis of its behaviour and 
features of its internal regime. It was now too late for Italy to withdraw from its 
plans, and for the Council to prevent the imminent conflict. On October 3, Italy 
invaded Ethiopia; four days later, the Council concluded that Italy had resorted to war 
in violation of article 12, and sanctions were applied under article 16 on November 
18.
However, the ongoing Anglo-French priority of keeping potential allies close in the 
face of rising Nazism meant that the proposals put forward by Britain and France to 
the League's Sanctions Committee were designed not to provoke from Italy serious 
retaliatory measures. For this reason also, France indulged Italian bullying by 
securing a two week postponement of the Sanctions Committee, which provided Italy
29 Walters, The League o f Nations Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p628.
30 Walters, The League o f Nations Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p632.
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with some much needed respite. When the Sanctions Committee finally met on 
December 12, the proposal of Britain and France offered Italy an exchange of 
territories, a zone of economic expansion and settlement in resolution of the dispute 
with Ethiopia. This proposal was strongly rejected by public opinion in the UK, US 
and smaller states; but as a new peace initiative requiring consideration by Italy and 
Ethiopia, it prevented further discussion in the Sanctions Committee of the extension 
of sanctions to crucial commodities such as oil.
In the early months of 1936, Italy continued its invasion, until it agreed with Ethiopia 
on March 3 to reopen negotiations at the request of the Council. However, Hitler’s 
rejection of the Locarno Treaty and remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7 
provided Britain and France with even greater reason to be lenient towards Italy. 
From the Anglo-French perspective, it was now more important than ever to retain 
Italian goodwill, in order to encourage Italy to enforce the Locarno obligations 
against Germany. Italy used its membership of the League as a vehicle for wooing 
Anglo-French support and to secure further delays until it armed forces were 
victorious and officially annexed Ethiopia on May 9. The League eventually 
abandoned its failed sanctions the following month, and passed a resolution 
requesting members to forward to the organization their conclusions from this 
situation with the aim of improving the application of the Covenant’s provisions. 
Throughout this episode, and up until the Italian withdrawal from the League in 
December 1937, the coming European conflict with Hitler preoccupied Britain and 
France and, given their status as important League members, influenced the way in 
which League procedures were invoked against Italy. League obligations, therefore, 
proved useless in terms of maintaining international security in circumstances where 
they conflicted with the balance of power considerations of the major powers. On 
these occasions, the Italo-Ethiopian dispute demonstrated that to the extent League 
procedures were applied to such conflicts at all, how they were applied would 
strongly reflect the same balance of power considerations in any case.
66
(c) Disputes Where Article 10 Was Not Applied by the League
In addition to the abovementioned disputes, certain conflicts were either dealt with by 
the League in a piecemeal way, or not addressed under League provisions at all, again 
as a consequence of great power vital interests and balance of power considerations. 
For instance, when Poland seized the traditional Lithuanian capital of Vilna in 1920, 
the Council called on the former to cease breaching her obligations under the 
Covenant, and recommended that the Vilna residents themselves should decide 
whether to be part of Poland or Lithuania. Despite the agreement to preliminary 
peace terms, fighting continued, and it was not until seven years later that the Council 
succeeded in terminating the state of war. The special relationship with France 
enjoyed by Poland worked to the latter's advantage by blocking any possible Council 
military action in response to the occupation of Vilna31.
Similarly, when Turkey invaded Armenia in the same year, the lack of interest on the 
part of League members, especially Britain and France, in committing military 
assistance to the conflict meant that the League had to decline the Supreme Council 
of the Allied Power’s request to accept a mandate over Armenia32. Although the 
Assembly brokered an agreement reducing arms to the area, by the time any 
assistance was able to be given, Armenia no longer existed. Armenia's location along 
the Soviet Union's border and the preoccupation of the stronger members of the 
League with the challenges posed by the immediate post-WWl settlement resulted in 
the loss of Armenia to the Soviet Union.
31 Charles K Webster, The League o f Nations in Theory and Practice (London: Allen and Unwin,
1933), pi 65. Other allies also wished not to weaken Poland as a bulwark against Russia.
32 Later, WL Westermann, of the American Peace Commission to Paris, seemed to express regret that 
the US too had refused to accept a mandate over Armenia: “...The history of the Russian advance over 
Trans-Caucasia in the nineteenth century and the geographic position of Armenia marks it as a 
legitimate sphere of Russian influence. Turkish Armenia lies in the pathway of Slavic Russian 
expansion. Soviet Russia now controls Russian Armenia. 1 hold no brief for Bolshevism, but we 
might as well be honest and face facts. Bolshevist Russia has done that thing which we have refused 
to do -  gone in and protected the Armenians. It seems obvious to me that the Armenian question must 
be looked at primarily in connection with the Russian problem...”: ‘The Armenian Problem and the 
Disruption of Turkey’, in House and Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, p468.
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In addition, the 1923 French seizure of mines and factories in the Ruhr region of 
Germany as a form of guarantee for the payment of reparations may also have been 
pursued under article 10. In fact, Council intervention was desired by a broad base of 
members, but was scuppered by France’s resolute will to have its way on this issue. 
Thus, in this case the determination of just one great power was sufficient to prevent 
a security issue of critical importance to all being considered by the Council.
Finland did not even bother to refer to article 10 in its 1939 appeal to the League 
about an unexpected attack by the Soviet Union, citing articles 11 and 15 instead. 
Nevertheless, by resolution, the Assembly declared that:
“by the aggression which it has committed against Finland, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics has failed to observe not only its special 
political agreements with Finland but also article 12 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris”33.
As a result, the League formally excluded the Soviet Union from the League under 
article 16. This was the strongest and most significant response the League made 
against aggression, though in terms of both the broader strategic context and the 
League’s international status, it was a case of too little, too late.
Perhaps the greatest example highlighting the degree to which balance of power 
considerations remained predominant in the security calculations of the major 
powers, reducing the League to a vehicle for pursuing these broader aims, was the 
reaction to growing German aggression from 1933 onwards. Having withdrawn 
Germany from the League in this year, Hitler pursued rearmament at an alarming 
pace, culminating initially in the remilitarization of the Rhineland in breach of the 
Locarno Pacts, and followed by the annexation of Austria in March 1938. No action 
was taken in response to these serious violations of the League Covenant; it was only 
when Hitler’s demands for Czechoslovakia became increasingly insistent that Britain, 
France, Italy and Germany met in September 1938 and agreed to partition the
33 World Peace Foundation, League o f Nations Official Journal 20 (1939), p540. .
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Sudeten area in Germany’s favour. However, this meeting did not take place at the 
League, but rather at Munich, behind closed doors, during which time the League and 
its other members were reduced to the role of mere spectators. War was looming, and 
in light of the failure of these negotiations, and the mixed track record of the League, 
more and more League members affirmed publicly their absolute freedom to decide 
how to respond to international military conflict34. Despite the Munich agreement, in 
March 1939, Germany occupied Bohemia, and by September of that year, when 
Germany attacked Poland, the stage was set for the onset of World War Two.
(6) Conclusion
This chapter examined the concept of aggression in two aspects of the League’s 
work: (1) its policy-making; and (2) its practical management of international
conflict. In relation to the first aspect, it was shown that continuing concerns in the 
early League years about the nature of the obligations created by the Covenant 
produced two different reactions: firstly, from Canada, a proposal to abolish the 
undertaking to combat aggression contained in article 10; and secondly, from League 
members with powerful neighbours, proposals to ‘define’ aggression in order to 
reinforce the League’s international security procedures. Both of these reactions 
demonstrated that the confidence placed by the League founders in the apparently 
morally unifying concept of aggression as a trigger for collective security measures 
was misplaced. Paradoxically, these League discussions about aggression 
underscored how little international moral consensus existed on this topic, and thus 
how fragile the League system was, especially when competing with the vital 
interests of the great powers, both individually and collectively.
This latter observation was confirmed in our examination of League practice. When 
the great powers were preoccupied with their own immediate problems -  especially if 
these concerned physically security -  the application of the League obligation to 
combat aggression was likely to reflect this preoccupation, as the conflicts between
34 Walters, The League o f  Nations Its Life and Times 1920-1946, p778.
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China and Japan (1931-1933) and Italy and Ethiopia (1935-1936) attested. In 
addition, if a vital alliance or interest of one of the great powers could be damaged by 
the application of League procedures, this was sufficient to prevent or postpone the 
situation from being brought before the League, as demonstrated by the 1920 Polish 
seizure of Vilna and the 1923 French seizure of German mines. However, outside 
these circumstances, it was also found that the League obligation to combat 
aggression was effectively fulfilled on at least two occasions: (1) in relation to the 
1925 dispute between Greece and Bulgaria; and (2) in relation to the 1926 Ethiopian 
reaction to the British-Italian economic agreement. These two examples show that 
international law and international morality -  as incorporated in the concept of 
aggression contained in article 10 of the League Covenant -  can and do play a 
significant role in international relations.
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Chapter Four: The Crime of Aggression at Nuremberg and
Subsequent Trials
The concept of aggression re-emerged internationally in the closing days of World 
War Two as the Allies considered what to do with the growing number of captured 
German elites. Although powerful forces within the US administration argued in 
favour of punitive peace terms, including the summary execution of top German 
leaders as they were captured, the US ultimately chose to promote a less harsh peace 
settlement, which would subject German elites to a largely independent, criminal trial 
process. This time, international political conditions favoured the further evolution of 
the concept of aggression: with few political alternatives available, Allied agreement 
to a trial was eventually achieved, though the UK, France and Soviet Union all 
pointed out the legal weaknesses of the American plan. From this point onwards, the 
case against the German elites unfolded largely the way US prosecutors wanted it to -  
which meant conspiracy and the ‘crime’ of aggression were the central charges laid 
against the Germans. These charges made it possible to link the top-level Nuremberg 
defendants to particular German World War Two activities on the ground, and hence 
they were of crucial signficance on this occasion.
While it might be tempting to conclude, on this basis, that the prosecution of 
aggression at Nuremberg was just another component of the US’ post-war German 
occupation policy -  and as such, a crude example of “victors’ justice” -  such a 
conclusion ignores the extent to which the majority of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) judges rejected the arguments of American prosecutors, instead 
issuing a relatively conservative judgment. Thus, it is argued that the prosecution of 
aggression at Nuremberg is significant as a first attempt to hold individuals of high- 
ranking state office criminally responsible for misdeeds negatively impacting upon 
international security.
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(1) The End of World War Two in Europe and the Problem of the Top-Ranking
Nazis
In 1944-1945, the issue of working out what to do with the surviving members of the 
Nazi leadership regime was gaining priority within US policymaking circles, as 
concerns mounted over the possibility that, as World War Two came to an end, Nazi 
leaders might flee Germany and seek political asylum in a neutral state1. Ways of 
resolving this issue strongly reflected the respective preferences of different actors 
within the US administration for the type of peace to be pursued in Germany, both as 
part of the strategy for ending World War Two and for the post-war settlement. Two 
divergent schools of thought emerged.
One school, led by US Secretary of Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr, supported the 
idea of using approaching military units to execute summarily top Nazi officials. On 
this view, any of the Allied powers would be entitled, on meeting any member of a 
pre-arranged list of high-ranking Nazis and on confirmation of their identity, to kill 
them immediately. Ultimate decision-making authority in relation to this task would 
rest with individual, Allied military commanders; they would retain full discretion as 
to the means of identity confirmation, as well as the timing and method of execution 
in accordance with the military practices of their own particular state. This approach, 
which emerged in September 1944, was promoted as part of a program which aimed 
to destroy completely Germany’s future ability to wage war, and to establish a 
general international deterrent via the imposition of a harsh punishment. Other 
components of this program included a rigorous agenda of German 
deindustrialisation and pasturalisation, with the intention of leaving that state 
economically powerless; the purging of Nazis from German institutions; and the use 
of extensive detention powers to apprehend all members of organizations such as the 
SS and others in business, law and education2. The Morgenthau plan was so
1 As Kaiser Wilhelm had done successfully in 1918: see Bradley F Smith, The Road to Nuremberg 
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1981), pl9.
2 Bradley F Smith (ed), The American Road to Nuremberg: the Documentary Record 1944-1945 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p7.
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thorough and severe that it even contemplated the removal from Germany of Hitler 
Youth members and other children exposed to Nazism3. Morgenthau thought a more 
lenient occupation policy than his would not only be unjust, but might also enable 
Germany to instigate another phase of expansionism and atrocities4.
A second view, developed by Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, later emerged, 
urging on political and moral grounds a fair trial for those within the Nazi leadership. 
To Stimson, depriving Germany of the means of achieving economic prosperity 
“would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetuate upon 
their victims -  it would be a crime against civilization itself’5. Worse, Stimson 
believed the strongly punitive economic basis of the Morgenthau Plan would cripple 
the German economy at a time of already great disruption to European markets 
generally, thus generating a catalyst for future war6. Stimson’s call for a more 
moderate Allied reaction appealed to military leaders, who knew that a successful, 
final advance would crucially depend on the maintenance of stability and order in the 
territory already overrun by the Allies -  a condition which would be entirely
# y
undermined by arrests on a massive scale and destruction of economic capacity . In 
Stimson’s view, only great power support for the rule of law buttressed by the force 
of concerned public opinion could reduce or end aggression for good. A trial of the 
leading Nazis would not only provide a mechanism by which convicted Nazi elites 
could be punished, but would also create an important educational record from which 
future generations could learn, thus making possible the avoidance of subsequent 
large-scale international conflicts8. Eventually, the Stimson view prevailed and 
became official US policy, with President Truman coming out strongly in favour of 
an international trial procedure after his appointment to office in April 1945.
3 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, p23.
4 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, pp22-23.
5 Whitney R Harris, Tyranny on Trial (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954), p 8.
6 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, pp37-38.
7 Peter Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001),
r88-Maguire, Law and War, p93.
73
However, Allied support for a trial of the top Nazis was by no means assured. In fact, 
Churchill and Roosevelt had already accepted a summary of the Morgenthau Plan’s 
recommendations in Quebec on 15 September 19449. Complicating the matter 
further, a third view had emerged: the British Lord Chancellor, Lord Simon,
cognizant of the political and legal difficulties presented by the proposed trial of the 
top Nazis, instead had promoted a ‘political’ execution of these men along similar 
lines to those used by the British government against Napoleon in 1815. According 
to this approach, decision-making authority concerning the fate of German elites 
resided with the Allied political leaders collectively, usual diplomatic practices of 
negotiation and consensus-building being used to determine the nature of the decision 
taken. Simon had been promoting this view for more than two years, and Churchill 
himself had been supporting this position in cabinet for over a year.
British opposition to a trial remained steadfast, despite a failed attempt to come to an 
Anglo-American compromise - namely, a perfunctory ‘arraignment’ procedure, 
which would see the leading Nazis indicted before an Allied tribunal, a quick ruling 
on the charges made, and an appropriate punishment decided. Even this modest 
proposal attracted savage criticism within the British camp. Critics argued that a 
pseudo-trial along these lines would please no-one, and through the blurring of 
“political and judicial jurisdiction”, Britain would be on the receiving end of “the 
worst of both worlds”10. On this basis, British cabinet members rejected the 
proposal, formally communicating to the US on 12 April 1945 that Britain would not 
accept a trial or hearing for Hitler and his colleagues, favouring a “political 
disposition” instead11.
In light of British opposition to a trial, Stalin’s pro-trial stance provided the American 
proposal with welcome support. At the meeting of the US, UK and Soviet Union at
9 Maguire, Law and War, p89. Indeed, Churchill has been reported to have commented in October 
1944 that “I’d like sixty or seventy of the people around Hitler shot without any trial, but I am against 
shooting all the German General Staff.. see Drexel A Sprecher, Inside the Nuremberg Tribunal 
(Lanham: University Press of America Inc, 1999), vol 1, p28.
10 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, 186.
11 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, 188.
74
Yalta in February 1945, Stalin had repeated his view that “the grand criminals should 
be tried before being shot”12. Though far from what the US had in mind in terms of 
how the trial procedure would function, at least this statement indicated backing in 
principle for some sort of judicial process to be incorporated into Allied plans for the 
top Nazis. When it became known to the US in April that France was also in favour 
of a trial procedure13, it was clear that staunch British opposition to the use of legal 
mechanisms for dealing with the top Nazis could be routed by the US, and that a trial 
could proceed. Hence, general agreement among the foreign ministers of the UK, 
Soviet Union and France to a trial by international military tribunal of the top Nazis 
was secured by the US in May 1945, at the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation (UNCIO) held at San Francisco14. The American vision 
of a moderate peace settlement incorporating the rule of law had won its first major 
victory.
(2) The Political and Legal Challenges Presented by the Prosecution of the 
Crime of Aggression
How to bring together the realities of Nazi war-mongering, the substance of relevant 
international law on the topic of armed conflict and the wish to prosecute individuals 
criminally for the excesses of Nazism was a pre-occupation of pro-trial policy 
advisers from the outset. Worldwide horror at the systematic slaughter carried out by 
the Nazis produced an overwhelming sense that violation of some moral code had 
occurred, but beyond this instinctive response, there were no easy answers. While 
‘aggression’ in abstract terms might have been recognized by League members in 
1919 as a wrong committed against any one of them in relation to which they agreed 
to come to each other’s aid, the League record itself had demonstrated that in
12 Ann Tusa and John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (London: Macmillan, 1984), p63. This tallies with 
Churchill’s opinion of Russian preferences in October 1944: “ ...Russia [could] do what she likes by 
force, but she would like sanction at the Peace Conference that her action was just and correct”: 
Sprecher, Inside the Nuremberg Tribunal, vol 1, p28.
13 Donald Bloxham, “The Trial That Never Was': Why There Was No Second International Trial of 
Major War Criminals at Nuremberg’ History 87 (2002), pp41 -60, at p42.
14 Harris, Tyranny on Trial, ppl 0-11. The role of the concept of aggression at the UNCIO is further 
examined in chapter six of this thesis.
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practice, collective measures to counteract aggression could not be relied upon in all 
circumstances. For this reason, difficult questions might re-emerge if the Allies 
sought to prosecute German conduct as ‘aggression’. Compounding this difficulty 
was the fact that the US actually wanted to go much further than this, resting its case 
against German elites on the twin assumptions that: (a) aggression amounted to an 
international crime pre-WW2; and (b) aggression was an international crime giving 
rise to individual criminal responsibility. The role of these two assumptions at the 
cornerstone of the American case against the top Nazis generated much debate within 
the US administration and later among the Allies.
(a) The US and the Crime of Aggression
In November 1944, it was ongoing consideration within the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (UNWCC)15 of whether or not aggressive war was a crime 
which accelerated decisions at the higher tiers of the US government about which 
crimes would be prosecuted at the IMT. The State and War Departments were still 
debating these topics when the American member of the Commission approached 
Stimson for instructions in relation to a proposal tabled at the Commission which 
urged a United Nations declaration as to the criminality of aggressive war16. Critics 
of the proposal to prosecute aggressive war as a crime demolished this idea on legal 
grounds; however, they failed to provide any adequate solution to the underlying 
political problem: namely, how to reconcile public expectations of a strong and 
united Allied stance against the Nazi regime with no apparent political, legal or moral 
foundation upon which to distinguish Allied conduct from German conduct in World 
War Two.
15 The establishment of the UNWCC was suggested by Churchill to Roosevelt in June 1942 in 
response to demands from the govemments-in-exile, and growing British public interest, to take 
concrete action in relation to war crimes. It ran from January 1944 until March 1948, collecting 
evidence of war crimes, and was comprised of seventeen founding Allied nations, excluding the Soviet 
Union: see Arieh J Kochavi, ‘Britain and the Establishment of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission’, The English Historical Review 107 (1992), pp323-349.
16 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, p92.
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For example, no action was taken by any of the World War Two Allied powers in 
response to Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1933 -  although a breach 
of the Locarno Pacts -  or in relation to the 1938 Anschluss. When finally compelled 
to act, appeasement in the form of the Munich Agreement rather than resistance was 
the initial chosen policy of the UK and France, thus preventing the Allies from 
arguing the high moral ground in support of the claim that the prohibition of 
aggression was taken very seriously after World War One. Moreover, legal argument 
about Germany acting in breach of Covenant obligations would be shaky at best, 
given that Germany had withdrawn from the League in 1933, before many of her 
worst excesses took place. Lieutenant Freeman, one of the Department of War’s top 
legal advisers, summed up the difficulty when he indicated that if the UNWCC 
supported the idea that aggressive war was criminal, it would damage its reputation 
within the legal community; yet if international public opinion learned the Allies 
failed to hold the top Nazis criminally responsible for the war, it would be outraged17.
The intransigence of this problem provided some leeway for Stimson and his 
supporters to further endorse the criminal prosecution of aggressive war through legal 
innovation. However, deadlock continued, and it appeared towards the end of 1944 
that, as a result of this thorny challenge, the Nuremberg trial plan in its entirety would 
have to be abandoned. It was only further outrage within US policy-making circles at 
the killing of seventy American prisoners near Malmedy, Belgium, on 17 December, 
which provided the necessary political and moral impetus to promote consensus 
around a trial, founded upon the premise that aggressive war was a crime18.
By 3 January 1945, and in response to pressure from the American UNWCC 
representative for some clear instructions, Roosevelt personally indicated that he 
favoured charging the top Nazis with “waging aggressive and unprovoked warfare in 
violation of the Kellogg Pact”19, and that this might be used in combination with a 
conspiracy charge. In late January, a draft memorandum endorsed by the War, State
17 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, ppl 04-105.
18 Maguire, Law and War, pp95-96.
19 Maguire, Law and War, p96.
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and Justice Departments was forwarded to the President, in which conventional war 
crimes took centre stage and the charge of waging a war of aggression was only 
mentioned in passing20. However, with the advent of the Truman presidency, and the 
subsequent choice of Robert Jackson as chief US war crimes prosecutor in May 1945, 
aggression became the key charge. Jackson’s position, combined with his deep 
conviction that the charge of aggression was the heart of the case against the leading 
members of the Nazi regime, ensured the prominence of this charge was resurrected 
and reiterated in virtually every Allied public pronouncement on war crimes policy 
produced from May 1945 until the close of the Nuremberg trial in 194621. For 
Jackson, all Nazi crimes derived first and foremost from the crime of aggression, and 
thus its inclusion and definition within the document establishing the IMT was vital.
(b) The Other Allied Powers and the Crime of Aggression
However, Jackson’s preference for the criminal prosecution of aggressive war was 
not immediately supported by the other allies. At meetings of the London 
Conference which ran from 26 June 1945, the UK, Soviet Union, and France raised 
many of the same objections to the criminality of aggression which had been played 
out earlier within US bureaucratic circles. Thus, although Britain had finally 
accepted in principle the US draft proposal concerning the trial of the top Nazis, 
Britain continued to refer to the lack of established sanction for the crime of 
aggression as a major setback22. In addition, though the French conceded the crime 
of aggression was “morally and politically desirable”23, they rejected its legality. 
France reiterated with approval a statement by Professor Trainin, one of the Soviet
20 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, pI45.
21 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, p215.
22 see the comments of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, 
in Department of State Publication 3080, Report o f  Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to 
the International Conference on Military Trials : London, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1949), available online <www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/jack37.htm>
23 see the comments of Professor Gros in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, Report o f  
Robert H Jackson.
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Union’s leading legal scholars present at the Conference: “the effort to make war of 
aggression a crime is still tentative”24.
In an attempt to overcome these objections, at a meeting of the London Conference 
on 19 July, 1945, the US tabled a proposal defining aggression which it suggested be 
included in what was to become the Nuremberg Charter. It was in relation to this 
proposal that major great power differences over the purposes of a trial process for 
the top Nazis really came to a head. The US proposal drew heavily on the 1933 draft 
definition proposed by the Soviet Union under League auspices and the treaties of
25non-aggression between the Soviet Union and her neighbours agreed in 1931-1932 . 
The US did not wish to “litigate the cause of the war”26 and in its view the 
incorporation of a definition of aggression into the Nuremberg Charter would help to 
avoid this outcome. From the American perspective,
“We either have to define [aggression] now, in which case it will end 
argument at the trial, or define it at the trial, in which case it will be the 
subject of an argument in which the Germans will participate; and it 
seems to me that it is much better that we face it now and preclude all 
of that argument.”27
The UK backed the American proposal to include a definition of aggression in the 
Nuremberg Charter, on the basis that without one, “we are rather opening the door for 
trouble”28. The British explained that the Conference only had three options where 
the Nuremberg Charter was concerned: (1) to omit aggression altogether from the 
charges, which was unappealing “because it is the essence of our complaint against 
the Germans”29; (2) to include aggression undefined, which would mean enduring 
political debate at the trial about what is aggression; or (3) to define aggression.
24 Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, p81.
25 See chapter three of this thesis.
26 See the comments of Mr Justice Jackson in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19,1945’, 
Report o f Robert H Jackson.
27 See Jackson’s comments in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, Report o f Robert H  
Jackson.
28 29 See Maxwell-Fyfe’s comments in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, Report o f
Robert H  Jackson.
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By contrast, the Soviet Union argued that neither the London Conference nor the IMT 
was competent to define aggression, and that instead, this was a task falling within 
the remit of the UN organization. The purpose of the EMT was to “determine the 
measure of guilt of each particular person and mete out the necessary punishment” 30 
only; Allied statements during World War Two such as the Moscow and Yalta 
Declarations31 had already established that Nazi leaders were criminals, and so 
questions about the causes and motivations for the war would simply not be raised or 
entertained before the IMT. Even if the London Conference did define aggression, in 
the Soviet opinion, it would not be binding on the top Nazis32.
Like the Soviet Union, France did not favour the London Conference defining 
aggression; it preferred the question of aggression to be left to the judges themselves, 
relying on prior international documents on aggression to guide their conclusions. 
France argued that with or without a definition of aggression, political controversy 
would arise, and that public opinion would have difficulty with a Nuremberg Charter 
definition that had the effect of excluding a potential defence33.
In response, the US held fast to its view that either the London Conference or the 
IMT would have to define aggression, and sought to distance this task from the 
general question of defining aggression as a matter of future policy for the UN 
organization. In Jackson's view, “political definition seems to me much more 
difficult than juridical definition”34. Moreover, if the Soviet view was correct, and 
the criminality of aggression by the Nazi leaders had already been established by
30 see the comments of General Nikitchenko in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, 
Report o f  Robert H  Jackson.
31 The Moscow Declaration was made in November 1943 and the Yalta Declaration in February 1945. 
Both published in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Department of State, A Decade o f 
American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 (Washington: GPO, 1950), available online 
<www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm> and 
<www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm> respectively.
32 See Nitkichenko’s comments in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, Report o f  Robert 
H Jackson.
33 View expressed by Professor Gros in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, Report o f  
Robert H Jackson.
34 Jackson’s comment, in ‘Minutes of Conference Session of July 19, 1945’, Report o f  Robert H  
Jackson.
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previous Allied political decree, Jackson did not see the point of a trial process at all. 
The meeting adjourned without resolution. The following day, the Soviet delegation 
pulled out of the agreed plan to visit Nuremberg with the other delegations to assess 
its suitability as a location for the IMT.
Final consensus on the charge of aggression emerged almost three weeks later, with 
the signing on 8 August 1945 of the London Agreement creating the International 
Military Tribunal and incorporating the Nuremberg Charter. From these documents, 
it is evident that little real progress was made towards common agreement about this 
charge. Ongoing French and Soviet concerns over the uncertainty of international 
law and the lack of precedent for such a tribunal meant that the Nuremberg Charter 
omitted any reference to the legal foundations of the charges. Hence, the law on 
aggressive war, even post-Charter, remained an open question. Despite Anglo- 
American attempts to include a definition of aggression in the Nuremberg Charter, 
Franco-Soviet concerns also ensured that this did not occur. The limitation of the 
charge to “the European Axis countries” stayed in at Soviet insistence35. A further 
Soviet victory was the renaming of the charge of aggression as a ‘Crime Against 
Peace’, a phrase originally used by Professor Trainin. Thus, aggression was to be 
prosecuted under Charter law according to the following:
“Article 6. (a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing;...”36
35 see first paragraph of article 6 of the ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’, in Trial o f  The 
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: International Military 
Tribunal, 1947), vol 1, pi 1. The desire to restrict the crime of aggression to the Axis powers only can 
be explained by reference to Soviet sensitivities in relation to its own World War Two conduct, which 
included the violation of its non-aggression pact with Poland, and its invasion of Finland, both in 1939: 
see George A Finch, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and International Law’, American Journal o f International 
Law 41 (1947), pp27-28. Concern over Soviet conduct in relation to Poland and Finland during the 
war also led the major powers to prohibit the Nuremberg defendants from using the tu quoque defence 
- namely, defending one’s own conduct on the ground that the accuser is guilty of the same conduct: 
see Joseph E Persico, Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (New York: Viking, 1994), pp35-36.
36 article 6 of the ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’, Trial o f  The Major War Criminals, 
vol 1, pi 1.
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Despite significant misgivings from the other Allied powers, the US had 
succeeded in retaining the crime of aggression as the key charge against the 
top-ranking Nazis.
(3) The Crime of Aggression at the IMT
With the foundations of the IMT thus laid, the case against the Nuremberg defendants 
was largely structured by American prosecutors, who sought to prove the existence of 
a conspiracy to commit aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity . 
Adding ‘conspiracy’ to the crux of the claim against the Nuremberg defendants 
caused its own problems, because while conspiracy was a reasonably well-developed 
concept in American law, its meaning in British law was much more limited, and in 
French and Soviet law it was entirely unknown38. This fact helped to determine 
among the great powers how to divide responsibility for presenting the prosecution’s 
case: at the Trial, the US dealt with the conspiracy charge; the UK handled the 
aggression charge; France managed war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
Western Europe; and the Soviet Union was responsible for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in Eastern Europe39. In practice, American responsibility for the 
all-encompassing conspiracy charge meant that US prosecutors exercised a high 
degree of control over how material was presented to the IMT and enjoyed the 
strategic advantage of introducing this material first, before other Allied prosecutors 
had an opportunity. Reflecting the significance of the charge of conspiracy in the 
prosecution's case, all twenty-two defendants were indicted under this head; sixteen 
were charged with aggression; eighteen were charged with war crimes, and eighteen 
with crimes against humanity40.
37 see count 1 of the indictment in Trial o f The Major War Criminals, vol I, p29.
38 Hans Ehard described conspiracy as a concept “not...familiar to continental law”: see ‘The 
Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War Criminals and International Law’, American Journal o f  
International Law 43 (1949), pp223-245, at p226.
39 Sprecher, Inside the Nuremberg Trial, vol 1, p97.
40 For further details of charges and convictions, see appendix one to this thesis.
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The strong American influence over the structure and content of the prosecution’s 
case did not extend to the IMT bench, which proceeded cautiously. In accordance 
with the strict terms of the Nuremberg Charter, the IMT considered the allegation of 
conspiracy in relation to the aggression charge only, rejecting the US prosecution’s 
attempt to have conspiracy recognized as an over-arching, stand-alone offence 
incorporating aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The IMT further 
limited its consideration of the aggression charges by focusing on whether or not the 
defendants played a role in relation to a war or wars of aggression; the alternative 
ground of a “war in violation of international treaties.. was left unconsidered41.
Having decided that aggression was committed against twelve states, the IMT then 
considered very carefully the individual criminal liability of each defendant for this 
offence. The IMT restricted quite substantially the timing and scope of conduct 
amounting to the crime of aggression, and as a consequence, four of the sixteen 
defendants charged with this crime were acquitted of it42. Thus, although Schacht 
and Von Papen had been very active in top Nazi circles from at least 1933 onwards, 
both with roles in the Anschluss, the fact that they began to lose their influence soon 
after this event was an influential factor in their acquittal43. Similarly, Speer’s 
contribution to the German war effort as head of the arms industry from 1942 was not 
sufficient to prove him guilty of aggression, as Hitler’s aggressive wars were already 
well under way by the time Speer accepted this position, and his contribution in this 
role only helped Germany “in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in 
the waging of war”44. In Von Papen’s case, though he committed “offences against
41 Although no separate findings about war in violation of international treaties were made by the IMT, 
in considering whether aggression had taken place, the IMT took into account various post-World War 
One treaties, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and draft documents such as the 1923 Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance and the 1924 Geneva Protocol, to establish the status of international law concerning 
aggression at the relevant time: see ‘Judgment’, Trial o f  The Major War Criminals, vol 1, pp218-224.
42 The four defendants acquitted of aggression were Schacht, Sauckel, Von Papen and Speer. Both 
Sauckel and Speer were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity; as Schacht and Von 
Papen had not been charged with these offences, they went free at the end of the Trial, along with 
Fritzsche.
43 Von Papen retired soon after the Anschluss and Schacht was arrested by the Gestapo and placed in a 
concentration camp in 1944.
44 ‘Judgment’, Trial o f  The Major War Criminals, vol 1, p330.
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political morality” such as “intrigue and bullying”45 to help to achieve the Anschluss, 
these were not made criminal by the Charter and hence could not establish guilt for a 
crime of aggression. Finally, the IMT also accepted evidence from the defendants 
about their activities in opposition to Hitler and his war plans, and about their 
motivations compelling their participation in Hitler’s regime. These factors were also 
relevant in the acquittal of Schacht and Von Papen46.
This conservative approach to the crime of aggression was also reflected in the IMT’s 
sentencing. Of the twelve men out of sixteen convicted of aggression, eight were 
sentenced to death47, three to life imprisonment48, one to fifteen years’ jail49 and one 
to ten years’ jail50. All twelve men sentenced to death received convictions for war 
crimes and/or crimes against humanity, thus reflecting the stronger, pre-World War 
Two legal basis underpinning these crimes. This result prevailed, despite the IMT’s 
statement in its judgment that:
“To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international 
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other 
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the 
whole.”51
In addition, it is apparent that the majority IMT judgment was more than just a 
judicial rubber-stamp of US political priorities if it is compared with the minority
45 ‘Judgment’, Trial o f The Major War Criminals, vol 1, p327.
46 Thus, the Tribunal took into consideration the fact that from 1936, Schacht opposed for economic 
reasons the vigorous arms stockpiling policies pursued by Hitler. Schacht’s rejection of the Nazi 
regime grew, and eventually led him to participate in two plans to remove Hitler from power. The 
Tribunal accepted Schacht’s claim that he wanted to “build up a strong and independent Germany 
which would carry out a foreign policy which would command respect on an equal basis with other 
European countries”. The Tribunal reconfirmed that rearmament itself was not a crime under the 
Charter, but if shown to have been accomplished in pursuit of the Nazi plan to wage wars of 
aggression, it would be sufficient to result in a conviction: ‘Judgment’, Trial o f  The Major War 
Criminals, vol 1, p309. Similarly, in relation to Schacht, the Tribunal pointed out Von Papen’s 
opposition to certain of the Nazi regime’s policies.
4 These included Goering, Von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Rosenberg, Frick, Jodi, Seyss-Inquart and 
Bormann. Bormann was tried in absentia, presumed dead. A few hours before he was scheduled to be 
hanged, Goering suicided in custody.
48 Namely, Hess, Funk and Raeder.
49 That is, Von Neurath.
50 Namely, Doenitz.
51 ‘Judgment’, Trial o f The Major War Criminals, vol 1, pi 86.
84
IMT judgment entered by the Soviet judge. In accordance with the Soviet view 
expressed during Allied negotiations that Nazi leaders had already been declared 
criminal prior to the Nuremberg Trial, the Soviet judge rejected the acquittals of 
Schacht, Von Papen and Fritzsche, and argued in favour of the death penalty for 
Hess. In light of the evidence tendered at trial relating to Schacht and Von Papen’s 
acts of opposition to Nazism, it seems clear that, unlike the majority judges, the 
Soviet judge was intent on convicting all the Nuremberg defendants without 
discrimination. Hence, the conservatism inherent in the majority IMT judgment 
suggests that the way in which the crime of aggression was developed at Nuremberg 
was not simply a product of the strong political forces compelling its prosecution, but 
also revealed the influence of sound legal principles and reasoning.
(4) Criticisms of the Nuremberg Trial
This conclusion has been attacked by political and legal commentators alike, who 
emphasise the weaknesses of the Nuremberg Trial to suggest that it was an unwise 
political decision, and/or an unfair example of “victors’ justice”. However, these 
criticisms demonstrate little appreciation of the international political conditions 
existing at the end of World War Two, or, as Wight argued, the important role of 
political power in the evolution of law52. In this section, some of the main criticisms 
of Nuremberg will be outlined, and responses made to them.
(a) Political Criticisms of the Nuremberg Trial
Certain critics justify the rejection of the Nuremberg Trial on policy grounds. They 
argue that the Nuremberg Trial could become a political precedent for victorious 
powers wishing to prosecute the vanquished. In this way, the Nuremberg Trial could 
encourage, or at least rationalise, the commission of injustices in the future.
52 See p22 of this thesis.
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Another political objection questions the wisdom of the Nuremberg Trial from the 
perspective of international order. Schick argues that the London Agreement was 
made by the Allies contrary to state practice and the generally accepted tenets of 
international law. To him, this indicates a basic lack of understanding for the fact that 
it is the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty which allow and ensure 
peaceful coexistence among independent states in the first place53. The implication 
made by Schick is that by creating the IMT, the Allies helped to undermine the 
constitutive rules of international society.
In relation to these objections, any potential injustice or damage perpetrated by the 
Nuremberg Trial needs to be assessed in context. The immediate problem the Allies 
faced as World War Two came to a close was what to do with the top Nazis. The 
only options available were to: (1) execute them on the spot; (2) jail them
indefinitely without trial; (3) subject them to a trial process; (4) send them into exile 
or (5) free them. Exile of Napoleon had not prevented him from re-emerging as a 
political threat to Europe in 1815 and international public opinion combined with the 
threat of Nazism reviving meant Nazi leaders could not be freed. Similarly, jailing 
them indefinitely without trial would create further political problems for the Allies 
by providing inspiration to Nazi revivalists during the Allied occupation of Germany. 
Hence, in reality, the only actual possibilities were to execute the top Nazis 
immediately or to hold a trial54.
The future possibility of injustice being caused by subsequent Nuremberg-style trials 
thus needs to be weighed against the very real political risk that the appearance of 
injustice posed to the Allied occupation and post-war normalization of Germany. 
Moreover, from the perspective of the leading Nazis -  and keeping in mind that three 
of them were cleared of all charges at the Nuremberg Trial -  it provided a much 
higher level of fairness than summary justice would have achieved. The full range of
53 FB Schick, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future’, American Journal o f  
International Law 41 (1947), pp770-794, at pp778-779.
54 The way in which Nazism had infiltrated all facets of German society, especially all tiers of 
government, meant that in practice, a trial of Nazi elites by a newly-formed German government was a 
long term prospect at best.
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procedural guarantees afforded most defendants in modem liberal democratic courts 
may not have been available to the German defendants, but they had the benefit of 
many fundamental ones -  for instance, the choice of legal counsel; translation of all 
documents and proceedings, notice periods, even an opportunity at the close of their 
case to address the Tribunal personally and without challenge from the prosecution55.
In addition, while it is true that the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty are 
two of the basic mles underpinning international society, it must be kept in mind that 
it was flagrant breaches of these principles by the Axis powers which ignited World 
War Two in the first place. Axis contravention of these principles compelled the 
Allies to enter into the war, and, after the war had ended, to punish those responsible 
for these breaches. Had the Allies not acted in the way that they did in response to 
these obvious, serious and consecutive breaches, the principles of non-intervention 
and sovereignty may never have regained international acceptance, thus potentially 
hindering the emergence of any form of international society. In fact, the importance 
placed by judges on the fundamental mles of international society is apparent from 
the case of United States o f America v Ernst von Weizsacker et al56. In this case, the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda57 provided the justification for rejecting German 
claims of self-defence against the punitive provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The 
Tribunal concluded Germany’s claim to self-defence was lost when it assured 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, France and Poland by treaty it had no territorial claims, and 
then violated the terms of that agreement. The Tribunal pointed out that strong policy 
considerations supported this conclusion: if Germany’s conduct after these
55 see article 16, ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’, Trial o f  The Major War Criminals, 
vol 1, pl4. Against these extensive protections, defence counsel objected to the IMT’s more relaxed 
rules of evidence, which permitted draft and unsigned documents to be considered by the Tribunal, 
such as the documents recording the four key secret conferences which weighed heavily in the IMT’s 
judgment. However, the Tribunal overruled these defence objections, pointing out that despite the 
form of these documents, the defence did not deny their basic authenticity: ‘Judgment’, Trial o f The 
Major War Criminals, vol 1, pi 88.
56 otherwise known as the Ministries case. This trial was held pursuant to Control Council Law #10 
which established a common legal basis for the prosecution of lesser alleged war criminals throughout 
the various occupation zones of Germany: see ‘Control Council Law No. 10’ in Telford Taylor, Final 
Report to the Secretary o f the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council law 
No. 10. (Washington: GPO, 1949), available online <www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imtlO.htm>.
57 Identified by Bull as one of the three aims of all societies: see p23 of this thesis.
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agreements was excused, this would be tantamount to saying that “no treaty and no 
assurance by Germany is binding and that the pledged word of Germany is 
valueless”58.
(b) Legal Criticisms of the Nuremberg Trial
As foreshadowed in discussions within the US administration and among the Big 
Four in the lead-up to the Nuremberg Trial, one of the first legal objections raised 
concerns the status of aggressive war immediately prior to the start of World War 
Two. Even if it is accepted that the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 made aggressive 
war illegal, it does not necessarily follow that the Pact simultaneously made it 
criminal. No international agreement criminalizing wars of aggression was in force 
in 1939, and therefore on the basis of the nullum crimen sine lege59 principle, the 
Allies were not legally entitled to prosecute the top Nazis for aggression. This 
argument claims it was unjust to subject Nazi leaders to a legal principle and process 
which were both so manifestly ex post facto60.
Developed further, this objection adds that even if the improbable was accepted as 
true -  namely, aggressive war was a crime in 1939 -no law at that time provided for 
the prosecution of individuals accused of its commission. For the establishment of 
the IMT to confer jurisdiction over the defendants, it would need to be shown that 
Germany consented to this jurisdiction by treaty, or that this was permitted by 
customary international law existing in 1939. Neither of these can be demonstrated, 
and thus no jurisdiction over these defendants could be legally conferred.
In addition, no entity such as the IMT or a permanent international criminal court 
existed in 1939 which might have prosecuted individuals for crimes against peace.
58 United Nations, Historical Review o f Developments Relating to Aggression (New York: United 
Nations, 2003), p59.
59 Namely, the principle that there is no crime except in accordance with law.
60 Scharf traces the origins of the ex post facto criticism to Ohio Senator Robert Taft in 1946, but 
claims the criticism gained significant public attention when Taft's speech was reprinted in John F 
Kennedy's 1956 book, Profiles o f Courage: see Michael P Scharf, ‘Have We Really Learned the 
Lessons of Nuremberg?’, Military Law Review 149 (1995), pp65-71, at p67.
Hence, the decision to go ahead with a criminal trial of the leading Nazis, on the basis 
of the Allies' view that Germany had resorted to an illegal war, was purely a political 
decision of the Allies as victors. As long as the right to make these key decisions is 
reserved to the victorious powers, whatever verdict results “will constitute a legally 
problematical and politically hazardous act”61.
Further objections cite the procedural aspects of the Nuremberg Charter and Trial to 
support the conclusion that it amounted to unfair “victors’ justice”. There are an 
almost infinite number of facts relied upon under in support of this contention. For 
instance, article 3 of the Charter prohibited both prosecuting and defence counsel 
from challenging the Tribunal or its members. In addition, article 10 permitted 
individuals to be brought to trial merely on proof of membership of a group or 
organization declared criminal by the Tribunal. Despite being called an International 
Military Tribunal, no judges from neutral states, let alone from the Axis powers, were 
on the bench. The Tribunal’s historical interpretation was not impartial, in that it 
accepted draft, non-binding international documents as good evidence of the principle 
that aggressive war was considered a crime prior to 1939. Finally, the lack of 
incorporation of the lessons drawn from Nuremberg in the other constitutive 
documents of the post-war international order -  such as the UN Charter and the ICJ 
Statute -  indicate an unwillingness to apply these lessons universally. All of these 
factors, it is argued, confirm the view that unfair “victor’s justice” prevailed at 
Nuremberg.
In the context o f a sophisticated, highly-developed domestic legal order, these 
criticisms would be serious indeed; however, as raised in the context of the 
international arena of the 1930s and 1940s, they lack resonance. In the international 
sphere, both political and legal authority are still highly decentralised, international 
organisation is rudimentary, and international enforcement mechanisms are weak. It 
is precisely these circumstances in the aftermath of widespread conflict which 
provoked the predominant political actor, the US, to push for the establishment of the
61 Schick, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future’, p783.
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IMT. In light of the elementary nature of both the content and enforcement of 
international law at this time, it is counterproductive to attack an innovation designed 
to address this problem on the basis that it itself does not conform with legal 
principles more appropriate to a well-established legal system. For instance, the 
principles of nullum crimen sine lege, nullum poena sine lege and the rule against ex 
post facto laws became part of the law of domestic societies at a comparatively late 
stage of development62. Similarly, to expect international defendants to be afforded 
the same range of procedural guarantees, as those enjoyed by defendants in many 
Western liberal democracies is another misapplication of the domestic analogy to 
international affairs. Hence, these criticisms can be refuted on the basis that the 
standard by which they measure the legal weaknesses of the Nuremberg Trial ignores 
the unique conditions of the international arena.
(5) Conclusion
The way in which the concept of aggression featured in the Nuremberg Trial provides 
significant insight into how political and moral forces can combine to compel the 
development of law in the international sphere. The problem of what to do with the 
Nazi elite in the closing days of World War Two and public outcry at Germany’s 
World War Two conduct were both strong political factors pushing the Allied powers 
to come up with a plan which would support Allied occupation policy while at the 
same time morally condemning Germany’s wartime purposes and the means it used 
to achieve these purposes. Achieving this latter objective would be particularly 
difficult for the Allies, as there were few grounds upon which to distinguish German 
means and ends from the conduct of other states -  including the Allies -  on previous 
occasions63. At US insistence, the prosecution of German elites for the crime of
62 Thus, it is Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach's Bavarian Code of 1813 which is usually 
credited as the source of the present-day version of these principles: see Jerome Hall, ‘Nulla Poena 
Sine Lege’, The Yale Law Journal 47 (1937), ppl65-193 at pi 69; (Unnamed Author), ‘The Use of 
Analogy in Criminal Law’, Columbia Law Review 47 (1947), pp613-629 at p614; and Paul 
Weidenbaum, ‘Liberal Thought and Undefined Crimes’, Journal o f Comparative Legislation and 
International Law 19 (1937), pp90-97 at p91.
63 How this consideration would play out in the context of the Nuremberg Trial was of concern within 
the US administration; in a cable to senior members of his Department of War in April 1945, Secretary
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aggression became the basis upon which these political purposes were achieved, and 
hence this crime made an important political contribution in the aftermath of World 
War Two in Europe.
However, it was demonstrated that the crime of aggression at Nuremberg was more 
than an expedient US response to extreme political conditions: it also represented a 
genuine watershed in the development of international law. The crime of aggression 
was the vehicle through which the conduct of the Nazi elite in their policy- and 
decision-making could be linked with wartime events at the grassroots level. The 
Charter had explicitly rejected legal counterarguments based on the ‘act of state’, or 
‘superior orders’ doctrines64, thus affirming that individuals at both the highest and 
lowest ends of the policy creation and implementation process could be held 
criminally liable for Charter crimes. Yet how were prosecutors to bring together the 
decisions and acts of Germany’s political and military leaders with the steps taken by 
the soldier, policeman or other official on the ground in pursuit of the leadership’s 
objectives? A way had to be found to form a link between the two if the 
prosecution’s case was to succeed. Normal legal methods of establishing a ‘chain of 
causation’ were of little use, considering the extraordinarily complex range of 
important events spanning many years and numerous states which led to the outcome 
of Germany’s aggressive wars65. In legal terms, the crime of aggression made 
possible the conviction of Hess, who played a very significant role at the highest 
echelon of regime leadership, though his individual acts were political rather than
Stimson referred to “the possibility that the defence may assert vigorously the existence of wrongs by 
other nations against Germany and make reference to historic instances of nations which have used 
aggressive action as an instrument of national policy”: paraphrased telegram from Henry Stimson to 
John McCloy, John Weir and R A Cutter dated April 1945, available online 
<www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg>.
64 see articles 7 and 8 of ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’, Trial o f The Major War 
Criminals, vol 1, pi 2.
65 For an account of the difficulties of imputing knowledge of ground-level activities to Nazi leaders in 
subsequent Nuremberg proceedings, see Henry T King, Jr, ‘The Nuremberg Context From the Eyes of 
a Participant’, Military Law Review 149 (1995), pp37-47, at p40.
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military in nature66. Without prosecution of the crime of aggression, Hess would 
have walked free.
Commentators who view the Nuremberg Trial -  and in particular, the crime of 
aggression -  in exclusively political terms forget the high degree of independence 
demonstrated in the IMT’s majority judgment. In addition, it was shown that many 
of those who criticise Nuremberg on political or legal grounds misinterpret the 
international context in which states operate. Hence, the Nuremberg example 
indicates that where international political conditions are favourable, the concept of 
aggression can make an important contribution within international relations.
66 On the importance of prosecuting non-military Nazi leaders, Maxwell-Fyfe remarked: "...What is in 
my mind is getting a man like Ribbentrop or Ley. It would be a great pity if we failed to get 
Ribbentrop or Ley or Streicher. Now 1 want words that will leave no doubt that men who have 
originated the plan or taken part in the early stages of the plan are going to be within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal. I do not want any argument that Ribbentrop did not direct the preparation because he 
merely was overborne by Hitler, or any nonsense of that kind.": see ‘Minutes of Conference Session 
of July 19, 1945’, Report o f Robert H Jackson.
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Chapter Five: The Crime of Aggression at the Tokyo Trial
In the last chapter, it was shown how strongly favourable international political 
conditions and moral outrage at the events of World War Two led to the prosecution 
of German elites for the crime of aggression at Nuremberg. It was also argued that 
the way in which the crime of aggression was developed in the majority IMT 
judgment demonstrated that the crime was not simply a political tool wielded by the 
most powerful states, but represented a significant contribution to the evolution of 
international law. In this way, political and moral priorities united to advance 
successfully the role of law in international affairs.
By contrast, in this chapter, it is argued that the prosecution of the crime of 
aggression at Tokyo was not as strongly supported by favourable political conditions 
or legal foundations, and thus more closely ressembled an exercise in unfair “victors’ 
justice” than the Nuremberg Trial. As a consequence, if Nuremberg demonstrated the 
possibilities presented by an international crime of aggression, then Tokyo revealed 
its constraints. Three major differences in the Tokyo context are responsible for this 
outcome: (1) the political decision to exclude Emperor Hirohito entirely from the
trial of major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE); (2) the lack of probative evidence concerning the conduct of Japan’s 
leaders before and during World War Two; and (3) the circumstances of Japanese 
involvement in World War Two. Before developing these arguments further 
however, it is necessary first to look more closely at the way in which the Pacific War 
ended, and how this differed from the final moments of the European War.
(1) The End of World War Two in the Asia-Pacific and the Establishment of the 
IMTFE
As in the European theatre, the Allies issued general policy statements during the 
Pacific War concerning how they planned to deal with Japanese war criminals, 
leaving the details to be ironed out once surrender and occupation ensued. Hence, the
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Cairo Declaration of December 1, 19431, issued by the US, UK and China declared 
that “the Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression 
of Japan”. Similarly, paragraph ten of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 19452 
indicated that “...stem justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those 
who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners...”, and called for Japan’s unconditional 
surrender.
However, the different circumstances surrounding the end of World War Two in 
Europe as compared with World War Two in the Asia-Pacific resulted in the 
prosecution of top elites for war crimes becoming a much more central issue in the 
Japanese surrender than in its German predecessor. By the date of German surrender 
on May 7, 1945, the Allies had already taken de facto occupation of much of 
Germany, Soviet troops had entered Berlin, and Hitler, Germany’s dictatorial leader 
and ultimate mastermind of that country’s warmongering, had committed suicide3. 
Others amongst those who had been part of Hitler’s inner circle had either fled, also 
killed themselves, or joined Admiral Doenitz in the establishment of a new 
government at Flensburg with the aim of postponing surrender as long as possible so 
that German military and civilians in the East could be saved from Soviet forces. In 
short, by this time the German cause had revealed itself as well and truly hopeless, 
and Doenitz’s government had no real choice but to accept the Allies’ demand for 
unconditional surrender.
By contrast, although the outlook was pretty grim for Japan by the time of the 
Potsdam Declaration, it still had a real choice whether to surrender or to continue to 
fight. Allied forces had not yet reached Japan -  in fact, Japanese forces still 
controlled Korea and Manchuria, much of China, and virtually the whole of Southeast 
Asia. Japanese war-making capacity still existed, which included two and a half 
million combat-ready troops, nine thousand military aircraft, and ample kamikaze
1 Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, available online 
<www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/cairo.htm>.
2 Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, available online 
<www.ibiblio.org/byperwar/PTO/Dip/Potsdam.html>.
3 Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, pp33-35.
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volunteers4. Although discussions in the Japanese Supreme Council for the Direction 
of the War about how to respond to the Potsdam Declaration revealed divisions on 
whether to start negotiating a peace agreement or to fight to the death, on one issue all 
were united: that the Emperor, who in formal terms was the supreme authority in 
Japan, must not be subjected to prosecution for war crimes. It was this implication of 
the Declaration which was most important to the members of this Council and 
reflected Hirohito’s divine status within Japanese society5. In light of the Allies’ 
arrests of high-ranking Nazis in the weeks following German surrender, members of 
the Council had good reason to suspect the Allies had a similar fate in mind for them 
and their Emperor. In the end, no Japanese response to the Declaration was made 
until after the Allied use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 
August 6 and 9 respectively.
The vital significance of the fate of the Emperor in Japanese calculations at this time 
is reflected in the response eventually made: on August 10, Japan conditionally 
accepted the Declaration’s terms, “with the understanding that the said declaration [of 
acceptance] does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His 
Majesty as Sovereign Ruler”, and a request that this qualification be expressly 
acknowledged by the Allies6. The Allied reply stipulated that the Emperor would be 
subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers7, General 
MacArthur; outlined what the Emperor would be required to do to effect the 
surrender; and simply stated that “the ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in 
accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will 
of the Japanese people”8. On this basis, Japan communicated its final acceptance on 
August 14, and signed the instrument of surrender on September 2.
4 Arnold C Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story o f the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (New 
York: Quill, 1987), pp34-35.
5 Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pi 74.
6 Japanese Qualified Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration of August 10, 1945, available online 
<www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-Al .html#Ala>. It is important to keep in mind that 
at this time, the fact that the Allies had just exhausted their atomic arsenal was secret: Brackman, The 
Other Nuremberg, p36.
7 Hereafter SCAP.
8 Reply by Secretary of State to Japanese Qualified Acceptance of August 11, 1945, available online 
<www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-Al.html#Alb>.
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Once surrender had officially taken place, the task of occupation began. Confirming 
the implication from earlier Allied correspondence that the Emperor would not be 
treated as a common war crimes suspect, the US interdepartmental committee 
responsible for occupation policy directed MacArthur in September to take no action 
against the Emperor, despite some opposition from other Allies9. However, personal 
impunity for the Emperor did not extend to his intimates or other members of the 
royal household, with MacArthur ordering the arrest of Kido, the Emperor’s chief 
adviser, and two princes towards the end of 1945. The Japanese government failed to 
secure a delay of the arrest of Prince Nashimoto; two days after the arrest order 
concerning Prince Konoye10 and Kido, the Emperor volunteered himself for trial “as 
the one to bear the sole responsibility for every political and military decision made 
and action taken by my people in the conduct of the war”11. However, in light of 
MacArthur’s existing instructions not to arrest the Emperor, nothing came of this 
rather astonishing offer. While Kido was later taken into custody and prosecuted by 
the IMTFE, Prince Konoye preferred suicide to trial12. The way in which the 
Emperor’s fate was interwoven with the peace terms, and the decision not to 
prosecute him, would complicate greatly efforts to hold elites criminally responsible 
for aggression, which is discussed in detail below.
It was not just the choice of who to arrest that strongly reflected US political 
preferences -  the question of what to do with them was also determined to a very 
great extent by American priorities. Thus, General Douglas MacArthur proclaimed 
the creation of the IMTFE on January 19, 1946, approving its functions, jurisdiction 
and constitution the same day. As a SCAP initiative, the IMTFE was controlled more 
directly by US interests than the IMT at Nuremberg. While at Nuremberg, decisions
9 Australia and the Soviet Union were particularly keen to indict the Emperor : Brackman, The Other 
Nuremberg, p47.
10 Apart from his royal status, Prince Konoye had twice been Prime Minister of Japan: he first served 
in this role from 1937-1939 and subsequently from July 1940-October 1941: National Diet Library of 
Japan, Historical Figures. 2003-2004, available online 
<www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e7etc/figures.html>.
11 Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, p50.
Prince Nashimoto was later released without charge in April 1946.
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concerning judicial appointments were made at the highest tiers of government by the 
US, UK, Soviet Union and France, with the judges themselves electing a president 
from among their number, at Tokyo, it was MacArthur who exercised both these 
powers. MacArthur also retained the right to review the sentences imposed by the 
IMTFE and reduce them if necessary, a power without parallel at Nuremberg13.
By all measures, the Tokyo Trial took on mammoth proportions compared to its 
Nuremberg counterpart. From indictment to judgment, the Nuremberg process had 
lasted just under a year; the Tokyo Trial went on for just over two and a half years. 
The sheer number of people present in the courtroom at any one time was greatly 
expanded at Tokyo on account of eleven powers being entitled to appoint associate 
prosecuting counsel14 and the use of both Japanese and American defence counsel in 
the proceedings. Relaxed rules of evidence and the burden of translation at Tokyo 
exponentially increased the amount of paper required to service the Trial: for its 
duration, the Trial took up one quarter of the Occupation Forces’ total paper supply, 
and at one point, more paper had to be flown in from the US exclusively to meet the 
Tribunal’s requirements15. Reflecting this greater complexity, one concurring 
opinion, two dissenting opinions and three separate opinions were recorded in 
addition to the majority judgment.
Hence, from the closing days of World War Two in the Asia-Pacific onwards, it was 
evident that the circumstances in which the Pacific War would end were very 
different from those in Europe. In particular, the high importance Japanese leaders 
placed on the sovereign immunity of the Emperor, in conjunction with the formal 
responsibility assumed by the US for every aspect of Japanese surrender and
13 Article 26 of the Nuremberg Charter states: “The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the 
innocence of any defendant shall...be final and not subject to review”: see ‘Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal’, Trial o f  the Major War Criminals, vol 1, pi 6.
14 That is, the nine Allied states who were signatory to the surrender document -  namely the US, UK, 
China, Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand - plus the 
Philippines and India: John A Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1954), p239.
15 R John Pritchard, ‘The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and its Contemporary 
Resonances’, Military Law Review 149 (1995), pp25-35, at pp26-27.
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occupation, were calculations unique to the Pacific War which impacted directly on 
the decision whether or not to prosecute the crime of aggression at Tokyo, and if so, 
how to prosecute it.
(2) The Decision Not to Prosecute Emperor Hirohito
While the decision not to prosecute the Emperor, or even compel him to testify as a 
witness, was explicable according to a variety of political explanations16, this 
decision significantly eroded arguments in support of the prosecution of Japanese 
defendants for the crime of aggression. Emperor Hirohito had been the Japanese 
head of state at all material times before and during World War Two; in strictly 
formal terms, he had been Hitler’s equal. Moreover, the extreme turbulence 
experienced in Japanese politics before and during the war meant that Hirohito was 
virtually the only constant position-holder throughout this period of interest, and thus 
he was uniquely situated to give evidence about the protagonists of, and the events 
leading up to, Japanese involvement in World War Two17. If the purpose of the 
crime of aggression was to hold individual leaders to account for their contribution to 
the waging of aggressive war, it was difficult to justify Hirohito’s immunity from 
prosecution, especially in light of his status as ultimate commander of Japan’s 
combined armed forces18. Even if it was true that in practice, Hirohito’s authority 
was significantly fettered by custom and that therefore he was more like a figurehead, 
one would expect this to be reflected in the outcome of the trial process; this claim 
does not, on its own, justify no prosecution of the Emperor at all. While Hirohito
16 The official reason for not prosecuting the Emperor was that he was a mere figurehead, and 
therefore he could not be held responsible for his role in the Pacific War. Piccigallo claims that the 
decision not to prosecute the Emperor was actually an astute political move, as the plan was to use 
existing forms of government in Japan to implement US occupation policy. There were also concerns 
that any attempt, whether real or illusory, to abolish the Emperor could incite chaos, violence and 
administrative collapse in Japan, which would also hinder occupation policy: Philip R Piccigallo, The 
Japanese on Trial (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), pi 6-17; and Timothy P Maga, Judgment 
at Tokyo (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), p35-39.
17 Indeed, the value of evidence about political affairs from imperial titleholders was not entirely 
excluded by the Tokyo Trial: Henry P’u Yi, the ex-Emperor of China, was a key witness for the 
prosecution in its case concerning Japanese activities in Manchuria: Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, 
ppl55-156.
18 This position was conferred on the Emperor under Japan’s 1889 Constitution: Shillony, Politics and 
Culture in Wartime Japan, p36.
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enjoyed immunity from prosecution, on what basis could any of his own ministers or 
other subordinates be prosecuted for the so-called ‘leadership’ crime of aggression?
Though this contention could be used to challenge the trial of any of the Tokyo 
defendants for the crime of aggression, it was an especially powerful argument in 
relation to Kido. From 1930 onwards, Kido was a top official in the Japanese 
imperial court, and from 1940 he became Hirohito’s closest adviser19. Other than 
brief periods as Minister of Education (1937), Welfare (1938) and Home Affairs 
(1939), Kido’s exclusive responsibilities were to Hirohito. If Hirohito was immune 
from prosecution, it is very difficult to understand how his most senior adviser could 
simultaneously be convicted of the crime of aggression against four states by the 
IMTFE -  yet this was precisely the outcome of the Tokyo judgment.
Thus, the significance of Hirohito’s future in the Japanese decision to surrender, and 
the SCAP decision not to prosecute him, were both important political factors which 
eroded any arguments in favour of a trial of the remaining Japanese leaders for the 
crime of aggression. Such problems were entirely avoided at Nuremberg as a 
consequence of Hitler’s suicide. The difficulties caused by the lack of justification 
for proceeding with a trial of Japanese leaders for the crime of aggression in light of 
Hirohito’s immunity was noted by both President Webb and Judge Bernard in their 
separate opinions within the Tokyo judgment20.
(3) Evidence and the Crime of Aggression
Another condition of the Japanese surrender which undermined rationales in favour 
of prosecuting the Japanese defendants for the crime of aggression was a relative lack 
of probative evidence on which to build a case against them. In the German context,
19 James TC Liu, ‘The Tokyo Trial: Source Materials’, Far Eastern Survey 17 (1948), ppl 68-170.
20 ‘The Separate Opinion of the President of the Tribunal (Sir William Flood Webb), the Member for 
Australia’, ppl 8-21, and ‘The Dissenting Opinion of the Member for France (Henri Bernard)’, p22, 
reproduced in R John Pritchard (ed), The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records o f the 
International Military Tribunal fo r  the Far East (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), vol 109 
and vol 105 respectively.
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orders from Berlin to destroy archives as Allied forces entered Germany were largely 
ignored, and thus the overwhelming bulk of the archives remained intact, providing 
the Allies with, quite literally, tonnes of documents outlining in great detail the plans, 
practices, participants and policies within the Nazi regime21. The comprehensiveness 
and very high quality of this documentation provided an excellent evidentiary basis 
upon which to proceed with a criminal prosecution of aggression against the 
Nuremberg defendants; there were plenty o f ‘smoking guns’ with their fingerprints all 
over them.
At Tokyo, however, the documentary evidence was not of the same standard: many 
Japanese had in fact destroyed, changed, or hidden incriminating evidence, or 
falsified records, immediately preceding the American landing22. Indeed, with a 
twelve day interval between the Allied acceptance of Japan’s surrender and the 
arrival in Tokyo of the first party of Americans, there was ample opportunity to 
destroy the most damning evidence: Brackman reports that among those documents 
destroyed at this time were the transcripts of all imperial conferences, all the records 
of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, all the deliberations of the 
Cabinet and Privy Council, all files on prisoners of war, all orders and plans 
concerning the attack on the Philippines and Southeast Asia, and all the documents in 
relation to the Manchurian and Chinese campaigns23. The evidence which remained 
was either of lesser importance or of more questionable reliability24. Consequently, 
the prosecution’s case largely relied on the diary of Kido, who had voluntarily 
surrendered it to the Allies25. As a result of this reduction in the qualitative standard 
of evidence, the very complete picture of events achieved at Nuremberg was not
21 Why the archives were not obliterated in accordance with official orders is discussed in Tusa, The 
Nuremberg Trial, pp96-97.
22 Peter Lowe, ‘The Tokyo Trial of Japanese Leaders, 1946-1948’, in RA Melikan (ed), Domestic and 
International Trials 1700-2000 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), ppl 37-156, at
s142-Brackman, The Other Nuremberg, p40.
24 Thus, Nobutaka’s volume translates notes of various Liaison and Imperial Conferences taken for 
Army use: see Ike Nobutaka, Japan’s Decision For War (California: Stanford University Press,
1967). Nobutaka indicates that the records used in this volume were discovered in the Military History 
Archives of the Japanese Defense Agency (at xiii). It is unclear whether these records were discovered 
in time for the Tokyo Trial.
25Solis Horwitz, ‘The Tokyo Trial’, International Conciliation 28 (1950), pp473-584, at p494.
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possible at Tokyo, resulting in many gaps concerning issues crucial to the case, such 
as the relationship between different political factions within the government at 
certain times and how powers were divided and exercised among important 
individuals. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how a trial of Japanese 
leaders for the crime of aggression could be pursued without either substantial risk of 
reducing normal thresholds of criminal responsibility to virtually nil -  in effect 
creating a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ principle - or acquittals on a large scale26. 
Yet another signficant obstacle arising out of the unique context of the Pacific War 
discouraged the prosecution of Japanese elites for the crime of aggression.
(4) The Crime of Aggression and the Circumstances of Japanese Involvement in 
WW2
A third factor problematising the decison to try Japanese leaders for the crime of 
aggression was the difference between Japanese and German conduct itself in relation 
to World War Two. What facts could be adduced at Tokyo in light of the evidentiary 
challenges already mentioned suggested that no easy analogy between the German 
and Japanese roles in World War Two could be made out. The general history of 
Germany immediately prior to, during, and after World War Two is reasonably 
straightforward and very familiar: the Nazi Party, with Hitler as its dictatorial leader 
at all material times, successfully seized power at an early stage, organised and 
controlled German domestic life according to Nazism’s ideological aims, and in 
pursuit of these aims, from 1938 to 1945 it embarked upon the gradual German 
conquest of Europe via a program of false assurances, invasion and annexation.
Conversely, the history of Japan reveals broad support at all levels for the pursuit of 
Japanese regional domination, but significant differences of view as to how to
26 By contrast, Tokyo prosecutors had ample evidence from survivors and eyewitnesses to sustain 
charges of conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity against those Japanese who were at 
the scene of the alleged crime. This is reflected in the prosecution’s summation at trial: over one-third 
of its general discussion of all the charges concerns war crimes and crimes against humanity, though 
these accounted for only three of the fifty-five charges in total made against the defendants: see R 
John Pritchard and Sonia M Zaide, Tokyo War Crimes Trial Index and Guide (New York: Garland, 
1987), vol 3, pp l025-1057.
101
achieve this. A bitter struggle ensued in leadership circles between a faction which 
supported wholeheartedly the use of force and Japan’s formal alignment with 
Germany and Italy to attain this objective, and others who advocated different, less 
immediately confrontational approaches. This struggle was enabled by a political 
system which encouraged power rivalries between different organs of government by 
assigning to each of them an exclusive sphere of authority, and making them and 
cabinet ministers directly answerable to the Emperor, not the Prime Minister27. 
While this separation of powers was designed to restrain any one organ of 
government from gaining too much political clout, it also meant that it was very 
difficult to pinpoint from among these organs which individual or individuals 
exercised actual decision-making authority for Japan on a particular issue at a specific 
point in time. For instance,, despite the extensive powers invested in the Emperor 
under the 1889 Constitution, tradition dictated that he rarely meddled in politics or 
administration. Instead, the Emperor was expected to endorse the collective advice of 
cabinet and military heads on matters of policy28. Formal imperial statements were 
in fact drawn up by the cabinet or military and had to receive initial approval from 
another body, the Privy Council, before the Emperor signed them. Similarly, in 
relation to the appointment of senior officials, Hirohito was supposed to act according 
to the wishes of yet another set of advisers. However, in other ways, he was able to 
exercise great influence by using occasions on which he met with senior officials or 
military chiefs to question them, issue general guidelines, and express his own 
opinion about their work. In addition, when his advisers were divided, Hirohito 
would personally intervene to decide the issue29. Clearly then, identifying 
responsible individuals and groups within the Tokyo regime was always going to be a 
much more difficult task than in a centralized dictatorship like Nazi Germany.
In addition, a procedural rule insisting upon unanimity of cabinet decisions or in the 
event of disagreement, the formation of a new cabinet, also had an impact during this
27 On the role of the Meiji Constitution in prewar Japan, see Takafusa Nakamura, A History ofShowa 
Japan 1926-1989 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998), pp2-4.
28 Shillony, Politics and Culture o f Wartime Japan, p37.
29Shillony, Politics and Culture o f Wartime Japan, pp37-38.
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struggle, and resulted in fifteen different Japanese cabinets in seventeen years. This 
constant political volatility meant that, unlike the German scenario, no clear pattern 
or system of conduct could be discerned which encompassed all the alleged counts of 
Japanese aggression; opportunism provided a better explanation of Japanese acts 
during this period than ideology. Apart from general economic motivations, Japan’s 
hostile actions in China in 1931 had few obvious connections in terms of actors, 
methods or immediate objectives with, for example, the attack on Pearl Harbour ten 
years later. This procedural rule also complicated substantially efforts to ascertain the 
degree to which each defendant was individually responsible for the decisions of the 
group. For example, what degree of responsibility, if any, would an individual 
merely acquiescing in a decision to proceed with war face, as opposed to an 
individual who actively supported this decision? Were an individual’s intentions 
relevant? Were the prevailing political circumstances relevant, and if so, how could 
these be taken into account in the judicial determination as to whether or not an 
individual was criminally responsible for aggression? These difficult questions were 
evaded at Nuremberg, where Nazi Germany’s totalitarian political structure and 
strong evidence of how, and by whom, political powers were exercised made the task 
of tribunal adjudication comparatively easy.
Eventually, through the use of intimidation tactics, deception and even assassination, 
Japan’s militaristic faction gained the upper hand over its uncoordinated opponents 
and in effect exercised a controlling influence over the government of Japan, though 
many ostensibly important positions remained occupied by those outside, or 
unsympathetic to, this faction. Even in relation to this faction, there was no evidence 
of a ‘conspiracy’30 in the Nuremberg sense: initially, individuals, usually of lesser 
ranking, who supported the use of force in the advancement of Japan’s goal either 
acted alone or in small groups, simply exploiting as much as possible their existing 
official positions to achieve the hostile engagement of the Japanese military in
30In accordance with the view expressed in the Nuremberg Charter and judgment, conspiracy is 
considered here as part of, and not a separate offence from, the crime of aggression: ‘Judgment’, Trial 
o f the Major War Criminals, p224.
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China31. While top elites may have acquiesced in, or at least failed to prevent these 
actions, few of them could properly be accused of the same type or level of positive 
acts in pursuit of warmongering for which the Nazi leaders were convicted. In short, 
the facts could not be easily moulded to the crime of aggression category prosecuted 
and developed at Nuremberg. Hence, even if evidence of the German standard was 
available in the Tokyo case, it was likely that a tribunal would come under heavy 
pressure to either throw out the case against Japanese leaders, or return many ‘not 
guilty’ verdicts on the basis of different facts.
The combination of the prior political decision not to prosecute the Emperor, patchy 
evidence and circumstances significantly different from the German situation were 
political conditions so detrimental to any possible rationale in favour of the 
prosecution of Japanese leaders for the crime of aggression, that they should have 
been sufficient to reject this possibility outright. While an argument was made at 
Nuremberg that the blatant wars of conquest embarked upon by Germany were 
classifiable under this heading on the basis of pre-war efforts to criminalise 
aggression and outlaw war “as an instrument of national policy”32, it was a much 
greater leap to suggest that Japan’s pursuit of regional domination by a range of 
means, many of which fell short of wars of conquest, also constituted crimes of 
aggression. Whereas it could reasonably be argued that moral outrage at the horrors 
of World War One had brought the acceptability of wars of conquest to an end, to the
31 The activities of Itagaki, Oshima and Shiratori are instructive on this point. Itagaki was held by the 
Tokyo Tribunal to have orchestrated the Mukden Incident of 1931 as an excuse for Japanese military 
response, and to have suppressed efforts to prevent such a response to that incident, though at the time 
he only held the rank of colonel: Pritchard, The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial, p49,796. Similarly, 
as military attache in the Japanese Embassy at Berlin, Oshima was convicted on the basis that he used 
this position to bypass the Japanese ambassador and to negotiate directly with von Ribbentrop in an 
effort to effect a full military alliance between Japan and Germany: Pritchard, The Tokyo Major War 
Crimes Trial, p49,823. Shiratori, who was the Japanese ambassador to Rome from 1938, was 
convicted on similar grounds to Oshima, except the target of Shiratori’s efforts was Italy, not 
Germany: Pritchard, The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial, p49,836. The significant role of middle 
management as the instigator of policy and in decision-making generally in Japan during this period 
and today is discussed in Nakamura, A History ofShowa Japan 1926-1989, pp252-253.
32 See article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1928, available online 
<www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm>. This argument remains the Nuremberg Trial’s 
single most important target of criticism. For a critical view of the Nuremberg Trial generally, see 
Franz B Schick, ‘Crimes Against Peace’, Journal o f Criminal Law and Criminology 38 (1948), pp445- 
465.
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extent that Japan achieved its objective by means other than wars of conquest, such as 
duress, treaty, installation of puppet regime and similar, no possible case could be 
made. On the contrary, a state’s pursuit of its economic goals by these means was a 
relatively regular feature of international relations. Put simply, whether because of 
the immunity of the Emperor, a lack of probative evidence necessary for a legal case 
or different facts, the Tokyo scenario was ill-suited for a Nuremberg-style trial of its 
vanquished leaders for the crime of aggression.
(5) The Crime of Aegression in the Tokyo Judgment
In these less favourable political conditions, it is unsurprising that the Tokyo 
judgment followed the prosecution’s case much more closely than the Nuremberg 
judgment did. With an even less secure political, moral and legal foundation than 
that supporting the prosecution of German leaders for aggression at Nuremberg, the 
Tokyo Tribunal had few guidelines on which to draw in coming to its conclusions. 
This left the Tokyo Tribunal only with initial, American political preferences in 
favour of prosecuting Japanese leaders for aggression, and hence it is these which are 
expressed to a very large extent in the Tokyo judgment. By contrast, the relatively 
stronger basis underpinning the Nuremberg prosecution ensured a more independent 
Tribunal and hence a judgment which did more than merely confirm the charges 
against the defendants. This distinction between the judgments is demonstrated in a 
number of ways.
For instance, the notion of conspiracy upheld by the Tokyo judgment, as compared to 
that supported by the Nuremberg judgment, reveals the ongoing impact during the 
Tokyo Trial of the extremely weak legal basis on which it was founded. At 
Nuremberg, it will be recalled from chapter four that the IMT rejected the 
prosecution’s attempt to have conspiracy recognised as a stand-alone international 
crime, and adhered strictly to the terms of the Nuremberg Charter, under which 
conspiracy was relevant in relation to the crime of aggression only33. The same
33 See p83 of this thesis.
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conservatism was not evident in the Tokyo judgment. There, prosecutors went even 
further than their Nuremberg counterparts, not just separating out the conspiracy 
charge, but expressing it in language radically different from that used in the Tokyo 
Charter, which largely followed the Nuremberg provision34. Hence, all of the Tokyo 
defendants were charged with an ongoing conspiracy between 1928 and 1945, the 
aim of which was:
“that Japan should secure the military, naval, political and economic 
domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and of 
all countries and islands therein and bordering thereon, and for that 
purpose should alone or in combination with other countries having 
similar objects, or who could be induced or coerced to join therein, 
wage declared or undeclared war or wars of aggression and war or 
wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and 
assurances, against any country or countries which might oppose that„ 35purpose.
Apart from reading down the geographical boundaries of this charge36, and despite its 
expansive terms, which brought into question whether what was being alleged even 
fell within the ambit of the crime of aggression as stipulated by the Tokyo Charter, 
the Tokyo Tribunal upheld this charge. It made this decision based on far less 
probative evidence than that relied upon at Nuremberg37. Worse, the wide scope of 
this charge and its vague language simultaneously broadened the range of persons 
likely to be found liable, and made it much more difficult for them to defeat this 
charge. As a result, twenty-three of the twenty-five Tokyo defendants against whom
34 Article 5(a) of the Tokyo Charter of 19 January 1946 defined crimes against peace as “namely, the 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing” (emphasis added); available online 
<www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm>.
35 Reproduced in United Nations, Historical Review o f Developments Relating to Aggression, p87.
36 That is, to include East Asia, the Western and South-western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, 
and certain islands in these oceans only: ‘Tokyo Judgment’ (1949), pi 137, available online 
<www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-9.html>.
37 Whereas at Nuremberg, special importance was assigned to the records of the four secret 
conferences mentioned above to prove a conspiracy existed among eight of the defendants, it was 
Okawa’s public statements in favour of the extension of Japanese territory to continental Asia and of 
Japanese domination of other areas, combined with the support this idea attracted from “a party of 
military men” and “other civilian supporters” which proved the Japanese conspiracy, according to the 
Tokyo Tribunal: ‘Tokyo Judgment’, pi 138.
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a judgment was entered38 were found guilty of conspiracy. Moreover, two of these 
were convicted of conspiracy despite being acquitted of waging aggressive war, 
suggesting a reversal of the Nuremberg conclusion -  namely, that conspiracy was a 
stand-alone crime in international law, though few, if any, references could be used in 
support of this claim. The Tokyo Tribunal’s acceptance of the prosecution’s broad 
conspiracy claim also made it easier to implicate the Tokyo defendants in the waging 
of aggressive war, and thus twenty-two of them were convicted of this charge.
Another indication that political considerations were paramount in the Tokyo 
judgment was the fact that only one defendant at Tokyo was acquitted of all 
aggression charges made against him39. Though this is not necessarily proof of a 
politically controlled tribunal, in light of the legal flaws undermining the Tokyo Trial 
from the start, several acquittals on aggression would have been a reasonable 
prediction had general legal principles prevailed in the judgment. By comparison, at 
Nuremberg, ten defendants were acquitted of aggression charges40.
There are many other procedural features of the Tokyo Trial which suggest that its 
outcome was largely a foregone conclusion once the American decision to proceed 
with prosecution had been made. Some of these include the wording of the Tokyo 
Charter compared with its Nuremberg counterpart41; partiality on the part of some of
38 Though there were originally twenty-eight Tokyo defendants, Matsuoka and Nagano died at trial and 
Okawa was committed. For further details of the charges and convictions at the Toyko Trial, see 
appendix two of this thesis.
3 Namely, Matsui. However, Matsui was sentenced to death for his failure to prevent breaches of the 
laws of war concerning POWs and civilians: see Horwitz, ‘The Tokyo Trial’, p584.
40 Bormann, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Streicher, Von Schirach and Fritzsche were acquitted of conspiracy 
and not charged with waging aggressive war; and Schacht, Sauckel, Von Papen and Speer were 
acquitted of both conspiracy and waging aggressive war.
41 One of the more worrying differences concerned each Tribunal’s powers with respect to jurisdiction. 
Article six of the Nuremberg Charter indicates that its tribunal “shall have the power to try and 
punish persons who...committed any of the following crimes”(emphasis added). By contrast, 
article five of the Tokyo Charter states its tribunal “shall have the power to try and punish Far 
Eastern war criminals who...are charged with offences which include Crimes Against 
Peace”(emphasis added). It is possible that the latter provision is simply an example of exceptionally 
poor drafting, but in light of the Tokyo Trial’s other numerous features reflecting an overwhelming 
political bias, this provision does leave open the conclusion that the Tokyo defendants were already 
considered criminal and therefore punishable at the time o f being charged rather than on conviction at 
the end of a trial process.
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the judges42; the change in evidence admissibility rules half way through the Tokyo 
Trial, which disproportionately disadvantaged the defence; the Tokyo Tribunal’s 
insistence that defence evidence in mitigation of sentence be submitted before its 
verdict was even released; and the absence of certain judges for periods of time 
without provision of an alternate43.
However, perhaps the ultimate indication of the supreme role of political imperatives 
at the heavy expense of legal principles in the Tokyo case was the fact that not one of 
the eighteen Japanese defendants sentenced to imprisonment served the full term of 
his sentence. While four died in prison44, fourteen were paroled in the 1950s45. Of 
these fourteen, thirteen had originally been given life sentences. Shigemitsu, who 
was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, was the first to be released in 1950, and 
four years later, he re-assumed his position as Foreign Minister of Japan. In contrast, 
at Nuremberg, four of the seven defendants served their full sentence46. The mass 
release of Japanese defendants might be explained as a response to recognition of the 
significant and numerous factors originally militating against the decision to 
prosecute Japanese leaders for aggression, which subsequently coloured the process 
and outcome of the Tokyo Trial, or as a response to changed political conditions. 
Either way, this action seriously undercuts the view expressed in the Nuremberg 
judgment, that initiation of a war of aggression constitutes “the supreme international
42 Aside from the issue that no neutral nations were represented on the Tokyo bench, three judges had 
prior experiences linked to the issues before the Tokyo Tribunal which made their appointment 
theoretically challengeable on grounds of partiality. While the Australian judge had previously 
investigated Japanese atrocities in New Guinea, and the second American judge had advised Roosevelt 
on responsibility for the Pearl Harbour attack, perhaps the most serious challenge available to the 
defence was against the Philippine judge, who had survived the Bataan death march - a specific subject 
of the Tokyo proceedings. After the defence challenged the Australian judge’s qualifications, the 
Tribunal indicated that no objections to any of the judges would be entertained, on the basis that no 
provision for review existed in the Tokyo Charter: see Richard H Minear, Victors’ Justice: the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp81-83.
43 For further discussion of these points, see Pritchard, ‘The International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East and its Contemporary Resonances’, pp25-35.
44 That is, Koiso, Shiratori, Togo and Umezu.
45 These fourteen included Araki, Hashimoto, Hata, Hiranuma, Hoshino, Kaya, Kido, Minami, Oka, 
Oshima, Sato, Shigemitsu, Shimada, and Suzuki.
46 namely, Hess, Doenitz, Von Schirach and Speer. Funk, Von Neurath and Raeder were released in 
the mid-1950s on grounds of ill health: Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg (Chapel Hill: UNC 
Press, 1998), p245.
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crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the 
accumulated evil of the whole”47. From this, it is apparent that the crime of 
aggression at the Tokyo Trial simply provided a rationale for effectively ousting 
Japanese elites from power during the US occupation of Japan.
(6) Conclusion
The Tokyo Trial can be interpreted as a cautionary tale about the limitations on what 
legal mechanisms can achieve in the international arena when pursued out of narrow, 
political self-interest despite factual circumstances which defy legal classification. 
While at Nuremberg, the decision in favour of prosecuting the crime of aggression 
was facilitated by Hitler’s suicide, high quality documentary evidence and a 
reasonably clear case history revealing a series of wars of conquest planned and 
implemented from the highest levels of government authority, the absence of these 
facilitating factors in the Tokyo circumstances militated strongly against the criminal 
prosecution of aggression there. Despite these major obstacles, and in accordance 
with political priorities, the decision was made to proceed with the Tokyo Trial and 
the prosecution of aggression. However, the impact of these obstacles continued to 
be significant, resulting in a judgment and verdict that was much more questionable 
than the Nuremberg outcome. These weaknesses were exacerbated by a range of 
procedural problems with the Tokyo Trial which unfairly helped the prosecution’s 
argument and hence further demonstrated the centrality of political objectives at 
Tokyo. As a result, with little guidance from the law, it was reasonably predictable 
that the majority of judges at Tokyo would affirm the prosecution’s case to a very
48great extent .
Over and above anything else, the decision to proceed with a trial of the Japanese 
defendants for aggression was dictated by the requirements of the American
47 ‘Judgment’, The Trial o f the Major War Criminals, pi 86.
48 However, the minority judges were far more critical of the prosecution’s case. The Member for 
India, Judge Pal, was particularly strident in his opposition to the conclusions of the majority, entering 
a 1200 page opinion which refuted virtually every point made in the majority’s judgment: see 
Pritchard, The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial, vols 106-108.
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occupation force, led by the SCAP. This decision was not altered even though it 
became apparent that such a trial would be beset by overwhelming legal problems of 
a kind unknown at Nuremberg. In this way, the prosecution of the crime of 
aggression at the IMTFE and the Tokyo Trial’s outcome are much more obvious 
exercises of naked political power than the Nuremberg experience. While 
Nuremberg provides positive proof of what the concept of aggression can achieve 
when supported by favourable political, moral and legal conditions, Tokyo reminds 
us of how easily the concept can be used to justify unfair “victors’ justice” in pursuit 
of political goals which supersede all other considerations.
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Chapter Six: Defining Aggression and the UN, 1944-1974
In chapter three, it was demonstrated how the desire to strengthen League procedures 
led to efforts to 'define' aggression as contained in the main collective security 
provision of the League Covenant, article 10. Despite these efforts, no consensus on 
a definition of aggression emerged at this time, and the League was eventually 
destroyed by the onset of World War Two.
In the post-World War Two era, defining the concept of aggression re-emerged in the 
context of negotiations prior to the creation of the UN Charter, and again once the 
UN organisation had been established. However, the political backdrop of the Cold 
War conflict between the superpowers prevented any progress on this topic. While 
UN committees consistently approached the task of defining aggression as a matter of 
law, the disputes played out in these committees strongly reflected the greater 
political conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, as well as their respective 
allies. The history of the concept of aggression in the UN period once again 
highlights the significance of favourable political conditions to the further 
development of this concept in international relations. Before examining the concept 
of aggression in the Charter period, it is important first to understand how the notion 
came to be included in the UN Charter.
(1) Aggression in the United Nations Charter
(a) Pre-Dumbarton Oaks Conference
Planning for the maintenance of peace and security post-World War Two via a form 
of international organization commenced soon after hostilities began in 1939, and 
again was largely spearheaded by the US. While the first State Department 
committee assigned to this task was established at the beginning of 19401, its efforts
1 Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation o f the UN (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997), p44.
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were soon interrupted by the more immediate challenges posed by Hitler’s march 
across Europe. Subsequent planning attempts met with the same fate until December 
1943, when the Department’s Informal Political Agenda Group was officially charged 
with this duty.
It was this group which examined all the major issues concerning postwar security 
and drew up comprehensive drafts for an international organization, which were then 
forwarded to the President for his consideration and comment. Like Wilson, 
Roosevelt preferred an international organization of universal reach, rather than one 
comprised of a system of bilateral alliances or regional groupings2; however, he was 
also keen to avoid comparisons between the new organisation and the failed League 
of Nations, or characterisations of the new organisation as some form of world 
superstate. Thus, he supported a decentralized organization in which security 
decisions would be made collectively by the US, UK, China and the Soviet Union on 
a ‘unanimity with abstention’ basis3. Roosevelt communicated these views and his 
general approval of the group’s proposals to the Department in February 1944; a 
more detailed draft was then produced, which laid the foundations of the 
Department’s submission to the Dumbarton Oaks conferences. This submission 
became the unofficial working document of those conferences4.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the UK turned its attention in a serious way to 
postwar planning in autumn 1942. However, real progress was slow until August 
1943, because of major differences of view between the Foreign Office and the Prime
2 John G Ruggie, ‘Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism After the Cold War’, 
Political Science Quarterly 109 (1994), pp553-570, at p555.
3 Robert C Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 
p35. ‘Unanimity with abstention’ meant that great power unanimity was required for a decision to be 
validly made, but any of the great powers could choose to abstain from voting, which would not 
impact upon the outcome of the vote. Only a negative vote by one or more of the great powers could 
prevent a decision from being made. For further discussion of the American position in relation to 
voting procedures, see Thomas M Campbell, ‘US Motives in the Veto Power’, International 
Organization 28 (1974), pp557-560; and by the same author, ‘Nationalism in America's UN Policy 
1944-1945’, International Organization 27 (1973), pp25-44.
4 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p71. Eagleton claims the early delivery of the US plan to the three 
other governments in July 1944, its “constitutional form” and greater detail were the reasons why it 
became the working document at Dumbarton Oaks: see Clyde Eagleton, ‘The Charter Adopted at San 
Francisco’, American Political Science Review 39 (1945), pp934-942, at pp934-935.
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Minister about the new international organization. While the Foreign Office 
supported Roosevelt’s plan for a universal organization in which the Big Four held a 
controlling interest, Churchill vigorously defended a regionally-organised structure, 
and saw little merit for the UK in the universalist, Big Four plan. For Churchill, 
Europe, her recovery, and the containment of the Soviet Union were the central 
concerns, and these priorities should have been strongly reflected in British proposals 
for the postwar international organization5. Finally at the Quebec Conference in 
August 1943, Churchill reluctantly accepted Roosevelt’s proposal for a universal 
security organization, thus clearing the way for more comprehensive British plans to 
be drawn up. By April 1944, a British interdepartmental committee had drafted five 
memoranda outlining the preferred contours of the new organisation from the British 
perspective.
The second memorandum, known as Memorandum B on peace and security, skilfully 
relied on the perceived drafting errors of the League Covenant to argue forcefully the 
British position. As in the negotiations leading up to the establishment of the League, 
the UK opposed any undertaking to guarantee members’ ‘territorial integrity’ or 
‘political independence’, for the reason that such a guarantee would make the new 
organization vulnerable to allegations of preserving the status quo and making 
peaceful change of borders impossible. The difficulty of defining ‘political 
independence’ was also raised as a reason not to make it the subject of a guarantee. 
In a similar vein, the UK opposed any reference to ‘justice’ in dispute settlement, as a 
consequence of its “ambiguous legalistic implications”6 and out of recognition that, 
in certain circumstances, maintaining peace may mean some members must bear 
lesser injustices.
The UK view was also highly skeptical of any attempt to use the term ‘aggression’ in 
relation to the new organisation. Memorandum B pressed the position that making 
the punishment of aggression the foundation for League action under article 10 of the
5 Hoopes, FDR and the Creation o f the UN, pp69-70.
6 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p50.
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Covenant had been a grave error. This stipulation meant too much League time had 
been wasted trying to define aggression in light of each set of circumstances coming 
before the League, which had aided aggressors by delaying the League’s response to 
their acts7. Yet it was also probable that a strict definition of aggression would also 
impede the new organization in the fulfillment of its peace and security functions. 
Consequently, with regard to the constitutional documents of the new organization, 
the UK rejected the inclusion of a list of circumstances amounting to aggression in 
relation to which the new organisation would act. Rather, it preferred to afford the 
new Council a high level of discretion on this issue, empowering it to act “in 
accordance with the principles and objects of the Organisation”8.
By contrast, the Soviet perspective viewed aggression -  more specifically, the 
prospect of revived German aggression, and ways of preventing this possibility -  as 
the raison d ’etre of the new postwar organization. On this basis, Stalin, like 
Churchill, initially favoured some form of regional organization for Europe, though 
he too eventually came to support Roosevelt’s worldwide aspirations. Beyond these 
very vague indicators, specific Soviet ambitions for the new organization at this time 
were opaque9. However it was clear that the Soviet Union was preoccupied with how 
the new organisation would serve its own security interests; other proposed features 
of the new organization -  such as an economic and social council and an international 
court of justice -  were of little importance in Soviet eyes10.
(b) Dumbarton Oaks Conference. August-October 1944
These initial views were further developed and argued out at Dumbarton Oaks. In the 
first and most important round, with the US, UK and Soviet Union in attendance, the
7 Kelsen supported the exclusion of the term ‘aggression’ from the UN Charter on similar grounds. In 
his view, aggression was a “military-technical” term rather than a legal term, which could “hardly be 
defined in a way satisfactory for legal purposes”: H Kelsen, ‘The Old and the New League: The 
Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals’, American Journal o f  International Law 39 (1945) 
pp45-83, at p74.
Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p50.
9Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, pp46-7.
10 Hoopes, FDR and the Creation o f the UN, ppl 42-3.
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difference between British and Soviet views on the relevance of the concept of 
aggression in the new organization became even sharper. In accordance with the 
Soviet view that the primary purpose of the Security Council was to keep aggression 
in check, it insisted that the term be expressly included in the Charter provisions 
dealing with the scope of the Council’s powers11. The Soviet delegation reasoned 
that the term ‘aggression’ had gained in prevalence in the preceding years, which 
justified an explicit reference in the new organisation’s constitution -  especially when 
it had been the major Allied powers themselves which had spurred on this growing 
prevalence12. Further, the Soviet Union failed to see how peacekeeping could take 
place unless based on the fundamental aim of punishing aggressors. It envisaged the 
Security Council as the institutionalized version of the wartime alliance between the 
Soviet Union, US and UK, which would use its superior military power to combat 
future aggressors as it had done against Nazi Germany13.
In response, the UK largely reiterated the reasons outlined in Memorandum B for 
omitting the term ‘aggression’. The League’s history of time-wasting and failure 
caused by placing the concept of aggression at the heart of its security provisions 
could only be overcome by abandoning the concept altogether and instead 
substituting more practical terminology, such as ‘breach of the peace’. On this point, 
the UK had the support of the US, which viewed the phrase ‘act of aggression’ as 
overloaded with moral implications14. In a shift away from its prior role promoting 
the concept of aggression for the purposes of international security and prosecuting 
war-mongering state leaders, the US now preferred the abandoment of ‘aggression’ in 
favour of less morally charged language like ‘breach of the peace’, which it felt
11 Edwin Borchard, ‘The Dumbarton Oaks Conference’, American Journal o f International Law 39 
(1945), pp97-101, at p98.
12 For instance, see Agreement Between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against 
Aggression (the Lend-Lease Agreement) of 23 February, 1942, available online 
<www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade04.htm>; the Moscow Declaration of November 1943, 
signed by the US, UK, Soviet Union and China, where reference is made to the “menace of 
aggression”: see footnote 31 of chapter four of this thesis (p80); and the Cairo Declaration of 
December 1, 1943, signed by US, UK and China, which refers to the “aggression of Japan”: see 
footnote 1 of chapter five of this thesis (p94).
13 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, ppl 37-138.
14 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, pi 38.
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would in any case still capture conduct falling within the ‘aggression’ category15. 
Despite the best arguments of the US and UK, the Soviet Union refused to yield on 
the importance of incorporating the concept of aggression into the constitution of the 
new organisation. Thus, the compromise formula empowering the Security Council 
with respect to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” was 
agreed upon, and formed part of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which were later 
used as the basis of discussions at San Francisco16.
On the related issue of whether to include a definition of aggression in the new 
organisation’s charter, the British position easily triumphed. The great technological 
advances in warfare experienced in the first part of the twentieth century, coupled 
with the uncertainty of not knowing how warfare might develop in the future, 
highlighted the need for the Security Council to be able to exercise its full powers 
unencumbered by definitions or other potential fetters17. Whether convinced by these 
arguments, or merely eager to protect their own freedom of action, the Americans and 
Soviets agreed with the British to exclude a definition of aggression from the final 
text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals18.
15 The US position at this time against including a statement about aggression in the UN Charter is 
difficult to reconcile with its signing of the Act of Chapultepec only a month prior to the 
commencement of the San Francisco Conference. This regional treaty declared “That every attack of a 
State against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political 
independence of an American state, shall...be considered as an act of aggression against the other 
states which sign this Act. In any case invasion by armed forces of one state into the territory of 
another trespassing boundaries established by treaty and dermarcated in accordance therewith shall 
constitute an act of aggression” [emphasis added]. See George A Finch, ‘The United Nations Charter’, 
American Journal o f International Law 39 (1945), pp541-546, at p543.
16 This formula featured in two different sections of the Proposals. It first appeared in Chapter 1, which 
dealt with the purposes of the organisation, as follows: “The purposes of the Organisation should be:
1. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures 
for prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace...”. It also appeared under Chapter VIII Section B: “2. In general the Security 
Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or 
restore peace and security”: text available online, <www.ibiblio.org/pha/policv/l 944/441007a.html>. 
The San Francisco conference in the next section.
17 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, pi 38.
18 At the second round of meetings at Dumbarton Oaks between the US, UK and China, the latter 
delegation reintroduced the suggestion that a definition of aggression be included in the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals. China argued that such definition would expedite Security Council action, promote 
confidence in the new organization, enable public opinion to identify an aggressor quickly and act as a 
deterrent to potential aggressors. China thought that some statement of examples of aggression would
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(c) United Nations Conference on International Organisation. San Francisco. April-
June 1945
At San Francisco, where fifty governments met to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals for the new international organisation, the issue of defining aggression in 
the Charter was again raised. Many delegations, particularly from among the smaller 
states, were extremely reluctant to leave the Security Council with the broad, 
sweeping discretionary powers it enjoyed under the Proposals19. The smaller powers 
feared the great powers might use such a provision to justify action in circumstances 
more politically expedient for them than strictly international security-threatening.
To this end, draft amendments to the Proposals from Bolivia and the Philippines were 
circulated on May 5, both of which included definitions of aggression20. At the May 
18 meeting of Committee III/3, which was addressing the new organisation’s 
enforcement arrangements, these states jointly proposed a motion compelling 
immediate Security Council intervention in the event of at least one of the
suffice as an indicator of that term’s meaning; a full definition was not necessary. However, having 
already addressed this issue with the Soviets, the UK and US evidently were able to persuade China 
that it would be better to leave to the Security Council the discretion to decide on an ad hoc basis what 
conduct amounted to aggression, and no alterations to the Proposals were made.
19 Leland M Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter o f the United Nations: Commentary and 
Documents {Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), p263.
20 Bolivia’s proposed definition read as follows: “A state shall be designated an aggressor if it has 
committed any of the following acts to the detriment of another state, (a) Invasion of another state’s 
territory by armed forces, (b) Declaration of war. (c) Attack by land, sea, or air forces, with or without 
declaration of war, on another state’s territory, shipping or aircraft, (d) Support given to armed bands 
for the purpose of invasion, (e) Intervention in another state’s internal or foreign affairs, (f) Refusal to 
submit the matter which has caused a dispute to the peaceful means provided for its settlement, (g) 
Refusal to comply with a judicial decision lawfully pronounced by an International Court.” The 
proposed definition submitted by the Philippines provided: “Any nation should be considered as 
threatening the peace or as an aggressor, if it should be the first party to commit any of the following 
acts: (1) To declare war against another nation; (2) To invade or attack, with or without declaration of 
war, the territory, public vessel, or public aircraft of another nation; (3) To subject another nation to 
naval, land or air blockade; and (4) To interfere with the internal affairs of another nation by supplying 
arms, ammunition, money or other forms of aid to any armed band, faction or group, or by establishing 
agencies in that nation to conduct propaganda subversive of the institutions of that nation”. Both 
proposed definitions reproduced in United Nations Conference on International Organization 
Documents (London: United Nations Information Organisation, 1945), vol 3, p585 and p538 
respectively.
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circumstances specified in the Bolivian amendment actually taking place21. This 
motion attracted support from a range of small and middle powers, including 
Uruguay, Mexico, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Mexico 
and New Zealand. Delegates from these states reiterated similar arguments in favour 
of definition to those presented by China at Dumbarton Oaks -  namely, (1) it was 
preferable to know in advance what acts comprised aggression and hence would 
attract sanctions; (2) the Security Council would be aided in its work by the 
incorporation of a list of specified aggressive acts into the Charter; and (3) the list did 
not have to be exclusive, and thus the Security Council would still be able to act in 
situations falling outside the scope of the list.
In an effort to resolve the crucial problem of enforcement, which had also plagued the 
League, this group of states further argued the Charter should make explicit that the 
occurrence of any of the circumstances contained in the Bolivian list should give rise 
to automatic Council action. This would provide assurance that the Council would 
indeed act in the listed situations. Specifying circumstances in the Charter where 
action would be automatic was also crucial if the Council’s voting procedure was 
going to allow just one veto from any of the permanent members to paralyse it. At 
least the first three circumstances in the Bolivian list were uncontroversial, in terms 
of requiring enforcement action in response; moreover, it was the collective view of 
the supporting states that “the Organisation must bind itself to oppose lawless force 
by lawful force in certain cases where action should be obligatory”22.
Opposition to the motion was expressed by a diverse collection of small states and 
great powers, namely Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, South 
Africa, the UK and the US. They countered that it was not possible to stipulate all 
acts that comprised aggression, and even if a non-exhaustive list format was accepted, 
that could promote the exclusion of unlisted acts from Council consideration23. The
21 United Nations Conference on International Organization Documents, vol 12, p341.
22 United Nations Conference on International Organization Documents, vol 12, p342.
23 William TR Fox, ‘Collective Enforcement of Peace and Security’, American Political Science 
Review 39 (1945), pp970-981, at p973.
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difficulties of defining aggression ahead of time were also raised; by contrast, 
identifying an aggressive act after its occurrence would be “simple”24. Automatic 
Council action was unwise and potentially hazardous because it might compel 
premature enforcement action. In relation to the substance of the Bolivian list, 
opponents argued that any act classified as aggression could also be considered a 
“legitimate act of self-defence”25 in certain circumstances; and that some of the terms 
in the Bolivian list, such as “intervention”, would themselves require further 
definition. For these reasons, it was safer to empower the Council with full discretion 
to decide when aggression had occurred.
At the next meeting of Committee III/3, the fate of the Bolivian/Philippines motion, 
and with it the issue of defining aggression in the Charter, was sealed: on this
occasion, France and the Soviet Union, amongst others, also stated their opposition to 
the motion. Thus, with four of the great powers having registered their disapproval, it 
was unsurprising that the motion was defeated by a vote of 22 to 1226. Subsequently, 
the issue of aggression was not brought up again at San Francisco. Thus, the 
Dumbarton Oaks approach - which expressly included aggression within the remit of 
the Security Council’s powers in response to Soviet views of the punitive role of the 
new organisation, and yet left this term undefined by agreement of the great powers -  
was adopted into the final text of the UN Charter27. By including references to 
aggression in the UN Charter without any further detail, the great powers had ensured 
they retained ultimate discretion in relation to international security matters.
(2) Defining Aggression at the United Nations
In the early UN period, it soon became evident that military action would be 
authorised very exceptionally by the Security Council as a consequence of growing 
Cold War tensions. As the split intensified between the Soviet Union and its allies on
24 United Nations Conference on International Organization Documents, vol 12, p342.
25 United Nations Conference on International Organization Documents, vol 12, p342.
26 United Nations Conference on International Organization Documents, vol 12, p349.
27 See articles 1(1) and 39 of the UN Charter: available online, <www.un.org/aboutun/charter>.
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the one side, and the US and its allies on the other, the likelihood increased of one of 
the P5 states exercising its veto power in the Security Council in pursuit of its 
priorities with respect to this broader conflict, thus reducing even further the 
probability that any given situation requiring Security Council response would 
actually receive one. Impotence in the Security Council caused by Cold War 
divisions started to encourage states with complaints concerning international 
security to go to the General Assembly instead. The complaints raised in the General 
Assembly of “threats to the political independence and territorial integrity” of 
Greece , of China , and of “hostile activities” in Yugoslavia are cases in point.
It was against the backdrop of Cold War paralysis in the Security Council that in 
1950 the General Assembly referred to the International Law Commission for its 
consideration the “Duties of States in the event of Outbreak of Hostilities”31. 
Inevitably, albeit indirectly, examination of this topic raised once again the prospect 
of defining aggression. By 1952, the Secretary-General had produced a 
comprehensive report outlining the arguments for and against defining aggression by 
international agreement. Although these arguments were largely irreconcilable with 
one another, each relying on a vision of international relations which strongly 
conflicted with the perspective underpinning the other side32, the General Assembly 
decided that same year to convene a special committee to consider the issue of 
defining aggression, in association with a possible code of international criminal 
offences against the peace and security of mankind33.
If the pro-definition camp was correct, the practical effects of a definition of 
aggression -  for instance, providing states with guidance on prohibited behaviour and
28 See GA Res 193 (III) of 27 November 1948.
29 See GA Res 292 (IV) of 8 December 1949.
30 See GA Res 509 (VI) of 14 December 1951.
31 see GA Res 378 (V) of 17 November 1950.
32 For instance, pro-definition states argued that a definition was necessary, while anti-definition states 
claimed it was not; the former further argued that a definition was in any case desirable, whereas the 
latter provided reasons it was not.
33 See GA Res 688 (VII) of 20 December 1952. Discussion of the related topic concerning 
international criminal jurisdiction will be developed in chapter seven.
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the limits of self-defence; educating and empowering public opinion; and assisting 
the international organs responsible for making determinations -  might help to 
overcome the significant political obstacles preventing the Security Council from 
fulfilling consistently and in all respects its peace and security duties. For this 
important reason, a definition of aggression was considered by the General Assembly 
to be worth pursuing, even if initial indicators of the success of this task were less 
than promising. It was thought that if the lawyers could define aggression 
successfully, the political stagnation on international security matters provoked by the 
Cold War might be circumvented.
In total, the General Assembly convened four committees to define aggression in the 
lead-up to the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression of 1974. Although the 
four committees throughout their deliberations continued to approach the issue of 
defining aggression as a legal exercise, the influence of political considerations in the 
committees’ meetings was strong and constant, with views often split down Cold War 
lines. Thus, the more the committees doggedly pursued attempts to paper over 
political divisions by negotiating a supposedly legally binding definition of 
aggression, ironically the more they highlighted the political differences that existed. 
Finally, after a significant verbal confrontation between the US and Soviet Union at 
the 1968 meeting of the fourth committee, the enduring political nature of the 
problem of defining aggression was noted, clearing the way for the very fragile 
consensus underpinning the General Assembly Definition of Aggression to be 
brokered. It is to the deliberations of these committees that we now turn.
(a) 1953 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression—
From this report, it is clear that very little agreement existed about any aspect of the 
task of defining aggression, and that the positions taken by delegates on these issues 
were strongly influenced by Cold War considerations. While France, the UK and the 
Netherlands favoured a narrowly-construed definiton of aggression informed by the
34 A/2638, reproduced in Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, ppl 87-201.
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Charter obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and the right of self- 
defence, other states, including the Soviet Union, Poland, Mexico, Bolivia, and Iran 
argued in favour of a definition which was not restricted to issues of armed force but 
also took into account the Charter principles of sovereign equality35, non­
intervention36, equal rights and self-determination37. The Soviet Union, Bolivia and 
Iran were joined by Syria and the Dominican Republic in the view that certain 
economic conduct fell within the scope of the Charter meaning of aggression, while 
the UK and Brazil contended that it did not. In support of the latter state, the US 
noted that “serious consequences might result from extending the idea of aggression”, 
which included a weakening of the concept as a whole38. The Soviet Union and 
others also advocated including acts of an ideological nature in the definition, such as 
the encouragement of “war propaganda”39. This again was opposed by two leading 
members of the Western bloc, the US and UK.
Even the form a definition of aggression should take provoked controversy. Three 
possible kinds of definition -  general, enumerative, or a combination of both -  were 
identified. While those in favour of a general definition argued it would provide 
sufficient flexibility to address unforeseen circumstances and would contribute to the 
evolution of international law, critics like Poland argued a general definition would 
be futile in the absence of a statement of elements constituting aggression, because
making a determination in accordance with a general definition would require
protracted discussions, thus impeding a timely UN response if indeed aggression had 
been committed. Those such as the Soviet Union and Poland who supported an 
enumerative definition -  namely, a list of condemned acts -  believed this would make 
the determination of aggression easier by placing the burden of proof on the alleged 
aggressor, rather than on the victim. However, critics like the UK and China40 
opposed this approach on the basis that it would make more problematic the
35 art 2(1) of the UN Charter.
36 art 2(7) of the UN Charter.
37 art 1 (2) of the UN Charter.
38 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, pi 95.
39 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, pi 99.
40 During this time, China was represented at the UN by the Republic of China. The People's Republic 
of China was recognised by the UN as the legitimate government of China in 1971.
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restoration of peace; it would make determinations of aggression automatic; and it 
would help would-be aggressors to avoid a determination against them simply by 
engaging in conduct outside the scope of the definition. A definition which combined 
a general statement and a list of acts was viewed by supporters as embodying the 
merits of both approaches, while opponents contended it would simply unite the 
defects of the two approaches.
The effect of a definition of aggression was perhaps the most contentious issue in this 
and subsequent committee meetings; disagreement was so entrenched that delegates 
were forced merely to repeat the same views stated by the Secretary-General in his 
report of the year before. Thus, proponents of definition, such as the Soviet Union, 
Iran, Syria, Poland, Bolivia and Mexico claimed it would contribute to the evolution 
of international law; provide guidance to international organs, facilitating less 
subjective decision-making; educate public opinion and discourage potential 
aggressors. Opponents of definition41, responded that it would not deter potential 
aggressors, it would only encourage them to adopt different techniques; it would 
impede international organs in their assigned task of determining the aggressor; and 
history had shown that a definition was both unnecessary and virtually impossible to 
reach through consensus. Norway pointed out that the real difficulty of judging 
whether aggression had taken place or not was a result of the difficulty of discovering 
the facts in a given situation of high conflict. The existence or otherwise of a 
definition of aggression was a secondary matter; a definition would only be of use 
provided preliminary agreement on the facts existed42. Thus, in practice, it was not 
whether a specific act was aggressive or not that divided opinion among states -  
rather, it was whether that act had in fact taken place.
Some committee members emphasized that a definition would exert immense moral 
authority over those bodies exercising international peace and security functions,
41 The 1953 Report does not identify specifically which states opposed a definition of aggression; 
however, excluding the supporters of a definition, the remaining committee members represented the 
following states: Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the US and UK. 
It can be surmised that these latter two states at least were firmly opposed to a definition.
42 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, pi 97.
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while the Dominican Republic argued that a definition, if adopted as part of a General 
Assembly resolution, might become recognized as a general principle of international 
law, in which case its effect would be “questionable”43 -  that is, more significant than 
a purely moral obligation. Other states, such as Poland, tried to shut down any future 
discussion on the effect of definition by arguing that General Assembly resolutions 
59944 and 68845 had settled the matter - in favour of definition -  for good.
(b) 1956 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression—
In 1954, the original special committee of fifteen members was expanded to nineteen 
members, and in General Assembly resolutions 897(IX)47 and 898(IX)48, work 
towards the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and 
the establishment of an international criminal court was suspended until the special 
committee on defining aggression had submitted its report49. The 1956 Report 
reveals little progress on the substance, purpose and effect of a definition of 
aggression since 1953.
Once again, the content of a definition was hotly debated, with positions on various 
proposals being largely determined according to Soviet or Western bloc membership. 
Seven draft proposals in total were submitted to the 1956 Committee by the Soviet 
Union and her friends and allies, including Paraguay, Iran, Panama, China, Iraq, 
Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Peru. The US expressly criticized six of these 
drafts50. The UK joined the US in criticizing four of these, and formally associated
43 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, pi 98.
44 Of 31 January 1952. In its preamble, this resolution stated “considering that...it is nevertheless 
possible and desirable...to define aggression by reference to the elements which constitute it”.
45 Of 20 December 1952. This resolution referred to “the need for a detailed study of (a) the various 
forms of aggression...” (emphasis added).
46 A/3574, reproduced in Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, pp215-247.
47 Of 4 December 1954.
48 Of 14 December 1954.
49 As a result of the longstanding difficulties each successive special committee had defining 
aggression, the impact of GA Res 897(IX) and 898(IX) was to postpone work on these related topics 
indefinitely. As shall be revealed below, the impact of this postponement played an important role in 
the development of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression.
50 The seventh draft was not the subject of comprehensive discussion.
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itself with American criticisms in relation to the Soviet draft. In particular, the 
centrality of the priority principle -  namely, the state who first commits any act listed 
as prohibited should be declared “the attacker” -  in the Soviet draft attracted serious 
opposition from the US, the UK and the Netherlands. By contrast, Soviet bloc 
members Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as firm Soviet friend Syria, spoke in 
favour of the Soviet draft51. While states such as Yugoslavia52 expressed their 
opposition to the inclusion of notions of economic, ideological or indirect53 
aggression in a definition, others including the Soviet Union, Paraguay, Iran, and 
China still pushed for the same.
As in 1953, the basic issue of what a definition of aggression would achieve -  
described quaintly in UN documents as “the possibility and desirability of a 
definition”54 -  remained controversial. While states including the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Poland, the Netherlands, Mexico, Syria, Paraguay and Peru felt 
that a definition was possible and desirable for international peace and security 
purposes, others lamented the fact that any definition would not be binding, and 
therefore would, at best, provide guidance. For this latter reason, certain delegates 
continued to argue that a definition would, in reality, be useless. This discussion also 
raised the issue of which international bodies were meant to be guided by a definition. 
While some states such as the Soviet Union contended that any definition was for use 
by the Security Council only in the performance of its peace and security functions, 
others claimed on the basis of GA resolution 377A (V)55 that in certain
51 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p231.
52 Other than Yugoslavia, the 1956 Report does not identity opponents of a definition of aggression 
which extends to economic, ideological or indirect means, merely indicating that their numbers are 
substantial: Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p222.
53 that is, subversive activities such as fomenting civil strife in foreign nations and assisting armed 
bands.
54 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p225.
55 Under GA Res 377A (V) of 3 November 1950, also referred to as the Uniting for Peace resolution, 
the General Assembly conferred upon itself the power to make “appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures”, in the event that the Security Council fails to perform its functions 
where “there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” as a 
consequence of a lack of P5 unanimity. Originally passed in order to enable UN action during the 
Suez Crisis, to which the UK and France were parties, GA Res 377A has subsequently been used as a 
basis for calling emergency special sessions of the General Assembly in response to outbreaks of 
international hostilities: see chapter seven of this thesis for further details.
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circumstances, the General Assembly might also be empowered to determine the 
aggressor56.
Further, extended debate on the definition’s effect merely reinforced the same old 
intractable divisions described in the Secretary-General’s 1952 report57. Thus, China 
doubted the utility of a definition in an international community “where everyone 
freely carried arms, everyone freely produced arms, where no police force or courts 
with compulsory powers existed”58; the US cited the “mischief and confusion”59 that 
a definition could bring to the fulfillment of the UN’s peace and security functions; 
and the UK restated that a definition might in fact encourage a potential aggressor by 
de-emphasising the significance of acts falling outside the definition’s scope. In 
response to this latter concern, “almost all”60 committee members agreed that the 
Security Council should retain and exercise its freedom to identify as aggression acts 
not specifically enumerated in the definition, in appropriate circumstances. However, 
the Netherlands and Norway questioned the extent to which a definition could 
perform its apparent guidance role if a provision to this effect was incorporated into 
the definition61. Despite this view, states such as Syria, Yugoslavia and Peru 
continued to argue respectively that it was desirable to bind the Security Council, at 
least morally, to identify aggression when the definition’s listed acts occurred; that a 
definition would make a significant contribution to the maintenance of peace and 
security; and although it was probable that any definition would display some flaws, 
“a legislator should not insist on formulating only perfect rules”62.
56 This conclusion is left open in the draft definitions forwarded to the 1956 Committee by Paraguay, 
Iran, Panama, and Mexico, which do not specify the Security Council but merely refer to the 
“competent organ of the United Nations”: Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, pp245- 
246.
57 Indeed, the US representative, pointed out “the artificial and insubstantial character of the 
impression that a large measure of agreement existed in the United Nations on the possibility of 
drafting an acceptable definition of aggression”, where in his view there was only “fundamental and 
irreconcilable differences”: Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p!225.
58 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p226.
59 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p226.
60 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p228.
61 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p228.
62 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p226.
126
In light of the continuing and irresolvable differences of opinion symptomatic of the 
broader Cold War conflict which were expressed in the 1956 report, the General 
Assembly decided in 1957 to postpone consideration of the question of defining 
aggression for two years, at which time a third special committee would be 
convened63. In 1959, this third committee of twenty-one members met; with Cold 
War tensions still operating, political differences continued to make defining 
aggression impossible, and the third committee adjourned until 1962. Again for this 
reason, the third committee adjourned its deliberations two more times, thus 
suspending further work until 1967. In that year, a Soviet request to the General 
Assembly about the “Need to Expedite the drafting of a definition of aggression in 
the light of the present international situation”64 resulted in the establishment of yet 
another special committee, this time of 35 members, which commenced work in 
1968.
(c) Work of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression from 
1968 onwards65
By 1968, the international political climate had shifted away from the intense 
acrimony which typified the early years of the Cold War, towards a slightly more 
conciliatory environment. The Sino-Soviet split from the late 1960s onwards 
diverted the attention of China and the Soviet Union from attacking US interests, and 
simultaneously presented the US with new opportunities to further its political 
leverage over one, or possibly both, powers66. In addition, by this time both the 
Soviet Union and the US began to feel the heavy economic strain of their global 
competition, in particular with respect to the nuclear arms race and the Vietnam War 
respectively, and hence they also had a clear financial interest in achieving a form of 
rapprochement. In these relatively less confrontational conditions, the chance to
63 See GA Res 1181 (XII) of 29 November 1957.
64 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p275.
65 The reports of the Special Committee from 1968-1973 are reproduced in Ferencz, Ferencz, Defining 
International Aggression, vol 2, pp280-319, 326-364, 372-438, 446-484,493-509, and 519-539.
66 Raymond L Garthodd, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to 
Reagan (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1994).
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make some progress towards a definition of aggression was grasped by the General 
Assembly.
However, the warming of relations between the superpowers would take a few years 
yet, as the 1968 Committee meeting attested. This first opportunity to meet to define 
aggression after a twelve year hiatus proved to be explosive by UN standards. While 
discussing the perennial issue of what would be achieved in international peace and 
security terms by a definition of aggression, and after the same old pro-definition 
argument about guidance “for Member States and the United Nations”67 had been 
reiterated, the Soviet Union used the occasion to declare unilaterally that the US had 
committed aggression in Vietnam, a view backed up by Algeria, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Syria. Not content to stop there, the Soviet Union added that the US had also 
committed other acts of aggression in Latin America, Cuba, Panama and the 
Dominican Republic. In response, the US indicated that in relation to the Vietnam 
conflict it was only North Vietnam and its supporters that were the aggressors. 
Further, the US reminded the Soviet Union it occupied “the almost unique position 
among world Powers of having been formally judged an aggressor by a world body”, 
and pointed out that “the Hungarian people must draw cold comfort from the pious 
declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union that no State could invade another 
State”68.
This exchange illustrated very clearly how irrelevant a definition of aggression was 
for the maintenance of international security in political circumstances where the 
great powers were locked in battle among themselves. This point was not lost on 
certain members of the committee: the 1968 Report indicates that doubts were 
expressed by certain states concerning the value of a definition, with some of them 
still questioning “the advisability of defining aggression at all”69 just five years 
before GA Res 3314. Finally, it was this latter group which succinctly identified the 
true source of the problem lurking beneath efforts to define aggression:
67 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p292.
68 ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, pp294-295.
69 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p298.
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“The main thing needed to deter or suppress aggression was not to 
have a definition, but to ensure that the system of collective security 
would be applied and until now it was not the absence of a definition 
of aggression which had hampered the organs of the United Nations 
in their efforts to maintain peace and security. Success or failure had 
depended on the willingness, or lack of willingness, of States 
Members to respect their Charter obligations. Consequently there 
was the danger that a definition would create an illusion of 
accomplishment when none in fact had been made”.70
The implication of this apparently long-forgotten insight -  that no development of 
international law, such as a definition of aggression, could successfully conquer 
international political conditions in which the great powers were each competing for 
world supremacy - dealt a serious blow to the pro-definition camp. Being compelled 
to concede that even with a definition of aggression, Charter obligations in relation to 
international security were unlikely to be enforced in light of the superpower global 
competition meant that pro-definition states had no option but to return to their 
original, rather weak starting point: that a definition could still act as a useful, non­
binding guide to decision-making bodies.
Following these events, it is unsurprising that the three draft proposals which 
dominated the attention of the 1969 Committee reaffirmed the non-binding nature of 
a definition of aggression vis-a-vis the Security Council’s powers71. With this 
agreed, the other issues raised by the task of defining aggression seemed to fade into 
insignificance. If, in the prevailing Cold War climate, a definition could at best only 
guide the Security Council in its peace and security functions, neither restricting the 
Security Council’s discretion to those acts listed in a definition, nor compelling the 
Security Council to determine aggression when any of the listed acts occurred, then
70 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p298.
71 See paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Soviet draft (Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, 
pp330-l) and paragraph 5 of the Thirteen Power draft submitted by Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, 
Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Spain, Uganda, Uruguay and Yugoslavia (Ferencz, 
Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p332). While these two drafts explicitly referred to the non­
binding nature of a definition, the Six Power draft submitted by Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the US 
and UK simply stated that “.. .‘aggression’ is a term to be applied by the Security Council when 
appropriate.. Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p333.
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neither the task of defining aggression, nor any particular definition, were any longer 
of crucial importance for international security. This growing realization during the 
Committee's 1970-1972 sessions facilitated compromise among the states, later 
making possible the adoption of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression in 
1974.
If, by 1968 onwards, it was recognised that inhospitable Cold War conditions limited 
what a definition of aggression could achieve, why did the Committee continue with 
its deliberations until 1974, when the General Assembly Definition of Aggression 
was adopted? The answer to this question lies in the General Assembly’s 1954 
decision to postpone work on the related questions of the Draft Code of Offences 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, and on the international criminal court, 
until a definition of aggression was accomplished. The desire to reopen these other 
issues thus provided strong motivation for a definition of aggression, separate from 
arguments about the inherent value of such a definition itself. Hence, at the 1973 
meeting of one of the UN’s subsidiary organs, where the Committee’s incomplete 
draft definition was discussed, a view stressing the importance of reaching consensus 
on a definition of aggression was stated thus:
“a modest compromise now was more important than continuous 
deliberations on a more comprehensive definition; a limited 
consensus could clear the way for continuing efforts to codify and 
progressively develop international law in some important 
fields...”72
The significance of this motivation over and above the substance of a definition of 
aggression is apparent in the text of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression, 
which simply preserved in its text many of the outstanding differences of view 
generated by conflicting political ideologies which were expressed during the 
deliberations of the UN committees since the early 1950s. Thus, in the General 
Assembly Definition of Aggression, the status of ‘economic’ and ‘ideological’ 
aggression is left open, and references supporting both the narrow and wide
72 Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol 2, p545.
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constructions of the Charter meaning of aggression were included73. These kind of 
loopholes reveal that the General Assembly ’Definition' of Aggression in fact defines 
very little; instead, this resolution demonstrates the continuation of Cold War political 
divisions during and after its adoption. Consequently, the thirty-year UN effort to 
define aggression has shown how powerless developments of international law for 
maintaining international security are in the face of great power struggles which 
threaten the prevailing balance of power.
(3) Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated how, in the aftermath of World War Two, the concept of 
aggression re-emerged during UN Charter negotiations and later in discussions within 
the UN organisation itself. Despite strong British and American opposition to any 
reference to aggression in the UN Charter in light of the League experience, 
aggression was included alongside ‘threat to the peace’ and ‘breach of the peace’ in 
the final Charter draft at Soviet insistence.
Although the great powers succeeded in preventing any ‘definition’ of aggression 
from being included in the Charter, this topic was revived by the UN in the early 
1950s in response to Security Council paralysis caused by the Cold War. Rather than 
helping to ease these international political tensions, however, it was shown how the 
efforts of the four consecutive committees to define aggression themselves revealed 
the ongoing impact of the Cold War conflict. Legal arguments about the content, 
form and purpose of a definition of aggression played out in these committees 
actually masked deeper political discord reflective of the Cold War divide, as 
dramatic outbursts from the Soviet Union and the US in the 1968 committee meeting 
attested. These political tensions were also reflected in the terms of the 1974 
Definition, which was agreed more out of a desire to reopen discussions postponed 
until aggression was defined than by any new international political consensus. Thus,
73 Contrast preambular paragraph 2 of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression, which refers to 
the enforcement provisions in the UN Charter, and article 7, which upholds the right to self- 
determination.
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UN attempts to define aggression for the purpose of international security exposed 
the high degree to which international law mechanisms are constrained by, and are 
reflective of, the existing balance of power.
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Chapter Seven: Aggression at the UN, 1945-
The last chapter contended that General Assembly efforts to ‘define’ aggression for 
international security purposes, and ILC attempts to further entrench the crime of 
aggression into international law both demonstrated the high degree to which the 
concept of aggression is influenced and constrained by international political 
conditions. In this chapter, the historical record of the Security Council, General 
Assembly and International Court of Justice is examined to reveal both (1) the extent 
to which, and (2) how, the concept of aggression has featured in the activities of these 
bodies. It is argued that the Security Council’s record with respect to the concept of 
aggression also provides strong evidence that unfavourable international political 
conditions have significantly hampered the performance of the Security Council’s 
peace and security duties, producing an incongruous array of Security Council 
resolutions.
In light of these difficulties, the General Assembly has adopted its own resolutions 
identifying aggression on certain occasions; however, these resolutions are of 
hortatory value at best, in light of the Security Council’s exclusive enforcement 
powers under the UN Charter. Since 1991, the concept of aggression has disappeared 
almost entirely from the Security Council’s and General Assembly’s vocabulary, both 
of these bodies tending to describe incidents involving the use of armed force as 
‘threats to international peace and security’. Finally, the International Court of 
Justice has also occasionally considered the concept of aggression in its 
jurisprudence, though it too has demonstrated great reluctance to rule that aggression 
has occurred, even when confronted with a serious instance of international 
hostilities. These findings lend further support to the claim that the operation and 
development of the current international legal order is more likely to reflect the 




Despite its power to make determinations as to the existence of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression under article 39 of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council very infrequently exercised this power between 1945 and 1990. 
Cold War competition obstructed consensus in the Security Council on how best to 
address challenges to international peace and security. In fact, Cold War 
considerations dominated political activities to such an extent during this time that the 
Security Council only managed to authorize full-scale peace enforcement action -  the 
most serious Security Council response available -  on two occasions: in Korea in 
1950, and in Kuwait in 1990. Significantly, the Soviet Union was absent from the 
Security Council during the vote on Resolution 82, which, despite is title1, 
determined that the armed attack by which North Korea commenced war against the 
Republic of Korea was a breach of the peace. Similarly, it was only at the tail end of 
the Cold War, when US-Soviet tensions had relaxed somewhat, that Resolution 6602 
was made possible. But even then, Soviet insistence that the concept of aggression be 
excluded from this resolution resulted in another determination “that there exists a 
breach of international peace and security”3. With top-end peace enforcement action 
authorized by the Security Council for breaches of the peace resulting in regional 
wars, it is perhaps no surprise that the Security Council has never in its history used 
its powers under Charter article 39 to determine the existence of aggression.
On this basis, if the Security Council made no reference to aggression or aggressive 
activities in any of its resolutions, this might suggest that in the post-Charter period, 
the concept of aggression has never played any political role in international relations, 
having been supplanted by the categories of ‘threat to the peace’ and ‘breach of the 
peace’ for the purposes of maintaining international order. However, on several 
occasions, the Security Council has complicated matters by
1 SC Res 82 of 25 June 1950 was entitled ‘Complaint of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea’.
2 Of 2 August 1990.
3 Christopher Greenwood, ‘New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law’, 
Modern Law Review 55 (1992), ppl53-178 at pi 59.
134
describing and denouncing an incident as aggressive, though stopping short of a 
formal determination to this effect. The cases of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia 
and Israel are especially relevant on this point.
From the early 1960s through to the mid-1980s, South Africa was the subject of 
many Security Council resolutions for its conduct in relation to Angola, Zambia, 
Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia. On multiple occasions, the Security Council 
“strongly condemn[ed]” South Africa for:
(a) its “aggression”4, its “latest premeditated and unprovoked aggression”5, 
and finally its “continued, intensified and unprovoked acts of aggression”6 
against Angola7;
(b) its “continued collusion.. .in repeated acts of aggression” against Zambia8;
(c) its “premeditated aggressive act” against Lesotho9;
(d) its “recent unprovoked and unwarranted military attack on the capital of 
Botswana as an act of aggression”10; and
(e) its ‘‘utilization of the Territory of Namibia as a springboard for acts of 
aggression and destabilization of Angola”11.
Despite these acknowledgements of the aggressive nature of South African actions - 
and with the exception of the largely unsuccessful arms embargo established by 
Security Council resolution 418 of 197712 - the Security Council did little more in 
these resolutions than demand that South Africa desist from its aggressive conduct, 
and ask other states to help the victims of the aggression. By deliberately refraining
4 see SC Res 387 of 31 March 1976, and SC Res 454 of 2 November 1979.
5 SC Res 574 of 7 October 1985.
6 SC Res 577 of 6 December 1985.
7 SC Res 574 of 7 October 1985.
8 SC Res 455 of 23 November 1979.
9 SC Res 527 of 15 December 1982.
10 SC Res 568 of 21 June 1985.
11 SC Res 602 of 25 November 1987.
12 The embargo's lack of success can be implied from SC Res 574 of 7 October 1985, in which the
Security Council reiterated its call to states to “implement fully” the arms embargo first made
mandatory eight years earlier.
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from making a formal determination about South African conduct, yet at the same 
time expressly criticising South Africa’s aggressions in its resolutions, the Security 
Council brought to the world’s attention its impotence as the main entity for ensuring 
international peace and security in the context on an enduring, all-encompassing great 
power conflict.
Similarly, without formally determining that aggression had been committed, the 
Security Council was still condemning the ongoing "provocative and aggressive acts" 
of Southern Rhodesia against Mozambique13 and the former’s "continued, intensified 
and unprovoked acts of aggression" against Zambia14 ten years after comprehensive 
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had first been introduced. Once again, in 1985, 
the Security Council condemned Israel’s “act of armed aggression”, and even went so 
far as to acknowledge Tunisia’s right to reparations from Israel for its raid of PLO 
headquarters, yet still failed to make a formal determination that aggression had taken 
place15. Further examples also exist of the Security Council invoking the notion of 
aggression for basic ‘naming and shaming’ purposes while at the same time ignoring 
the opportunity to make a formal finding of its existence16.
Taken together, these examples reinforce the blunt observation made at the 1968 
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression: that it is the lack of 
political will, not perceived difficulties with the concept of aggression itself, which is 
the real issue preventing the Charter security regime from functioning as designed17. 
Until this underlying problem is addressed, the concept of aggression is destined to be 
used as a term of moral censure at most by the Security Council, other bodies and 
individual states alike.
13 SC Res 386 of 17 March 1976 and SC Res 411 of 30 June 1977.
14 SC Res 455 of 23 November 1979.
15 SC Res 573 of 4 October 1985.
16 For instance, the Security Council also condemned "the act of armed aggression" committed against 
Benin (SC Res 405 of 14 April 1977) and the "mercenary aggression" against the Seychelles (SC Res 
496 of 15 December 1981 and SC Res 507 of 28 May 1982), without explicitly identifying the state 
from which such conduct originated, let alone making a determination under article 39.
17 This observation is discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis (pi 28-129).
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However, there is reason to believe that even in relation to this limited use, the 
concept of aggression in the context of international relations is waning. While the 
end of the Cold War has facilitated the emergence of a revived UN, including a 
Security Council which more frequently exercises its powers under article 39, at the 
same time, the Security Council has shifted even further away from the concept of 
aggression. Virtually all situations subject to a Security Council determination since 
1991 have been classified in the ‘threat to the peace’ category. Thus, events arising 
out of the implosion of the former Yugoslavia18; civil wars in Sierra Leone19,
O f\ 0 \  0 0  0"XAngola , Liberia , and Haiti ; mutinies in Central African Republic and Ivory 
Coast24; the failure of the Taliban in Afghanistan to “respond to the demands o f ’ 
Security Resolution 1214 of 199825; and the “magnitude of the human tragedy”26 
resulting from conflict within Somalia’s borders have all been held by the Security 
Council to constitute, or to continue to constitute, “a threat to international peace and 
security”. In none of these resolutions has the Security Council described or 
denounced the acts committed in terms of aggression. To the extent that historical 
record is any guide, the Security Council’s practice during the Cold War of 
classifying even invasions as ‘breaches of the peace’, combined with its post-Cold 
War tendency to expand the ‘threat to the peace’ category to encompass all 
unconventional challenges to international peace and security, would strongly suggest 
the concept of aggression plays an insignificant role in relation to the maintenance of 
international security.
18 See, for example, SC Res 1088 of 12 December 1996, SC Res 1575 of 22 November 2004, and SC 
Res 1639 of 21 November 2005 on Bosnia and Herzegovina; SC Res 1079 of 15 November 1996, and 
SC Res 1120 of 14 July 1997 on Croatia; and SC Res 1244 of 10 June 1999 on Kosovo.
19 SC Res 1132 of 8 October 1997.
20 SC Res 1374 of 19 October 2001.
21 SC Res 788 of 19 November 1992.
22 SC Res 1529 of 29 February 2004.
23 SC Res 1125 of 6 August 1997 and SC Res 1136 of 6 November 1997.
24 SC Res 1464 of 4 February 2003.
25 SC Res 1267 of 15 October 1999 and SC Res 1333 of 19 December 2000.
26 SC Res 794 of 3 December 1992.
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(2) General Assembly
These difficulties in the Security Council have been mirrored in the General 
Assembly, whether in its emergency special sessions, its general special sessions, or 
its ordinary meetings. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution27, nine emergency 
special sessions of the General Assembly were called by the Security Council during 
the Cold War to address urgent problems of international peace and security in 
relation to which the proper course of action could not be agreed28. What is striking 
about these emergency special sessions is the degree to which the General Assembly, 
like the Security Council, refrained from identifying international conflicts as 
aggression, despite the General Assembly’s more representative composition and 
formal equality of voting, regardless of the gravity of the situations being addressed. 
Thus, the General Assembly made no mention of aggression in relation to the 1956 
Suez Crisis29, the Soviet invasion of Hungary the same year30, the 1967 Six Day 
War31, or the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan32. Only three of the ten situations 
dealt with by the General Assembly in its emergency special sessions refer to 
aggression at all, and these all took place in the 1980s, as the Cold War was coming 
to an end33.
Similarly, the General Assembly has echoed condemnations of aggression first made 
by the Security Council. Nine years after the Security Council first decided South 
Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia was “an aggressive encroachment on the
27 GA Res 377 of 3 November 1950.
28 In addition, one emergency session, dealing with the Six Day War of 1967, was convened on the 
basis of a letter from the Soviet Union under rule 20 of the General Assembly’s rules of procedure.
291st Emergency Special Session of the GA: held 7-10 Nov, 1956: see GA Res 997-1003 (ES-1)
30 2nd Emergency Special Session of the GA: held 4-10 Nov, 1956: see GA Res 1004-1005 (ES-II)
31 5th Emergency Special Session of the GA: held 17 June-18 September 1967: see GA Res 2252- 
2257 (ES-V)
32 6th Emergency Special Session of the GA: held 10-14 January, 1980: see GA Res ES-6/2.
33 The General Assembly’s three emergency special sessions referring to aggression were: (1) its 
seventh session in 1982, in which the General Assembly indicated it was “deeply alarmed at the 
explosive situation in the Middle East resulting from the Israeli aggression against the sovereign state 
of Lebanon and the Palestinian people, which poses a threat to international peace and security” (see 
GA Res ES-7/7); (2) its eighth session in 1981 on Namibia; and (3) its ninth session in 1982 
concerning the Israeli administration and occupation of the Golan Heights. The latter two emergency 
special sessions are discussed below.
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authority of the United Nations”34, the General Assembly in 1978 described the 
South African annexation of Walvis Bay as “an act of aggression against the 
Namibian people”, and indicated that “South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia 
constitutes a continued act of aggression”35. Moreover, the General Assembly 
condemned South Africa’s aggression against Angola, among other states, in 1988, 
yet South African aggression towards Angola had already been denounced by the 
Security Council in 197636. While the great powers remained divided on the issue of 
whether or not to respond to South Africa with military enforcement action, the 
General Assembly’s resolutions added moral support at most to the existing 
resolutions of the Security Council on these occasions37.
The value of the General Assembly’s resolutions as a form of moral support is one 
thing; their worth as tools of moral suasion for compelling Security Council action 
where great power consensus is absent is quite another. On occasions where the 
General Assembly has been first to condemn aggressive activities, the Security 
Council has not followed suit with corresponding action. For example, while the 
General Assembly criticized “acts of aggression” taking place in Central America in 
1983, the Security Council made no determination about these events at all38.
The Security Council has not even acted on General Assembly decisions about 
international security specifically referred to that body by the Security Council itself
34 SC Res 269 of 12 August 1969.
35 GA Res S-9/2 at paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 respectively. However, it should be noted that the 
General Assembly generally and somewhat pre-emptively stated that it “considers that any attempt to 
annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression” (GA 
Res 1889 of 6 November 1963) and “considers further that any attempt to annex a part or the whole of 
Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression” (GA Res 2074 of 17 December 1965).
36 See GA Res 43/26 and SC Res 387 of 1976 respectively.
37 Where the Security Council can agree on what action to take, it is even less clear what value 
statements about aggression emanating from the General Assembly hold. Hence, what motivated the 
General Assembly’s finding that “the Central People’s Government of People’s Republic of China, by 
giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by 
engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea” 
more than seven months after the Security Council had determined a breach of the peace had occurred, 
and almost four months after US forces crossed the 38th parallel, is uncertain.
38 Compare SC Res 530 of 19 May 1983 with GA Res 38/10 of 11 November 1983. However, despite 
the General Assembly’s strong language in this resolution, it did not explicitly identify which state or 
states were the culprit/s.
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as a consequence of great power disagreement. Thus, while the General Assembly 
declared at its eighth emergency special session in 1981 “that the illegal occupation 
of Namibia by South Africa together with the repeated acts of aggression committed 
by South Africa against neighbouring states constitute a breach of international peace 
and security”, Cold War conflict between the great powers left the General Assembly 
re-declaring South Africa’s conduct as aggression under the terms of the General 
Assembly Definition of Aggression a further six times, up until 198 839. In addition, 
the General Assembly’s conclusion at its ninth emergency special session in 1982 
that:
“Israel’s decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, 
jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan 
Heights constitutes an act of aggression under the provisions of 
article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and [the General 
Assembly Definition of Aggression]”,
was similarly ignored by the Security Council, though the General Assembly 
condemned and re-declared this act of aggression every year for seven consecutive 
years40. Despite the General Assembly’s best efforts, at no stage did the Security 
Council make a formal determination that aggression existed in either of these cases. 
Constant mention of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression in that body’s 
resolutions appears not to have made any difference either. From this, it would seem 
that the General Assembly’s greater willingness to invoke the concept of aggression 
has exercised minimal moral force over the Security Council’s hesitancy to do the 
same.
While in the post-Cold War period, the Security Council seems to have abandoned 
altogether any references to the concept of aggression in the performance of its peace 
and security functions, opting instead to respond to new challenges by interpreting
39 See GA Res 37/233 of 20 December 1982; GA Res 38/36 of 1 December 1983; GA Res 39/50 of 12 
December 1984; GA Res 40/97 of 13 December 1985; GA Res 42/14 of 6 November 1987; GA Res 
43/26 of 17 November 1988.
40 See GA Res 39/146 of 14 December 1984; GA Res 40/168 of 16 December 1985; GA Res 41/162 of 
4 December 1986; GA Res 42/209 of 11 December 1987; GA Res 43/54 of 6 December 1988; GA Res 
44/40 of 4 December 1989 and GA Res 45/83 of 13 December 1990.
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widely what is meant by a ‘threat to international peace and security’, the General 
Assembly continued to hold on to to the notion of aggression, at least until 1994, 
while at the same time adopting the Security Council’s new approach. Thus, the 
General Assembly referred to “the aggression against the territory of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security” in 199241 and “the continued aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
in 199442. It was also in 1994 that the General Assembly noticeably dropped any 
references to Israeli aggression or GA Res 3314 from its resolutions in relation to the 
Golan Heights43. Since 1994, the situation in the Golan Heights appears to have been 
downgraded even further by the General Assembly, which last year “determine[d] 
once more that the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and its de facto 
annexation constitute a stumbling block in the way of achieving a just, 
comprehensive and lasting peace in the region”44. The ways in which the General 
Assembly has addressed other situations since 1994 also suggest that the concept of 
aggression has now disappeared entirely from its resolution vocabulary45.
(3) The International Court of Justice
The record of the International Court of Justice also reflects the limitations of UN 
organs where entrenched political problems are concerned. On the one hand, the 
requirement that the express consent of both sides to a dispute is given before the ICJ 
can carry out its adjudication functions addresses the problem of law enforcement in
41 GA Res 46/242 of 25 August 1992. Also note GA Res 47/121 of 18 December 1992 and Res 48/88 
of 20 December 1993 which include references to “aggressive acts” and the “continuation of 
aggression” respectively.
42 GA Res 49/10 of 3 November 1994.
43 See GA Res 49/87 and GA Res 49/88, both of 16 December 1994.
44 GA Res 60/40 of 1 December 2005.
45 See for example GA Res 50/159 of 28 February 1996, in which the General Assembly “condemns
all those from within and outside [Burundi] who are attacking innocent populations, arming extremists, 
heedlessly violating human rights and seriously undermining national peace and security”; GA Res 
59/32 of 31 January 2005, in which the General Assembly “reiterates its determination that any actions 
taken by Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Holy City of Jerusalem are 
illegal and therefore null and void and have no validity whatsoever”;and GA Res 53/203A-B of 12 
February 1999 in which the General Assembly “condemns the fact that foreign military support to the 
Afghan parties continued unabated through 1998 and calls upon all States strictly to refrain from any 
outside interference [in Afghanistan] and immediately to end...the presence and involvement of any 
foreign military, paramilitary or secret service personnel”.
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the international arena, by increasing the likelihood that implementation of those 
decisions will take place. However, on the other hand, this condition also restricts 
greatly the range of disputes heard by the ICJ in practice, meaning that where 
relations between states have deteriorated to the degree that allegations of aggression 
are involved, it is unlikely that all parties will consent to the I d 's  adjudication of the 
dispute. Even where consent of the parties is granted, the outcome of ICJ 
proceedings is often strongly influenced by external political considerations, reflected 
in the discontinuance notices filed with the agreement of the parties on the basis that 
the issues have subsequently been resolved out of court46.
As a consequence of ICJ rules and practice, then, it is unsurprising that it has only 
been confronted with arguments explicitly concerning aggression on two occasions. 
The ICJ has dealt with these contentions very cautiously. In the Nicaragua 
(Admissability) case47, the US argued that Nicaragua’s application to the ICJ was 
inadmissible on the grounds that the crux of Nicaragua's claim was that:
"the United States is engaged in an unlawful use of armed force, or 
breach of the peace, or acts of aggression against Nicaragua, a 
matter which is committed by the Charter and by practice to the 
competence of other organs, in particular the United Nations 
Security Council"48.
However, the ICJ rejected this argument, on the basis that it was evident the situation 
"demand[ed] the peaceful settlement of disputes"49, did not concern a continuing
46 See, for example the Questions o f  Interpretation and Application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v United States)(l992-2003) cases, which were discontinued at the request of Libya, 
the UK and the US; and Aerial Incident o f  3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic o f Iran v. United States o f  
America) (1989-1996), which was discontinued at the request of Iran and the US. Further details are 
available online, <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm>.
47 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States o f  
America)(l984-1991), available online <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm>.
48 as summarised by the ICJ in its judgment on admissibility (hereinafter ‘Admissability Judgment’), 
p431, paragraph 89: see <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusframe.htm>.
49 ‘Admissability Judgment’, p434, paragraph 94: available online,
< www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusframe.htm>.
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armed conflict between Nicaragua and the US, and was hence properly brought 
before the ICJ.
As Nicaragua had not expressly alleged aggression in its application, in Nicaragua 
(Merits)50 the ICJ was able to avoid to a great extent making any important rulings in 
this area. Instead, it focussed on what was meant by an "armed attack". In deciding 
the scope of "armed attack", the ICJ indicated that art 3(g) of the General Assembly 
Definition of Aggression reflected the position of customary international law51. By 
narrowly restricting its ruling to this specific provision, it has been suggested the ICJ 
has thrown doubt on the status of the rest of the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression.
By contrast, in Armed Activities on the Territory o f the Congo52, the Congo asked the 
ICJ to declare inter alia that Uganda was "guilty of an act of aggression within the 
meaning of article 1 of [the General Assembly Definition of Aggression]...contrary 
to article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter"53. This was top of the 
Congo's list of requests to the ICJ, and in light of the seriousness of the events being 
adjudicated54, was a vital part of the Congo's application. The ICJ substantially 
upheld the Congo's claim, but did so in its own terms: "the unlawful military
intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration that the Court
50 See footnote 47 of this chapter.
51 ‘Merits Judgment’, pi 03, paragraph 195: available online,
<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusframe.htm>. Article 3 states: "Any of the following acts, 
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of art 2, 
qualify as an act of aggression....(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as 
to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein".
52 (Democratic Republic o f the Congo v Uganda)(l999-2005), available online 
<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm>.
53 see ‘Application Instituting Proceedings’ of 23 June 1999, pi 7, available online 
<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icoapplication/ico_iapplication_19990623.pdf>.
54 In his declaration, Judge Koroma points out that the events forming the subject of the case cost three 
to four million lives (‘Declaration of Judge Koroma’, paragraph 1), and Judge Simma emphasises that 
during the events in question, Uganda controlled Congolese territory the size of Germany: (‘Separate 
Opinion of Judge Simma’, paragraph 2), available online <www.icj-
cij.org/icj www/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm>.
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considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in 
article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter”55.
This was as close as the ICJ got to considering the extent to which Uganda’s actions 
amounted to aggression, let alone to making a finding that Uganda had committed 
such aggression. Given the Congo's multiple requests throughout the proceedings for 
a declaration in relation to aggression, the I d 's  evasion of this important question can 
only be explained by reference to political sensitivities concerning the Security 
Council and its own record with respect to determinations of aggression. Had the ICJ 
explicitly made a finding of aggression, this would have brought more public 
attention to the political problem of inconsistent great power compliance with 
international obligations, an outcome the ICJ was apparently eager to avoid, despite 
the demands of its own judicial role.
Yet by avoiding altogether the issue of aggression in the circumstances presented by 
this case, the ICJ derogated from its own duties, and revealed the high degree to 
which this formally independent legal body can be influenced by grave political 
considerations. This point was not lost on two of the judges presiding over this case. 
Hence, in his separate opinion, Judge Elaraby outlined a range of factors pertaining to 
this case which:
"require[d] the Court to adhere to its judicial responsibility to 
adjudicate on a normative basis...the Court should...have embarked 
on a determination as to whether the egregious use of force by 
Uganda falls within the customary rule of international law as 
embodied in [the General Assembly Definition of Aggression]''56.
55‘Judgment of 19 December 2005’, paragraph 165, available online, 
<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm>.
56 ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby’, paragraph 17, available online, 
<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm>.
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By normal judicial standards, Judge Elaraby's conclusion was outspoken: "I am 
unable, however, to appreciate any compelling reason for the Court to refrain from 
finding that Uganda’s actions did indeed amount to aggression"57.
By comparison, Judge Simma's separate opinion made Judge Elaraby look restrained:
"...So, why not call a spade a spade? If there ever was a military 
activity before the Court that deserves to be qualified as an act of 
aggression, it is the Ugandan invasion of the DRC. Compared to its 
scale and impact, the military adventures the Court had to deal with 
in earlier cases, as in Corfu Channel, Nicaragua, or Oil Platforms, 
border on the insignificant...
The Council will have had its own - political - reasons for refraining 
from such a determination [ie that the Ugandan invasion constituted 
an act of aggression]. But the Court, as the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations, does not have to follow that course. Its very 
raison d'etre is to arrive at decisions based on law and nothing but 
the law, keeping the political context of the cases before it in mind, 
of course, but not desisting from stating what is manifest out of 
regard for such non-legal considerations. This is the division of 
labour between the Court and the political organs of the United 
Nations envisaged by the Charter!...
By the unnecessarily cautious way in which it handles this matter, as 
well as by dodging the issue of 'aggression', the Court creates the 
impression that it somehow feels uncomfortable being confronted 
with certain questions of utmost importance in contemporary 
international relations."58
Thus, even within the ICJ, it seems the impact of international political conditions has 
triumphed, at least for the moment, over the further development of the concept of 
aggression.
57 ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby’, paragraph 20.
58 ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Simma’, paragraphs 2, 3 and 15 respectively. Emphasis in original. The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo also filed separate applications similarly requesting declarations 
that Burundi and Rwanda had committed "acts of armed aggression" against it, but these proceedings 
were later discontinued: see Press Release 2001/2 of 1 February 2001, available online <www.icj- 
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icb/icbframe.htm>. The Congo later sought to make a fresh application against 
Rwanda on 28 May 2002, but the ICJ ruled on 3 February 2006 it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter 




The approaches in practice adopted by the Security Council, General Assembly and 
International Court of Justice to the concept of aggression since 1945 confirm our 
findings from chapter six -  namely, that great power disagreement arising out of the 
Cold War conflict has prevented to a great extent the concept of aggression from 
assuming a central role in the maintenance of international peace and security. While 
up until 1990 the Security Council and General Assembly on occasion referred to 
instances of aggression in their resolutions, the Security Council has never made a 
formal determination to this effect, and thus the concept has never formed the basis of 
UN action to restore order. Instead, the concept has acted as an indicator of the 
Security Council’s and/or General Assembly’s moral condemnation of a situation, 
though this in itself has not translated into UN remedial action in the face of strong 
political forces militating against this option. With minimal evidence to suggest the 
concept of aggression plays any positive, tangible part in the maintenance of 
international peace and security -  and in light of the controversies associated with the 
General Assembly’s attempts to define the notion -  it is perhaps not surprising that in 
the post-Cold War period, the concept of aggression has quietly vanished from 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. This political shift away from 
the concept of aggression has even infiltrated the UN’s judicial organ, as the majority 
judgment in the ICJ’s Armed Activities on the Territory o f the Congo case 
demonstrates. However, this infiltration has not gone unnoticed or unopposed, as the 
opinions of Elaraby and Simma JJ reveal. While certain members of the ICJ continue 
to resist the extinction of the concept of aggression, we can expect the clash between 
great power political interests and the legal status quo to continue on the international 
stage.
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Chapter Eight: The Crime of Aggression and the UN. 1946-1998
Like the General Assembly's attempts to define aggression which culminated in 
the General Assembly Definition of Aggression, its efforts to develop this notion 
as an international crime also strongly reflect the influence of changing 
international political conditions. Initial General Assembly efforts -  prompted by 
Security Council inaction as a consequence of the Cold War - focussed on moving 
beyond the Nuremberg and Tokyo precedents to establish aggression as a state 
crime. For this reason, further progress on this task was postponed until the 
outcome of the General Assembly’s attempts to define aggression. As the Cold 
War intensified in the 1950s, however, it became evident that establishing 
aggression as a state crime would be a political impossibility, and thus, the 
International Law Commission (ILC) shifted its emphasis back to individual 
criminal responsibility for aggression. Despite this shift, the influence of the 
General Assembly Definition of Aggression and continuing preoccupation with 
defining aggression have lingered on in an international criminal law context, 
disguising the underlying, central political question: namely, whether or not the 
crime of aggression should be prosecuted at all. Since the end of the Cold War, it 
is this unresolved political issue which has been at the heart of discussions about 
the crime of aggression, it being no longer possible to assume on the basis of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo precedents that a great power consensus supporting the 
prosecution of the crime of aggression still exists. Like General Assembly efforts 
to define aggression, the history of the crime of aggression in the UN era 
demonstrates the extent to which international legal initiatives are constrained by 
the vital interests of the great powers.
(1) Aggression as a Crime: 1946-1954
The crime of aggression was considered initially by the General Assembly in 
relation to two separate, but related, topics: (a) the codification of international 
law; and (b) an international criminal jurisdiction. The thrust of debates on these 
topics during this period concerned aggression as a state crime, with individual
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criminal responsibility as a secondary consideration. It is to these debates that we 
now turn.
(a) The Codification of International Law
In an effort to contribute to the further development of international law, in 1947 
the General Assembly directed the ILC to extrapolate the relevant tenets of 
international law from the Nuremberg Charter and judgment, and to draft a code 
of offences against the peace and security of mankind1. The ILC held its first 
session in 1949; the following year, the Special Rapporteur for this topic 
submitted his report on a draft code. Even at this stage, it was evident that 
insistence on defining aggression was futile. Quoting Soviet objections to the 
American proposal to insert a definition of aggression into the Nuremberg Charter 
in 1945 , the Special Rapporteur reasoned as follows:
“ ‘When people speak about aggression, they know what that 
means, but, when they come to define it, they come up against 
difficulties which it has not been possible to overcome up to the 
present time’...For the[se] reasons... we suggest that the 
International Law Commission abstain from any attempt at defining 
the notion of ‘aggression’. Such an attempt would prove be a 
pure waste of time.”3
In addition, the Nuremberg and Tokyo precedents themselves demonstrated that, 
for the purposes of individual criminal responsibility, a definition of aggression 
was unnecessary; there, a general statement of an individual’s culpability was all 
that was used. While the ILC thus refrained from attempts to define aggression 
exhaustively in its 1951 Draft Code4, its provisions setting out liability for 
aggression went far beyond the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, expressing 
responsibility in terms of state, rather than individual, conduct:
1 See GA Res 177 of 21 November 1947. Hereafter referred to as Draft Code. Although the title 
of the 1951 Draft Code refers to “offences” rather than “crimes”, the difference is cosmetic rather 
than substantive, as the commentaries to the 1951 Draft Code -  which refer to crimes -  makes 
clear. The Draft Code was renamed the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind in 1987.
2 See chapter four of this thesis, p80.
3 ‘Report by J. Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur’ (A/CN.4/25), Yearbook o f the International Law 
Commission (1950), vol 2, p262. Emphasis added.
4 The ILC also produced a draft code in 1954. The only difference between the 1951 and 1954 
drafts was the addition of crimes against UN personnel within the ambit of the latter.
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“The following acts are offences against the peace and security of 
mankind:
(1) Any act of aggression, including the employment by the 
authorities of a State of armed force against another State for 
any purpose other than national or collective self-defence or in 
pursuance of a decision or recommendation by a competent 
organ of the United Nations.
(2) Any threat by the authorities of a State to resort to any act of 
aggression against another State.. .”5
The intention of the ILC was to criminalise every act of aggression committed by 
a state6, thus endorsing a conclusion that the judges at Nuremberg were careful to 
avoid -  namely, that states themselves were capable of, and could be held 
responsible for, committing international crimes. The 1951 Draft Code did 
recognise the criminal responsibility of individuals “acting on behalf of the State”, 
and suggested in certain circumstances such responsibility might also extend to 
private individuals.
This explicit extension to states of criminal responsibility for aggression was not 
the only massive leap since Nuremberg. Whereas in the Nuremberg Charter, the 
major war criminals were charged with, inter alia, “initiation or waging a war of 
aggression”, the 1951 Draft Code criminalized all “acts of aggression”, thereby 
including within its scope conduct not limited to the use of armed force, and 
deliberately reiterating the language used in the UN Charter’s provision relating to 
the Security Council’s role7. Again, at Nuremberg, judges were circumspect on 
the issue of non-military aggression, stopping short of finding aggression against
Austria and Czechoslovakia where no armed resistance to German occupation
<>
arose . Hence, the 1951 Draft Code incorporated into its terms controversial
5 ‘Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly’ (A/1858), Yearbook o f  
the International Law Commission (1951), vol 2, pl35. The threat o f aggression was also included 
in the 1954 draft as a separate offence, but was later dropped: see below.
6‘Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly’ (A/1858), ILC Yearbook 
(1951), pl35.
7 ‘Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly’ (A/1858), ILC Yearbook 
(1951), pi 35. Note the Security Council’s powers under article 39 of the UN Charter, to 
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression...”.
8 In relation to Austria, the judgment simply concluded that "the methods employed to achieve the 
object were those of an aggressor", and that "a calculated design to resort to force" was behind the
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inferences deliberately left vague by the Nuremberg judges. In particular, the 
1951 Draft Code's focus on state acts later caused significant and unnecessary 
difficulties, as revealed below.
(b) International Criminal Jurisdiction
This emphasis on state criminality rather than individual criminal responsibility 
for aggression was also evident in relation to the topic of an international criminal 
jurisdiction, and was perhaps even more controversial than in the context of a 
draft code. Nowhere in the UN Charter was the future prosecution of 
international crimes mentioned; the sole judicial body the Charter expressly 
recognized was the International Court of Justice, a court which could rule only 
on interstate disputes, and only with state consent9. In fact, under the Charter, the 
exclusive entity with supranational powers was the Security Council, and these 
powers were only exercisable in very limited, and serious, circumstances -  that is, 
for the maintenance or restoration of international order10.
In 1948, the General Assembly called upon the ILC to:
“study the desirability and possibility of establishing an 
international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with 
genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred 
upon that organ by international conventions”11.
The 1950 report of the Special Rapporteur for this issue outlined ten general
12principles upon which international criminal jurisdiction could be established .
seizure o f Czechoslovakia: see ‘Judgment’, Trial o f  the Major War Criminals, pi 94 and pi 96 
respectively.
9 see article 34(1) of the Statute o f the International Court of Justice, available online 
<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatuteJitm#CHAPTER_II>.
10 see chapter VII of the UN Charter.
11 GA Res 260 B of 9 December 1948.
12 Many of these principles are recognizable in the statutes governing the international criminal 
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the International Criminal Court. For 
instance, note principle (10), “that defendants appearing before the international judicial organ 
shall have all the guarantees necessary for their defence and that hearings shall be public”; and 
principle (6), “that the judges of the Criminal Court or Chamber be jurists of high 
qualifications...chosen without distinction as to nationality”: ‘Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro,
Special Rapporteur’ (A/CN.4/15*), Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission. (1950), vol 2, 
pl?.
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While on the one hand, the Special Rapporteur recommended that the power to
initiate international criminal proceedings reside solely with the Security 
11
Council , on the other, he also advised that international criminal jurisdiction 
should be exercised over states and individuals -  a clear indication of the 
supranational character of the international criminal law which the proposed 
international judicial organ would apply14. The political implications of 
extending both the subject-matter and parties over which supranational powers 
could apply were unlikely to attract state consensus in normal circumstances, let 
alone as the Cold War was intensifying between the superpowers, less than ten 
years since the establishment of the UN organisation. As a result, the reference to 
international criminal jurisdiction over states was soon dropped, and the 1953 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court applied expressly to natural 
persons15.
Even with the controversial question of state criminal responsibility sidestepped, 
other overwhelming difficulties remained. The problem of what types of conduct 
should be prosecuted by an international criminal court was ever present; the 1953 
Draft Statute got around this by conferring jurisdiction simply over “crimes 
generally recognized under international law”16, apparently leaving it to a future 
international criminal court itself to decide what this meant. Similarly to General 
Assembly efforts to define aggression for international security purposes, the 
fundamental challenges faced by the prospect of an international criminal court 
were political. This became evident at the meeting of the 1953 Committee for an 
International Criminal Jurisdiction, where vastly contrasting differences of 
opinion were expressed. Extended debate took place on such basic political 
questions as the appropriateness of an international criminal jurisdiction in light of 
the existing state of international law and international relations; the relationship 
between the administration of international criminal justice and the maintenance
,3See principle (9), ‘Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur’ (A/CN.4/15*), ILC 
Yearbook (1950), p i7. However, the Special Rapporteur thought in appropriate circumstances the 
Security Council might authorise a state to commence proceedings directly.
14 See principle (3) ‘Report by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur’ (A/CN.4/15*), ILC 
Yearbook (1950), pi 7.
15 See ‘Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction 27 July-20 August 
1953’ (A/2645), General Assembly Official Records Ninth Session, Supplement No. 12, p23.
16 ‘Report o f the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction 27 July-20 August 1953’ 
(A/2645), GAOR (9th Sess.), p23.
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of peace; the purpose of an international criminal court; the relationship between 
an international criminal court and the UN; and the standards to which a proposed 
international criminal court would need to live up to. While the UN report about 
the meeting of the 1953 committee carefully avoided associating individual ILC 
members with particular positions in relation to these questions, the high level of
17disagreement is apparent .
This lack of consensus was reflected in the 1953 Draft Statute, where several 
provisions in fact incorporated a choice between two possible alternatives. Thus, 
each of articles 7, 8, 9 and 11 concerning the procedure for electing judges listed 
two different alternatives, and article 29 presented options on which entities 
should be entitled to exercise powers related to the initiation of proceedings. This 
high level of political disagreement underpinning these ostensibly legal questions 
meant that the Committee was unable to decide even whether it was possible, 
practicable and desirable to create an organised international criminal jurisdiction, 
let alone determine the details of such a jurisdiction. Despite this significant 
obstacle, the members of the Committee concluded that:
"...on the basis of the preparatory studies made by the General 
Assembly and both the Special Committees on International 
Criminal Jurisdiction the moment had come for the General 
Assembly to decide what, if any, further steps should be taken 
toward the establishment of an international criminal court."18
While efforts to produce the Draft Code had been linked by the General Assembly 
in 195019 to the Soviet Union’s proposal to define aggression, it was in 1954 that 
these two issues, as well as the Draft Statute, were expressly brought into 
relationship with one another by two General Assembly resolutions. Given that 
both the 1954 Draft Code and the question of defining aggression sought to target
17 Thus, on virtually all of these issues, the Report indicated that “some members” took one view, 
while “other members” took another. ILC members of the 1953 Committee came from the 
following states: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Israel, 
Netherlands, Panama, Peru, Philippines, UK, US, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Officially, ILC 
members act in their own private capacity, not as representatives of their home states. However, 
the reluctance of the Report to reveal the views of these individuals demonstrates, in reality, the 
strongly political nature of these positions.
18 ‘Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction 27 July-20 August 1953’ 
(A/2645), GAOR (9th Sess.), p22.
19 See GA Res 378B of 17 November 1950.
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state acts, in GA Res 89720, it was decided to delay further consideration of the 
1954 Draft Code until the special committee on defining aggression -  originally 
set up by the General Assembly in 1952 -  had completed its work. Similarly, in
<y 1
GA Res 898 , consideration of the 1953 Draft Statute was postponed until the 
special committee on defining aggression had finalized its report, and the General 
Assembly once again took up consideration of the 1954 Draft Code. However, 
because it took so long for the special committees on defining aggression to finish 
their work, the effect of these postponements was to shut off discussions about 
aggression as an international crime and about an international criminal court for 
at least twenty years. Thus, early UN efforts in relation to the crime of 
aggression had experienced a rocky start, and as a consequence of an inhospitable 
political climate, were abandoned indefinitely only four years after they had 
begun.
As demonstrated in chapter six, it was dissatisfaction with this indefinite 
postponement, rather than any sudden achievement of consensus on the substance 
of the definition of aggression after years of wrangling, that mainly motivated the
99adoption of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression . Without any 
accompanying work on the crime of aggression in the intervening period, it is not 
surprising that the criminality of aggression received only a token 
acknowledgement in the General Assembly Definition of Aggression, with article 
5 simply providing that “a war of aggression is a crime against international 
peace” and “aggression gives rise to international responsibility”. In any case, as 
discussions evolved in the special committees tasked with defining aggression, it 
was clear that committee members mainly considered their work in peace and 
security terms, criminal responsibility for aggression being incidental to this. As a 
result, over this period discussions about the crime of aggression suffered a 
double disadvantage: not only were they delayed by twenty years, but once the 
General Assembly Definition of Aggression was finally adopted in 1974, it was 
far from evident what its relevance was in an international criminal context. This
20 O f 4 December 1954.
21 Of 14 December 1954.
22 See p i 30 of this thesis.
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confusion persisted, and unnecessarily hampered renewed efforts from the 1980s 
onwards in relation to the 1954 Draft Code.
(2) Aggression as a Crime: 1981-1996
(a) The Draft Code
After a 27-year hiatus on the topic, it was not until 1981, as the Cold War entered 
its final years and seven years after the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression, that the General Assembly invited the ILC to resume its activities 
with respect to producing a new Draft Code . A Special Rapporteur was 
appointed, who generated nine reports on the topic between 1983 and 199124. 
Making up for lost time, the Special Rapporteur in his second report 
recommended that the offences listed in the 1954 Draft Code, including 
aggression, should remain. He also noted that certain delegations favoured the 
addition of economic aggression as a specific offence, though he acknowledged 
the difficulties with this proposal, and suggested it was a turn of phrase “more 
suited to political than legal parlance” .
In 1986, the Special Rapporteur’s report included provisional articles for an 
updated Draft Code. Despite the only very tenuous link between the 1974 
Definition and the crime of aggression, preoccupation with this relationship now 
infected the ILC's efforts to produce a Draft Code. Consequently, article 11 of the 
1986 Draft Code detailed word for word many of the paragraphs comprising the 
General Assembly Definition of Aggression. In fact, the only sections of the 
General Assembly Definition of Aggression that were excluded from the 1986 
Draft Code concerned evidence and interpretation, omitted on the basis that these
23 See GA Res 36/106 of 10 December 1981.
24 See Adriaan Bos, ‘The Experience of the Preparatory Committee’, in Mauro Politi and Guiseppe 
Nesi (eds), The Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001),
p21.
25 Dodou Thiam, ‘Second Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’ (A/CN.4/377*), Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission (1984), vol 2, pi 00.
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9A •were “matters within the competence of the judge” . The crime of aggression 
was now defined in the 1986 Draft Code as:
“the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as set out in this definition”,
and the series of qualifying acts from the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression was listed. This resolution, aimed at states, was imported into the 
Draft Code despite its provision limiting responsibility to "any person who
97commits an offence against the peace and security of mankind" .
The General Assembly Definition of Aggression also featured in the 1988 Draft 
Code. Worse, the Special Rapporteur at this time sought to broaden the range of 
potential acts which could be classified as aggression by including the words ‘in 
particular’ at the start of the list of acts taken from the General Assembly 
Definition of Aggression, though this idea also provoked disagreement. With the 
Cold War coming to an end at this time, it is unsurprising that ILC members from 
great power states such as the US, France, China and the Soviet Union, among 
others, all opposed the addition of ‘in particular’, while members from smaller 
powers such as Bahrain, Brazil, and Mexico supported it28. In an attempt to unite 
the General Assembly Definition of Aggression with individual criminal 
responsibility, an article was proposed that “any individual to whom acts 
constituting aggression are attributed under this Code shall be liable to be tried 
and punished for a crime against peace”. On its face, this statement seemed to be 
self-evident, in light of the Nuremberg precedent. Yet to some, it had no place in 
the Draft Code on the basis that it was redundant, vague or dangerous. Finally, in 
an effort to avoid the political storm provoked by the prospect of an international
26 Dodou Thiam, ‘Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’ (A/CN.4/398), Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission (1986), vol 2, p84.
Article 5 of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression, which referred to “international 
responsibility” and described a war of aggression as a crime, was excluded on the grounds that this 
was precisely the subject of the present draft.
27 Emphasis added, see Thiam, ‘Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind’, ILC Yearbook {1986), p82.
28 ‘Summary Records of the Meetings o f the Fortieth Session: 2085th Meeting’, Yearbook o f  the 
International Law Commission (1988), vol 1, pp291-299.
155
criminal court, the 1988 report included a proposal that “any determination by the 
Security Council as to the existence of an act of aggression is binding on national 
courts”, though a divergence of views even on this more conservative idea 
existed. Once again, discord surrounding essentially political issues such as 
whether or not to establish an international criminal court and the relationship 
between political and legal organs in determining the existence of a crime of 
aggression were noted on the record, leaving them intact for future meetings.
While the General Assembly Definition of Aggression remained in the Draft 
Code, very little progress was made on these matters; trying to join state and 
individual responsibility in abstract terms was proving impossible. In 1991, the 
member from France expressed his total opposition to the inclusion of the General 
Assembly Definition of Aggression in the Draft Code, and suggested the only way 
forward was for the Draft Code:
“to indicate that aggression constituted in itself a crime against the 
peace and security of mankind, with the consequences defined 
under the Code, and to leave it to the courts which had jurisdiction, 
in other words, to domestic courts or to a future international 
criminal court, to decide, in the light of the facts of the case and in 
accordance with general principles of international law, whether 
aggression had occurred and to draw the appropriate 
conclusions.”29
In other words, he advocated a return to the Nuremberg approach. However, this 
view failed to gain favour, and the General Assembly Definition of Aggression 
survived in the Draft Code.
It was not until 1995 that the stranglehold of the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression over the Draft Code eased. On the advice of the Special Rapporteur, 
the General Assembly Definition of Aggression’s list of acts qualifying as 
aggression was omitted altogether from the Draft Code, a consequence of the 
great amount of criticism this list - and attempts to recast it - had attracted. The 
introductory statement from the General Assembly Definition of Aggression was
29 ‘Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Third Session: 2237th Meeting’, Yearbook o f  
the International Law Commission (1991), vol 1, p200.
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also expressly rejected in favour of wording that more accurately reflected article 
2(4) of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, opinion remained divided: reasons given 
for opposing this newly redrafted provision included its reference to the phrase ‘in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations', which 
some felt would itself result in many controversies; the lack of distinction between
in
major and minor uses of force; and the provision being "too close" to the text of 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Others appeared willing to tolerate the redrafted 
provision only on the basis that any other formulation attracting consensus might
i t
take years; that the provision was viewed as merely a "first stage" ; and because 
"it was pointless to devote too much attention to the problem of aggression, which 
could never be solved" . Tellingly, no member spoke in full support of the 
redrafted provision.
Finally, the last remaining trace of influence from the General Assembly 
Definition of Aggression - namely, the apparent need for a paragraph 'defining' 
aggression - was knocked out of the Draft Code in 1996, when the provisions on 
aggression were compressed into one article simply outlining in general terms the 
basis of individual responsibility for aggression:
"an individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or 
orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression 
committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of 
aggression".33
Via a very circuitous route, drafters had finally achieved their original purpose: 
that is, setting down the conditions in which individual responsibility for the 
crime o f aggression would arise. Early efforts to advance too far and too fast the 
scope of the crime of aggression as the Security Council stagnated due to growing 
Cold War tensions had completely overtaken the ILC’s work on the Draft Code. 
The 1996 Draft Code thus represented the completion of a full circle: the
30 The Italian ILC member, ‘Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Seventh Session: 
2408th Meeting’, Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission (1995), vol 1, p203.
31 The Sri Lankan ILC member, ‘Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Seventh Session: 
2408th Meeting’, ILC Yearbook (1995), p210.
32 The Moroccan ILC member, ‘Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Seventh Session: 
2408th Meeting”, ILC Yearbook (1995), p211.
33 Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code, available online <www.un.org/law/ilc>.
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emphasis on criminal responsibility for state acts in the 1950s as the Cold War 
intensified, had, towards the end of the Cold War, eventually given way to 
individual criminal responsibility for international crimes, as per the Nuremberg 
precedent of 1946. The General Assembly brought the final Draft Code of 1996 
to the attention of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court; since this time, no further steps to bring the 1996 
Draft Code into force have been taken34.
(b) The Draft Statute
Meanwhile, when the ILC's work towards the creation of an international criminal 
court revived, debates from the 1950s concerning whether or not aggression 
should fall within the jurisdiction of an international criminal court were also 
reopened. In response to a General Assembly request in 1989, the Special 
Rapporteur for the Draft Code included consideration of the establishment of an 
international criminal court in his report from 1990 onwards35. Reflecting 
fluctuations in international political conditions resulting from the end of the Cold 
War, the question of which crimes to include within the jurisdiction of an 
international criminal court received varied responses in the early 1990s. While 
in 1990, the Special Rapporteur envisaged that this question would be determined 
primarily by reference to a finalised Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, by 1992, he was proposing exclusive and compulsory 
jurisdiction over five listed crimes - none of which included aggression - plus 
jurisdiction over other crimes on the basis of consent from particular states with 
an interest in the matter . However, just a year later, the Special Rapporteur once 
again suggested the jurisdiction of an international criminal court remain 
contingent on the "adoption of a criminal code"; in the absence of such a code, the
34 Conspiracy, which had been such an important part of the prosecution of aggression at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, was not expressly mentioned in the final Draft Code with regard to the 
crime of aggression, though it did apply in relation to the other crimes: see article 2(3Xe) of the 
1996 Draft Code.
35 See GA Res 44/39 of 4 December 1989.
36 The five listed crimes were genocide; systematic or mass violations of human rights; apartheid; 
illicit international trafficking in drugs; and seizure of aircraft and kidnapping o f diplomats or 
internationally protected persons: ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind: Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction’ 
(A/CN.4/L.471), Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission (1992), vol 2, p61.
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ambit of an international criminal court would be determined by special
17
agreements between state parties or by a unilateral state declaration .
In 1994, the ILC adopted a Draft Statute, and recommended to the General 
Assembly that it organise an international conference at which this draft might be 
considered. The 1994 Draft Statute conferred jurisdiction to an international 
criminal court over aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and serious crimes established by treaty38. The inclusion of the crime of 
aggression was explained by the ILC in its commentary to this provision, in the 
following terms:
"...a court must, at the present time, be in a better position to define 
the customary law crime of aggression than was the Nuremberg 
Tribunal in 1946. It would thus seem retrogressive to exclude 
individual criminal responsibility for aggression (in particular, acts 
directly associated with the waging of a war of aggression) 50 years 
after Nuremberg."39
However, the ILC also noted "the difficulties of definition and application"40, and, 
in light of the Security Council's peace and security duties, suggested that some 
stipulation be included permitting prosecution by an international criminal court 
of the crime of aggression only after the Security Council had determined that the 
relevant state committed an act of aggression41. ‘Defining’ aggression was thus 
resurrected in relation to the establishment of an international criminal court.
In accordance with the ILC's recommendation, the General Assembly agreed to 
establish an ad hoc committee to meet in 1995 to consider the 1994 Draft 
Statute42. While the ad hoc committee could agree in principle to the inclusion of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of an
37 Dodou Thiam, ‘Eleventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’ (A/CN .4/449), Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission (1993), vol 2, ppl 15- 
116.
38 see article 20 of the 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, available online 
<untr eaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_l 994.pdf>.
39 ‘Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 
July 1994’ (A/49/10), Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission (1994), vol 2, pp38-39.
40 ‘Report o f  the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 
July 1994’, ILC Yearbook (1994), p39.
41A provision to this effect was included in article 23(2) of the 1994 Draft Statute.
42 see GA Res 49/53 of 9 December 1995.
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international criminal court, no consensus on including the crime of aggression 
was achieved. By 1995, the “international crimes generally recognized” in the 
1953 Draft Statute evidently did not cover the crime of aggression. Just as the 
legal dead end of ‘defining’ aggression had swamped efforts in relation to the 
Draft Code, the advantages or difficulties of a definition of aggression were now 
being cited by states to support their respective political positions on whether or 
not an international criminal court should exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. Thus, those advocating prosecution of the crime of aggression by an 
international criminal court justified their view by reference to the Nuremberg 
Charter, the General Assembly Definition of Aggression, the 1996 Draft Code and 
other draft documents, implying that these might provide assistance in ‘defining’ 
aggression for the purposes of individual criminal responsibility.
By contrast, those wanting the crime of aggression excluded from the jurisdiction 
of an international criminal court argued that a definition of aggression would take 
too long and cause lengthy delays to the establishment of an international criminal 
court. They also claimed a definition would have to address excuses and defences 
such as humanitarian intervention and self-defence. Both the Nuremberg Charter 
and the General Assembly Definition of Aggression were rejected outright as 
unhelpful in this context. The old issue about the relationship between the UN -  
in particular, the Security Council -  and an international criminal court was also 
cited as a rationale for excluding aggression from its jurisdiction. Hence, 
arguments over a definition of aggression were just the latest peripheral, legal 
debates concealing the true source of difficulty: a lack of political consensus, 
especially among the great powers, in support of a permanent, international 
judicial organ with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
This firmly entrenched lack of political consensus was only confirmed by the 
Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
between 1996-1998. While the same types of arguments as advanced in the ad 
hoc committee were put forward by supporters and opponents alike, a third 
position also emerged at this time: certain states now claimed to support in theory 
the inclusion of aggression within the jurisdiction of an international criminal 
court, but only on the conditions that “general agreement could be reached on its
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definition and on the appropriate balance of the respective roles and functions of 
the Court and the Security Council, without delaying the establishment of the 
Court”43.
With the formation of this third group, attention once again focussed upon 
‘defining’ aggression. Coalitions began forming around the various precedents in 
existence, including the Nuremberg Charter, the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression, and the 1996 Draft Code. Proposals for defining aggression for 
Statute purposes were put forward based on these precedents, and the tired legal 
arguments over whether a ‘general’ or enumerative definition was better, and 
whether or not a proposed enumeration should be exhaustive, were resurrected44. 
For each group in favour of one proposal, there were multiple factions ready to 
point out that proposal’s failings. Thus, the Nuremberg Charter’s provision on 
aggression was considered by opponents as either too imprecise, too limited or too 
obsolete, while the General Assembly Definition of Aggression was attacked for 
not addressing de minimis considerations or potential defences45. Other 
delegations refused to be drawn into this interminable debate, denying the need 
for a definition of aggression, and arguing in favour of a provision in the Statute 
reserving the Security Council’s powers to determine whether a situation 
constituted aggression or not. As always, the fundamental issues debated in the 
Preparatory Committee concerning whether or not to include aggression in the 
statute establishing an international criminal court, its 'definition' if included and 
what its inclusion would mean for the relationship between the Security Council 
and an international criminal court formed “an essentially political judgment 
question which is so far not entirely resolved” 46. Without such resolution, no 
amount of legal paper-shuffling would achieve very much.
43 ‘Report o f the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ 
(A/51/22), General Assembly Official Records (51st Sess.)(1996), p i 8.
44 For the text of these proposals, see ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court’ (A/51/22), GAOR (51st Sess.), p58-.
45 De minimis considerations reflect the views held by some that only certain situations of 
sufficient gravity qualify as aggression. For contrasting views, see ‘Report o f the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (A/51/22), GAOR (51st Sess.), 
pl9.
46 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Observations Concerning the 1997-1998 Preparatory Committee’s Work’, 
in Nouvelles Etudes Penales 13 (1997), p24. Chicago: International Human Rights Law Institute.
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This was confirmed by the text of the Draft Statute produced by the Preparatory 
Committee in 1998, immediately prior to the Rome Conference. Although the 
Preparatory Committee’s proposal listed three different alternative options on the 
crime of aggression, from the outset it stated that while “a large number of 
delegations” favoured aggression’s inclusion in the Statute, the listing of these 
three options was “without prejudice to a final decision” on the crime’s 
inclusion47. Without even basic political agreement on whether or not to include 
aggression, setting out three possible alternatives for its inclusion was premature. 
Nevertheless, option one outlined in broad terms the prohibited conduct; option 
two combined a short statement of the conditions attracting liability with the list 
of qualifying acts from the General Assembly Definition of Aggression; and 
option three stipulated a more qualified version of option one, with the significant 
proviso that jurisdiction over aggression was subject to Security Council 
determination “regarding the act of a State”48. In line with UN drafting 
procedure, square brackets surrounded amendments or additions still the subject 
of debate; tellingly, virtually all of the text contained in these three options fell 
within square brackets, just a few months before the Rome Conference would be 
convened49. By contrast, other crimes within the Preparatory Committee’s draft, 
such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, not only attracted 
broad-based political support in terms of their inclusion in the statute, but as a 
consequence of the jurisprudence emanating from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, they also benefited from substantial clarification with regards to their 
substance. A lack of political consensus about subjecting acts comprising the
47 ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ 
(A/CONF. 183/2/Add.l) of 14 April 1998, pl2, available online <www.un.org/icc/prepcom.htm>.
48 ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ 
(A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1X1998), pl4.
49 For instance, option 1 read as follows: “[For the purpose of the present Statute, the crime [of 
aggression] [against peace] means any of the following acts committed by an individual [who is in 
a position of exercising control or capable of directing political/military action in a State]: (a) 
planning, (b) preparing, (c) ordering, (d) initiating, or (e) carrying out [an armed attack] [the use of 
armed force] [a war of aggression] [a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing] by a State against the [sovereignty,] territorial integrity 
[or political independence] of another State [when this] [armed attack] [use of force] [is] [in 
contravention of the Charter of the United Nations] [[in contravention of the Charter of the United 
Nations as determined by the Security Council].]” For the text of the other two options, see 
‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ 
(A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1X1998), pp 13-14.
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crime of aggression to international adjudication procedures remained the 
foremost obstacle confronting the inclusion of the crime of aggression within the 
jurisdiction of an international criminal court.
(3) United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court. Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998
The experience of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee with 
respect to the crime of aggression was simply a taste of things to come at the 
Rome Conference, which demonstrated even more clearly the extent to which the 
international political landscape had changed since the end of the Cold War. 
Broadly speaking, political affilitations at Rome were split three ways, into: (1) 
the P5 states; (2) the ‘Like-Minded Group’, an association of small and middle 
powers who strongly supported the establishment of an international criminal 
court, though their views differed on detail; and (3) the Non-Aligned Movement. 
In relation to the crime of aggression specifically, at least 3250 small and middle 
powers expressed their unconditional support for the inclusion of aggression in 
the ICC Statute during the opening plenary meetings; and another 3051 states, 
including Russia, offered their conditional support, -  the two most common 
provisos predictably being the drafting of a ‘precise’ definition of aggression, and 
sorting out the relationship between the Security Council and an international 
criminal court. This split was further complicated by the deafening silence of 
4552 states, including France and the UK53, that made no mention of the crime of
50 These states included: Egypt, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Philippines, Albania, Germany, Austria, FYR Macedonia, Namibia, Afghanistan, Italy, Slovakia, 
Tajikistan, Guinea, Zambia, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Bulgaria, Greece, Gabon, Madagascar, Qatar, 
Cape Verde, Niger, Vietnam, Jordan, Georgia, Cyprus, Angola, Uganda: United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal 
Court Official Records (Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998) (New York: United Nations, 2002), vol 2, 
pp64-121.
51 These states were: Japan, Sweden, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Armenia, Syria, Portugal, Sierra Leone, 
Mozambique, Brunei, Hungary, Iran, Cuba, Poland, Estonia, Moldova, Belgium, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Paraguay, Mexico, Oman, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Denmark, Malta, Russia, 
Belarus, Bahrain, and Ecuador: United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2, pp64-121.
52 These states were: Norway, Venezuela, Lesotho, Holy See, Indonesia, Algeria, Ivory Coast, 
Tanzania, Peru, Kenya, Costa Rica, Andorra, Singapore, Burkina Faso, Croatia, UK, Finland, 
Nepal, Sudan, Thailand, Malawi, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, Iraq, Monaco, Australia, Canada, 
Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Senegal, Colombia, Ghana, Chile, Luxembourg, France, 
Argentina, Rwanda, Switzerland, Malaysia, Samoa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uruguay, and
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aggression at all in their opening statements, and another 554 powers, including 
the US, which expressed their complete opposition to the crime of aggression 
within the scope of an international criminal court. With this level of division, the 
prospect of the Rome Conference, at the end of its three week duration, producing 
a generally accepted way forward for empowering an international criminal court 
with respect to the crime of aggression was remote indeed.
At Rome, more thorough discussions on the Preparatory Committee’s proposals 
ensued, but without any real progress. During the course of these discussions 
during 18-19 June, it became evident that many delegations preferred option 3 out 
of the three Preparatory Committee’s proposals, which made an international 
criminal court’s jurisdiction over aggression contingent upon a Security Council 
determination; combined with those who were willing to consider this option as 
an alternative to their own first preference, this group was significant in number. 
However, even among those delegations claiming to support this option, very few 
were prepared to accept it as is, without any modifications; their support for 
option 3 was as a “working basis”55 only, and they continued to attempt to redraft 
option 3 in accordance with their own political preferences. Even the key feature 
of option 3 -  namely, its dependence on a prior Security Council determination - 
was not immune from challenge, with states including Non-Aligned Movement 
members Angola, North Korea, and Cuba, as well as Ukraine56, opposing a 
decisive role for the Security Council in this context, with global leaders such as 
Japan, Russia, France and the UK insisting on the same. Hence, the appearance of 
even limited consensus around option 3 was in fact chimerical.
Another faction -  mainly comprised of Middle Eastern states -  which expressed 
support for the inclusion of aggression in principle, felt that none of the three
Botswana: United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an 
International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2, pp64-121.
53 During the Conference, France and the UK became associated generally with the Like-Minded 
Group of states, though on certain issues they continued to side with other P5 states. Most 
members of the European Union belonged to the Like-Minded Group.
54 See the statements of representatives from India, US, Morocco, Turkey and Israel.
55 See the remarks of the representatives for Trinidad and Tobago, and Italy: United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal 
Court Official Records, vol 2, pi 75 and pl78 respectively.
56 Ukraine holds observer status within the Non-Aligned Movement.
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options presented by the Preparatory Committee were adequate, and that 
something closer to the General Assembly Definition of Aggression was required. 
Others again expressed their opposition to including aggression on any basis, and 
were joined by a few states who were now openly doubtful about whether the 
issues raised by the prospect of including the crime of aggression within an
cn
international criminal court’s jurisdiction could be resolved at Rome . Thus, 
detailed consideration of the crime of aggression simply splintered even further 
the original political divisions expressed at the start o f the Conference.
Between 20 June-5 July, the Rome Conference moved on to consider other issues 
concerning an international criminal court generally, such as questions of standing 
and other jurisdictional concerns. During this period, three proposals concerning 
the crime of aggression were distributed, including one from the Middle East 
grouping mentioned above. However, none of these were included in the 
Conference Bureau Discussion Paper of 6 July, which included 2 options only: 
(1) to accept the Preparatory Committee’s option 3 as drafted, or (2) to include no 
provision on aggression at all58. With time running short, some progress towards 
consensus -  or at least a reduction in the various positions taken - was needed, 
when discussions on aggression resumed on 8 July; however, presentation of these 
alternatives at this juncture of the Conference merely divided opinions further. 
While a few delegations were prepared to accept option (1) as currently drafted, 
others continued to claim their support of this option as simply a “reference point” 
for further discussions59.
In their responses to the two straightforward choices summarised in the 
Conference Bureau Discussion Paper, significantly the vast majority of
57 For instance, see the statement of the Norwegian representative that “he was not persuaded that 
a consensus on [the question of the Security Council] was possible at the current stage” (pi 72); 
and of the Mexican representative who “doubted whether the problems [associated with 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression] could be solved” (pi 75).
58 Even at this late stage, the Bureau was still acknowledging that “discussions are still ongoing as 
to the inclusion of the crime of aggression and on the definition.” The Bureau also suggested that 
continuing interest in reviving the 1974 Definition might somehow be accommodated in the 
‘definition’: see ‘Bureau Discussion Paper’ (A/CONF.183.C.1/L.53), United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court Official 
Records, vol 2, p204.
59 See the statement of the Maltese representative in United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2, 
p290.
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delegations made no reference to either option, merely reiterating the vague and 
often repeated statement, that the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the 
Statute must be conditional upon (a) an ‘acceptable’ definition of aggression; 
and/or (b) agreement as to the relationship between the Security Council and the 
international criminal court. Interestingly, India - which from the beginning had 
expressed its thinly-veiled opposition to the inclusion of aggression -  ostensibly 
became part of this group of ‘in theory’ supporters, now claiming aggression 
should “in principle” be included in the Statute, “if properly defined”60. Another 
group of states was even less specific: they simply indicated their ongoing
support for the inclusion of the crime of aggression, without making any attempt 
to address the concerns of other delegations. Within this latter group, however, 
two states were brave enough to point out the real source of the problem 
underpinning the crime of aggression: Azerbaijan and Ethiopia both highlighted 
the role of political calculations in resolving the aggression debate61.
By this point, the earlier murmurs expressing doubt as to whether consensus could 
be reached concerning the crime of aggression had turned into a chorus. States 
from the Like-Minded Group started to find reasons to exclude the crime of 
aggression, including a lack of time to address the issues of definition and the 
Security Council’s role62; the possible risk these unresolved issues posed to the 
outcome of the Conference63; and that exclusion was the only “realistic 
alternative” if all of the elements of option (1) could not be agreed upon64. By 
contrast, Syria asked aloud why the 1 July proposal it and other Middle Eastern 
states had submitted had not been included in the Bureau’s discussion paper, and 
suggested fresh amendments with regard to the preconditions for the international 
criminal court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Exclusionists now also sought to express
60 United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an 
International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2, p279. Note at the end of the conference, 
India was one o f just seven states to vote against the Statute: 
<ww.un.org/law/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm>.
61 United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an 
International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2, p271 and p288 respectively. Denmark also 
came close to making the same point when it declared that “to claim that aggression could not be 
included in the Statute because it had not been defined was unacceptable”: p286.
62 Sweden (p270), Norway (p271) and Australia (p273) made this comment.
63 This point was raised by Samoa, p279.
64 The UK came to this conclusion, p272.
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their opposition in terms of the lack of progress on the crime’s definition and the 
Security Council’s role in relation to it.
Reflecting this ongoing diversity of opinion, the Bureau released a second 
proposal on the 10 July, setting a deadline for the development of “generally 
accepted” provisions about aggression of 13 July65. If none were forthcoming, 
the Bureau proposed to exclude aggression from the Statute, instead addressing 
this crime “in some other manner, for example, by a Protocol or review 
conference”66. From this point, the focus of meetings of the Committee of the 
Whole shifted away from the secondary issues of definition and the ICC-Security 
Council relationship back to the basic concern: whether or not to include the 
crime of aggression in the statute establishing an international criminal court.
Early on 13 July, several delegations once again spoke in favour of including the 
crime of aggression, with influential Syria threatening to “reconsider its position 
with regard to the Statute as a whole” if aggression was excluded from the 
Statute67. At the same meeting, Iran, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, also expressed its disappointment that the latest Bureau proposal 
contained no substantive provision relating to aggression. Later in the day, Egypt 
explicitly tied its position with respect to the ICC-Security Council relationship 
generally to a package of its preferred proposals, indicating it was willing to 
reconsider its view of the former on the condition that, inter alia, the crime of 
aggression was included in the Statute. Most of Egypt’s wishes were 
accommodated in the final document68. Certain delegations advocated it would 
be preferable to defer consideration of the crime of aggression until sometime
65 ‘Bureau Proposal’ (A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59), United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2,
p212.
66 ‘Bureau Proposal’ (A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L.59), article 5.
67 United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an 
International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2, p322.
68 Thus, in terms of the Security Council’s powers of suspending an investigation or prosecution, a 
time limit was fixed and it was stipulated that such a request from the Security Council must take 
the form of a resolution, in accordance with Egypt’s wishes. In addition, the crime of aggression 
was included in the Statute, another key wish of Egypt. However, its other requests -  namely, that 
a role for the General Assembly equal to that of the Security Council be conferred, and that the 
Court be empowered with the right to request the Security Council to examine a situation of 
aggression if the Security Council had not done so itself, did not feature in the final document.
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after the Conference69. Echoing Ethiopia and Azerbaijan, a few Non-Aligned 
Movement member delegations underscored that greater political support would
70overcome the problems related to the inclusion of the crime of aggression . The 
Bureau’s deadline of 13 July -  the last day on which the crime of aggression was 
discussed by the Committee of the Whole - came and went, with no resolution of 
the matter.
The following day, the Non-Aligned Movement submitted a new proposal, which 
sought to reconcile these perspectives. It proposed to add aggression as a crime 
within the international criminal court’s jurisdiction, but to postpone this entity’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over this crime pending: (1) elaboration by the proposed, 
post-Conference Preparatory Commission of the definition and elements of the 
crime of aggression; and (2) the Preparatory Commission’s recommendation that 
these be adopted by the Assembly of State Parties. Although the wording differs, 
it is clear from the substance of this proposal that it is the predecessor to article 
5(2) of the Rome Statute, which was signed by 120 states just three days later, on 
17 July 199871.
(4) Conclusion
UN efforts in relation to the crime of aggression confirm our conclusion from 
chapter six -  namely, the great extent to which prevailing international political 
conditions are expressed through the evolution of international law, rather than 
overcome by it. In the early UN years, the ILC aspired to extend responsibility 
for the crime of aggression to states, building on the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
precedents. However, the division among the great powers caused by the Cold 
War made progress politically impossible, and the ILC’s work on this topic was 
shelved in 1953, as the Cold War deepened. It was only after the General
69 For example, see the comments of Norway (p344), Congo (p344), Andorra (p347), and Slovakia 
(p347).
70 For instance, see the remarks of Mozambique (p341), Algeria (p337) and Tanzania (p339).
71 Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute reads: “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this 
crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”
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Assembly Definition of Aggression was adopted, and the Cold War entered its 
final decade that the ILC resumed its work in relation to the crime of aggression. 
Despite the earlier difficulties raised by the prospect of state responsibility for the 
crime of aggression, this issue re-emerged indirectly as the ILC unhelpfully 
contemplated the relationship between the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression and the crime of aggression for ten years from 1986 onwards. In 
1996, the ILC finally discarded the issue of state responsibility and concentrated 
on individual responsibility for the crime of aggression.
The end of the Cold War and the new international political conditions it created 
also permitted the related topic of an international criminal court to be reopened 
by the ILC, within which context the crime of aggression was again reconsidered. 
While the post-Cold War political climate now revealed significant support for the 
establishment of an international criminal court, which prompted the creation of 
two UN committees in the mid-1990s to discuss proposals in detail, the inclusion 
of the crime of aggression within the jurisdiction of an international criminal court 
continued to provoke controversy. As in the negotiations leading to the adoption 
of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression, arguments among states 
centred around the legal task of ‘defining’ aggression, such arguments concealing 
the real split of political perspectives in relation to the crime of aggression.
By the time of the Rome Conference in 1998, a three-way split of post-Cold War 
political affiliations was very evident, with the P5 states, the ‘Like-Minded 
Group’, and the Non-Aligned Movement forming the major state groupings on 
international criminal law issues. Negotiations at Rome revealed that while the 
Non-Aligned Movement strongly supported the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression within the jurisdiction on an international criminal court, the US 
strongly opposed it, with other states conditionally supporting inclusion if a 
‘definition’ of the crime of aggression was agreed, and the relationship between 
the Security Council and an international criminal court was clarified. This lack 
of political consensus was reflected in the Rome Statute, where the crime of 
aggression was included, though the International Criminal Court is prohibited 
from exercising its jurisdiction over this crime until these conditions are satisfied. 
Thus, the Rome Conference demonstrates that, even in the different political
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conditions of the post-Cold War era, the issue of the crime of aggression remains 
very strongly influenced by the prevailing international political landscape.
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Postscript
The high level of political controversy surrounding the crime of aggression, as 
examined in chapter eight, has only intensified since 1998. While a vast array of 
proposals for a new provision on the crime of aggression have been received, 
discussed and suggested by the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression (WGCA) in the lead-up to the Rome Statute’s first review conference 
in 2009, fundamental political questions requiring resolution as a precondition of 
a new provision remain undecided. For instance, at the WGCA’s informal 
meeting in June 2005, it was noted that no agreement was reached on the crucial 
issue of which entity or entities should be empowered to make a prior 
determination that an act of aggression had occurred, hence triggering the ICC’s 
jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression. Some delegates favoured the 
view that the Security Council enjoyed exclusive competence to make such a 
determination, while others argued that this competence could also be exercised 
by other bodies such as the General Assembly or the International Court of 
Justice. A third view maintained that such a determination should be left to the 
ICC itself1. In addition, how to reconcile a prior determination that an act of 
aggression had occurred with the rights of a defendant accused of the crime of 
aggression also proved contentious, as did the issue of the extent to which any 
new provision should depart from the Nuremberg text3. If these ongoing 
differences among the sixty-six states participating in the June 2005 meeting of 
the WGCA are anything to go by, it is highly improbable that a new provision on 
the crime of aggression will be adopted at the review conference, where one 
hundred states are likely to be represented4.
1 ‘Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 
held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton 
University, New Jersey, US from 13 to 15 June, 2005’( ICC-ASP/4/32), pp367-369, available 
online <www.icc-cpi.int/asp/aspaggression.html>. Hereafter ‘Informal Inter-sessional Meeting 
(2005)’.
2 ‘Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting (2005)’, pp366-367.
3 ‘Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting (2005)’, p369.
4 As of 1 January 2006,100 states had become parties to the Rome Statute: 
<www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html>. This conclusion is confirmed by the outcome of the 
June 2006 meeting of the WGCA, where representatives from seventy-seven states met and major 
differences of view on the same issues from the June 2005 meeting persisted: see ‘Report of the 
Informal Inter-sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 8-11 
June 2006’ (ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.l), available online 
<www.icc-cpi.int/asp/aspaggression.html>.
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Other recent political developments also do not bode well for the exercise of ICC 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression becoming a reality in the short to 
medium term. Although the US expressed its opposition to the inclusion of the 
crime of aggression in the Rome Statute from the first days of the 1998 
Conference5, American hostility towards article 5(2)(d) of the Rome Statute, and 
the ICC more generally, has turned into profound and undisguised rancour since 
this time. Apart from the Bush administration’s “unsigning” of the Rome Statute 
in 20026, the passage of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act - which 
leaves open the possibility that the US may choose to invade the Netherlands in 
order to release any American citizen that might be held by the ICC -  
demonstrates the lengths to which the US is prepared to go in order to undermine 
the Court’s functioning7. In light of the US’s pre-eminent position on the world 
stage, and its unrivalled military presence in all comers of the globe, the impact of 
this intensely anti-ICC stance cannot be ignored, and, if continued, is likely to 
make efforts to bring the crime of aggression within the ICC’s operational 
jurisdiction very difficult indeed.
Certain incidents in criminal law have also struck a blow against present attempts 
to strengthen the crime of aggression as an important feature of international 
relations and international law. For example, in 2003, the Iraqi Special Tribunal 
(1ST) was empowered by statute to try, inter alia, “The abuse of position and the 
pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces 
of Iraq against an Arab country...”8 -  an offence which clearly falls within the
5 At the fifth plenary meeting of the Rome Conference on 17 June 1998, a US delegate stated:
“ . ..The jurisdiction of the Court must extend to internal armed conflicts and crimes against 
humanity, including rape and other grave sexual violence. The Court must have a clear, precise 
and well-established understanding of what conduct constituted a crime. At the same time, acts 
not clearly criminalised under international law should be excluded from the definition. It was, 
therefore, premature to attempt to define a crime of aggression in terms of individual 
criminal responsibility. Vague formulas that left the Court to decide on the fundamental 
parameters of crimes should be a v o i d e d . s e e  United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court Official Records, vol 2, 
p80. Emphasis added.
6 ‘US Renounces World Court Treaty’, May 6 2002, available online 
<news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/l 970312.stm>.
7 See 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist 
Attacks on the United States. Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002), s 2008, reproduced at 
<www.globalsolutions.org/programs/law_justice/icc/aspa/aspatext.html>.
8 See article 14(c) o f the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, available online:
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Nuremberg parameters of the crime of aggression, and yet no reference to 
aggression was made in this statute. Hence, an opportunity to further develop in 
explicit terms the jurisprudence concerning the crime of aggression was missed. 
Moreover, despite the IST’s jurisdiction over this aggression-type offence, to date 
no effort has been made to indict any of the defendants under this head in relation 
to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and there appears to be no plans to do so in 
the future. The standing of the international crime of aggression in domestic law 
was further eroded in the House of Lords case of R v Jones; R v Milling; R v 
Olditch; R v Pritchard; R v Richards; Ayliffe v Director o f  Public Prosecutions; 
Swain v Director o f  Public Prosecutions9, in which it was decided that the crime 
of aggression was not capable of constituting a ‘crime’ under s3 of the Criminal 
Law Act 1967 (UK), or an ‘offence’ within the meaning of s68(2) of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK)10. Combined, these developments 
suggest that, in the short- to medium-term, the favourable international political 
conditions necessary for the prosecution of the crime of aggression to take place 
are, at best, a remote possibility.
<www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm>.
9 [2006] UKHL 16.
10 The defendants -  peace protesters - had sought to defend their actions against British military 
bases on the eve of the Iraq war on the grounds that they were intended to prevent the crime of 
unlawfully going to war: Jean-Yves Gilg, ‘International Aggression Not a Crime’, Solicitors 
Journal 150 (31 March 2006), p374.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, it was argued that prevailing international political conditions 
strongly influence how moral and legal impulses compelling the further 
development of the concept of aggression play out in practice. However, it was 
also demonstrated that the way in which the concept of aggression featured in 
international affairs was not solely a reflection of existing political realities, but 
on occasion made an important, practical contribution to international relations. 
In the final chapter of this thesis, the significance of the concept of aggression for 
the theory and practice of international relations is examined.
(1) The Relationship between the Balance of Power and Law in International 
Society
In chapter one, Bull’s view of international society was developed and discussed. 
It was found that while Bull acknowledged the roles of both the balance of power 
and international law in the unique conditions of international society, he argued 
that these “institutions” sometimes came into conflict. Instead of contributing to 
international order, occasionally international law actually impeded it by 
hampering measures aimed at reinforcing the balance of power, Bull claimed. 
The issue of how to respond to aggressive war was one example of the collision 
between the balance of power and international law. Although resolution of the 
clash between balance of power and international law had been attempted through 
different means, Bull still considered these types of conflict a major limitation of 
international law at time of writing, in 1977. Thus, in the event of conflict, 
balance of power considerations would take priority over international law.
The study of the concept of aggression undertaken in this thesis provides strong 
evidence in support of Bull’s claims, and of their ongoing relevance today. For 
instance, in chapter two it was demonstrated that the preoccupation of the major 
European Allies with preventing a re-emergent and belligerent Germany in the 
aftermath of World War One led to punitive peace terms entirely at odds with the 
objectives of the new, liberal, and values-based system of international security
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established in the same peace agreement. This inherent contradiction -  and the 
continuing operation of balance of power calculations among the great powers at 
the expense of international law -  was illustrated vividly at the League, covered in 
chapter three. There, it was demonstrated that aggressors Japan and Italy 
successfully avoided effective League military response to their actions as a 
consequence of an Anglo-French desire to retain them as potential allies in the 
face of the growing threat posed by Nazi Germany. In chapter seven, it was 
shown that the impact of the Cold War conflict between the superpowers 
prevented the UN Security Council from ever making a determination about the 
existence of an act of aggression, even when confronted with the onset of a 
regional war. From this chapter also, the refusal of the majority of ICJ members 
to consider the question of whether Uganda had committed aggression in the 
recent Armed Activities on the Territory o f the Congo case provided another 
dramatic instance of the subordination -  this time, by a prominent section of the 
international legal community itself - of international legal procedure to great 
power sensitivities. Thus, the intermittent clash between the balance of power and 
international law identified by Bull appears to be as evident today as it was thirty 
years ago.
Each of these examples have demonstrated how the balance of power can prevent 
the concept of aggression from contributing to efforts to maintain international 
security through international law. Further, they have also revealed the great 
extent to which the content of discussions and efforts at the international level in 
relation to the concept of aggression actually reflect that same balance of power. 
For instance, in chapter six, international legal activism in the form of UN efforts 
to ‘define’ aggression during the Cold War conflict not only showed that 
international law was ill-prepared to replace the balance of power as an 
“institution” of international society, but also provided an opportunity for Cold 
War tensions themselves to be played out under the rubric of legal argument. 
Thus, for instance, pro-Soviet or Third World states argued in favour of 
recognizing ‘economic’ and ‘ideological’ aggression, while pro-Western states 
insisted the concept of aggression be limited to military matters. A similar lesson 
about the degree to which the balance of power is reflected in and through 
international law can be drawn from another example of international legal
175
activism -  namely, the unsuccessful attempts up until now to further entrench the 
crime of aggression into international law, as examined in chapter eight. This 
example, extending across the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, shows that 
Bull’s insights are not limited to the specific circumstances of the Cold War 
conflict, but are applicable more generally. The way in which the process and 
substance of international law reflect prevailing international political conditions, 
as highlighted by these efforts to advance the concept of aggression, provides 
some explanation why it is not easy for international society to either coerce or 
attribute moral responsibility to an unruly member, as observed by Wight1.
(2) Morality, Law and International Society
On the basis of our conclusions from the previous section, one might be forgiven 
for thinking that it is realists, rather than international society theorists, who 
provide the best explanation of the concept of aggression in international 
relations. If it is accepted that the balance of power always wins against 
international law in the event of conflict, and if international law itself mirrors to a 
great extent existing international political conditions, then on these grounds 
could it not be argued that international relations is nothing more than power 
politics in action? Having revealed the practical and important role of morality 
and law in international relations, this thesis rejects this argument. With the 
support of favourable international political conditions, international morality and 
international law can and do play a significant role in international affairs -  a role 
that cannot be explained by reference to power politics alone.
Far from just a “mere figure of speech” , as Morgenthau claimed, international 
morality was shown to exert some influence over states and their behaviour, for a 
variety of reasons. The very fact that the concept of aggression -  with its strongly 
moral overtones -  has remained a topic of debate attracting scarce international 
resources since the last days of World War One itself suggests that the issue of 
moral standards in the conduct of international affairs continues to be relevant. In 
addition, there is some evidence that states themselves consider international
1 See p21 of this thesis.
2 See p!6 of this thesis.
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morality important for reasons to do with their international reputation. For 
instance, in chapter two, it was noted that the US Senate’s rejection of the Treaty 
of Versailles was phrased in the following terms:
“Under no circumstances must there be any legal or moral 
obligation upon the United States to enter into war... nor can
any opportunity of charging the United States with bad faith be
permitted...”3
From this excerpt, it is clear that by rejecting the Treaty of Versailles, the US 
Senate not only sought to free the US government of any potential international 
legal obligations to combat aggression established by the League Covenant, but 
also sought to avoid possible future damage to its international standing.
Concern about how their conduct would be judged in the ‘court of public opinion’ 
also explained why, at the League, major powers Britain and Italy sought to 
distance themselves publicly from the overt pressure they applied to Ethiopia 
through their communications about coordinating their economic leverage in their 
own best interests, as examined in chapter three. From a power politics
perspective, Britain and Italy were strong enough to sustain or intensify their
coercion indefinitely against weak Ethiopia through a range of means. Instead, 
Britain and Italy talked down the significance of their coordination plan to the 
League, before the League could take the matter any further. In 1926, any 
suggestion that two important League members themselves did not act in 
accordance with the values and spirit of the League would have damaged the 
public view of that organization -  and its transgressors - considerably. Thus, 
Britain and Italy abandoned their economic coordination plan.
This situation also provided practical illustration of a point made by Carr and Bull 
about international morality. In chapter one, it was noted that both of these 
theorists argued that to promote the survival of a particular international moral 
order, those powers which benefit most from that order must respond positively to 
some of the fair demands from those powers which benefit least4. In Carr’s
3 See p41-42 of this thesis.
4 See p25 of this thesis, especially footnote 69 on this page.
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words, “self-sacrifice” or a “willingness not to insist on all the prerogatives of 
power7’ is needed on the part of the great powers if some form of international 
morality is to flourish. Britain and Italy’s response to Ethiopia’s appeal to the 
League can be interpreted as one such example of their “self-sacrifice” in support 
of the international moral order created by the League. The collective decision in 
1998 to include a provision about the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute at 
the strong insistence of the state members of the Non-Aligned Movement might 
also be interpreted as the acceptance of a fair demand. Hence, on each occasion, 
the importance of international moral values as a rationale underpinning a 
particular international order was recognized through the response of the majority 
of states most advantaged by that order.
The significance of international moral values is particularly evident in the 
aftermath of cataclysmic events, such as World War One and World War Two. 
Drawing on worldwide moral revulsion to the excesses of World War One, 
Wilson strongly advocated a joint moral commitment to combat aggression by 
member states -  not necessarily a legal duty -  as the foundation for a new 
international system of collective security, as demonstrated in chapter two. While 
collective security failed in practice, moral distinctions once again took centre 
stage at the conclusion of World War Two. Once again, the Allied Powers had 
the choice of establishing peace in Germany on punitive terms -  which would 
mean summary justice for the Nazi elite -  or on a more morally sound basis. Yet 
another punitive peace might lead to World War Three; in any case, international 
outrage at Hitler’s ‘Final Solution’ and the limited ability of international law to 
prevent war -  as exemplified by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact and the 1938 
Munich Pact -  placed significant pressure on the Allied Powers to distinguish 
their own conduct in World War Two from Germany’s. This could only be done 
by reference to moral considerations, and in this way, the concept of aggression as 
an international crime giving rise to individual responsibility -  as part of the 
prosecution of top-ranking Nazis at Nuremberg discussed in chapter four -  
became a key element of practical response to prediction-defying misdeeds which, 
even in the extreme conditions of war, were morally offensive in terms of both 
gravity and scale. Thus, while the momentum created by public moral indignation 
to World War One was not sufficient to establish the strong international moral
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order envisaged by Wilson, worldwide moral outrage at the atrocities of World 
War Two did provide the impetus necessary to propel the further development of 
international legal rules and procedures for dealing with the Nazi elite. 
Nuremberg hence provides a relevant example of how international morality -  
backed by favourable political conditions -  can make a positive contribution to 
the evolution of international law.
While the Nuremberg example revealed what it is possible to achieve when 
international morality converges with law and politics in international relations, 
the Tokyo Trial demonstrated that, even when the “hegemony of power”5 which 
is a prerequisite of an international moral order exists, problems can arise. In 
chapter five, it was shown that despite strong, American leadership in the 
occupation of Japan, the moral, legal and political context supporting arguments 
in favour of the prosecution of the Japanese elite for the crime of aggression was 
much weaker than in the German situation. Nevertheless, the need to purge 
wartime leaders other than the Emperor from the top tiers of Japanese government 
in aid of the occupation of Japan dictated the establishment of the IMTFE, which, 
in its majority judgment, contributed little to the promotion of international 
morality and law, instead simply confirming the charges laid against the 
defendants. The important, supporting role played by international morality in 
relation to the Nuremberg Trial, and its notable subordination to more immediate, 
political motivations at the Tokyo Trial, perhaps goes some way to explaining 
why most Germans today regard the Nuremberg Trial as fair6, while in Japan, at 
least ten of the Tokyo defendants convicted of the crime of aggression are 
included on the list of ‘divine spirits’ revered at Yasukuni Shrine by five million 
Japanese visitors a year7.
5 see footnote 69 of chapter one of this thesis, (p25).
6 The results of secret polls conducted by the US and released in 2002 revealed that the majority of 
Germans felt this way from the 1970s: see ‘Germany Marks Nuremberg Tribunals’, 20 November 
2005, available online < news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4453790.stm>. Strong and vocal German 
support for the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute at the 1998 Rome 
Conference also suggests that Germany upholds the validity of the Nuremberg Trial.
7 The twelve defendants mentioned here include the seven sentenced to death by the IMTFE. One 
prominent and regular visitor to the Yasukuni Shrine has been former Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, who went to Yasukuni annually for the duration of his time in office. See 
Anthony Faiola, ‘Japan Honours War Dead and Opens Neighbor’s Wounds’, 23 April 2005, 
available online < www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10450-2005Apr22.html>; and 
‘Japan PM Visits Yasukuni Shrine’, 17 October 2005, available online:
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It might be argued that the majority of these illustrations of the practical relevance 
of morality in international affairs are quite dated, thus begging the question of 
whether international morality continues to play an important role today. 
Certainly, the way in which the concept of aggression has twice taken on central 
importance at the end of one international order and the start of another lends 
substantial support to the idea that one of the functions of international morality is 
to justify the existence of a particular form of international order. It may be that 
at times of international disorder -  for instance, at the end of worldwide conflict -  
the entire point of international morality is to provide, in circumstances where 
little else may remain, a set of principles around which a new international order 
can emerge. In this case, what are we to make of the fact that since at least the 
mid-1990s, the concept of aggression seems to have disappeared completely from 
the vocabulary of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, while it 
continues to attract mixed views in the context of the International Criminal 
Court?
This development would suggest that the declining relevance of the concept of 
aggression for international peace and security purposes over the course o f the 
twentieth century, as mapped in this thesis, has now diminished to zero. Instead, 
as demonstrated in chapter seven, the variety of post-Cold War matters in relation 
to which the Security Council has acted are usually described as ‘threats’ to 
international security, a term which plays down the moral reprehensibility of the 
originator of the threat, and in relation to which the type of international response 
is left more open. This is markedly different from the record of the Security 
Council and General Assembly during the Cold War period, when UN action 
rarely took place, though condemnations of aggressive conduct in the strongest 
terms by these bodies were quite frequent. The current disappearance of the 
concept of aggression from the international security context might also be 
suggestive of a heightened awareness in the Security Council and General 
Assembly of the controversies associated with many of the assumptions upon 
which this concept relies, that were identified in chapter one -  such as the moral
< news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4348280.stm>.
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value of peace; and the authority of the UN and its rules of procedure in
o
interpreting and enforcing international standards of conduct . Indeed, such 
disappearance might be indicative of a broader, post-Cold War shift in 
international moral values themselves, the new contours of which are not yet 
settled9.
At the same time as the Security Council and General Assembly entirely abandon 
strong, overt moral judgments about states and their military activities, this 
development also signals a political shift since Nuremberg on the issue of 
assigning individual criminal responsibility for the commission of grave military 
acts against other states. In particular, the complete US rejection of empowering 
the International Criminal Court to adjudicate the crime of aggression is a major 
obstacle, given the US’ pre-eminent international political position and the fact 
that it has, by far, more military forces deployed worldwide than any other state. 
Nonetheless, as shown in chapter eight, by 1998 the vast majority of small- and 
medium-sized states had no objections in theory to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the International Criminal Court over the crime of aggression. This support helps 
to sustain the ongoing efforts by international criminal lawyers to empower the 
International Criminal Court with this jurisdiction in practice, which were 
examined in the postscript to the thesis. The International Criminal Court’s 
growing track record in relation to prosecuting genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity; recent signs that the official US attitude to the International 
Criminal Court generally might be softening10; and new Security Council
8 Indeed, Adam Roberts, among others, has argued that “sooner or later the UN will have to 
address the difficult conundrum of its own democratic deficit”: ‘Order/Justice Issues at the United 
Nations’, in Foot et al, Order and Justice in International Relations, p79.
9 Supporting this suggestion is the debate which has raged most recently from the 1990s onwards 
about the so-called ‘doctrine’ of humanitarian intervention. Nicholas J Wheeler and Tim Dunne 
have argued that the extent to which states collectively regard humanitarian intervention as a 
legitimate practice is a “key test” of their solidarity: ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and 
Solidarism of the Will’, International Affairs 72 (1996), pp91-107. For a further discussion of 
humanitarian intervention more generally, see, by the same authors, ‘East Timor and the New 
Humanitarian Interventionism’ International Affairs 77 (2001), pp805-828 and by Wheeler, 
‘Pluralist and Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent o f Humanitarian 
Intervention’ Millennium 21(1992), pp463-489.
10 Jess Bravin, ‘US Warms to Hague Tribunal’, 14 June 2006, Wall Street Journal, available 
online, <www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2006/0614warm.htm>; ‘Four Years Later, US Sees 
International Criminal Court in Better Light’, 27 December 2006, available online: 
<www.iht.eom/articles/ap/2006/12/28/america/NA_GEN_US_Intemational_CriminaI_Court.php>
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willingness to use its peace and security powers to target specific individuals11 
might also help to create the favourable international political conditions 
necessary for making this goal a reality. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, 
it is only these conditions, supported by strong moral and/or legal arguments, 
which make possible the further evolution of the concept of aggression in 
international relations.
11 See, for example, SC Res 1735 of 22 December 2006, which imposes financial sanctions on Al- 
Qaeda, Usama Bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with them. As of 12 December 
2006, the list of individuals and entities on this sanctions list ran to 45 pages long: available 
online, <www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/! 267/pdflist.pdf>.
Appendix One: Results of the Nuremberg Judgm ent. 1946
Name/Count . Cl C2 C3 C4 Sentence
Goering G G G G Death
Hess G G I I Life
Bormann I - G G Death
Von Ribbentrop G G G G Death
Keitel G G G G Death
Kaltenbrunner I - G G Death
Rosenberg G G G G Death
Frank I - G G Death
Frick I G G G Death
Streicher I - - G Death
Funk I G G G Life
Schacht I I - - Not guilty
Doenitz I G G - 10 years
Raeder G G G - Life
Von Schirach I - - G 20 years
Sauckel I I G G Death
Jodi G G G G Death
Von Papen I I - - Not guilty
Seyss-Inquart I G G G Death
Speer I I G G 20 years
Von Neurath G G G G 15 years.
Fritzsche I - I I Not guilty
Count One; participation in the formulation or execution o f a common
plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity
Count Two: participation in the planning, preparation, initiation and
waging o f wars of aggression, which were also wars in 
violation o f international treaties, agreements and assurances.
Count Three: commission o f war crimes.
Count Four: commission o f crimes against humanity.
G = guilty; I = acquitted; - = not charged with this count Compiled From: Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: Germany, 1947).
Appendix Two ; Results of the Tokyo Judgm ent, 1948
Count 1: All defendants participated in the formuation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy between 1 Janaury 1928 and 2 September 1945 to
secure for Japan the military, naval, political and economic domnination of the Asia-Pacific, and for that purpose they conspired that Japan 
should wage wars o f aggression, and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements, and assurances, against any country which 
might oppose that purpose.
Count 54: Some or all of the accused ordered, authorized and permitted the commission of Conventional War Crimes.
Count 55: Some or all of the accused failed to take adequate steps to secure the observance, and prevent breaches, of conventions and laws
of war in respect of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
Some or all of the accused participated in waging wars of aggression and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements, and assurances against:
Count 27: China between 18 September 1931 and 2 September 1945;
Count 29: US between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945;
Count 31: British Commonwealth between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945;
Count 32: Netherlands between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945;
Count 33: Araki, Dohihara, Hiranuma, Hirota, Hoshino, Itagaki, Kido, Matsuoka, Muto, Nagano, Shigemitsu and Tojo waged such a war against France
on or after 22 September 1940;
Count 35: Araki, Dohihara, Hata, Hiranuma, Hirota, Hoshino, Itagaki, Kido, Matsuoka, Matsui, Shigemitsu, Suzuki and Togo waged such a war against
the Soviet Union during the summer o f 1938;
Count 36: Araki, Dohihara, Hata, Hiranuma, Itagaki, Kido, Koiso, Matsui, Matsuoka, Muto, Suzuki, Togo, Tojo and Umezu waged such a war against
Mongolia and the Soviet Union during the summer of 1939.
Appendix Two : Results of the Tokyo Judgm ent, 1948
Names/Counts Cl C 27 C 29 C 31 C 32 C 33 C 35 C 36 C 54 C 55 Sentence
Araki G G I I I I I I I I Life: Paroled 1955
Doihara G G G G G I G G G 0 Death
Hashimoto G G I I I - - - I I Life: Paroled 1954
Hata G G G G G - I I I G Life: Paroled 1954
Hiranuma G G G G G I I G I I Life: Paroled 1951
Hirota G G I I I I I - I G Death
Hoshino G G G G G I I - I I Life: Paroled 1955
Itagaki G G G G G I G G G 0 Death
Kaya G G G G G - - - I I Life: Paroled 1955
Kido G G G G G I I I I I Life: Paroled 1955
Kimura G G G G G - - - G G Death
Koiso G G G G G - - I I G Life
Matsui I I I I I - I I I G Death
Matsuoka Died of tuberculosis early in trial
Minami G G I I I - - - I I Life: Paroled 1954
Muto G G G G G I - I G G Death
Nagano Died of natural causes during the trial
Oka G G G G G - - - I I Life: Paroled 1954
Okawa
•
Sent to psychiatric ward on 1st day of trial; freed 
1948
Oshima G I I I I - - - I I Life: Paroled 1955
Sato G G G G G - - - I I Life: Paroled 1956
Shigemitsu I G G G G G I I G 7 yrs: Paroled 1950; appointed foreign minister 
1954
Shimada G G G G G - - - I I Life: Paroled 1955
Shiratori G I I I I - - - - - Life
Appendix Two : Results of the Tokyo Judgm ent, 1948
Suzuki G G G G G - I I I I Life: Paroled 1955
Togo G G G G G - - I I I 20 years; died 1949
Tojo G G G G G G - I G 0 Death
Umezu G G G G G - - I I I Life
G = guilty; I = acquitted; - = not charged with this count; O = charged but no finding made by the Tribunal on this count.
Compiled From: Brackman, AC, The Other Nuremberg (New York: Quill, 1987) and Horwitz, S, ‘The Tokyo Trial’, International Conciliation 28
(1950).
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